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ABSTRACT 
' The s t u d y d e a l s v; i th t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s tudy of t h e 
r o l e s of I n d i a and U.S .A. in t h e p o l i t i c s of t he I n d i a n 
Ocean. 
I n d i a n Ccean has become yery s i g n i f i c a n t as i - i s 
t h e key t o t h e seven s e a s . 
I n d i a n Ocean i s t n e t h i r d l a r g e s t wcc-an in t h e 
wor ld . I t comes a f t e r t h e A t l a n t i c and t i ie p a c i f i c u c e a n . 
I t i s s u r r o u n d e d by a number of c o u n t r i e s on a l l s i d e s 
l i k e I n ' - i a , P a k i s t a n and J a n g l a d e s h a t i t s i^pex, Junna, 
Ma lays i a , T h a i l a n d , o i n g a p o r e , I ndon ' ? s i a , an:: J u s t r a l i a 
on the £ a s t - . v e s t , i n c l u d e s I r a n , I r a q , S a u d i .vrabia, 
U.A.E. and A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t . S o u t h e r n s i d e h a s / x n t a r t i c a . 
The main c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e Ocean a r e .led Sea , i -e r s ian 
Su l f , .-^rabean Sea , Say of Benga l , Andaman Sea, uava Sea, 
T inor 'Sea e t c . 
G e o g r a p h i c a l l y i t i s t h e l i n k between E a s t e r n and 
Western p a r t s of t h e E a r t h . I t c o n n e c t s P a c i f i c and 
A t l a n t i c Oceans . Today i t i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
because 90/= of t h e wor ld t r a d e i s c a r r i e d o u t from h e r e . 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l l y i t i s "cast s u i t e d for t r a d e t h r o u g h o u t 
t h e y e a r . The m;OSt o u t s t a n d i n g f e a t u r e of th-e I n d i a n 
vjccan i s t h e p o s i t i o n of I n c i a . I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y l i e s . 
to a large extent, on the Indian Ocean and the freedom 
at the mercy of v;hichever country controls this Ocean. 
Besides trade and commerce, there is a concentra-
tion of oil reserves '..hich is of great interest to half 
of the western v-'crld. Then there is uranium, cold and 
diamonds deposits. From this hunter land and littorals 
U.S.r^ . imports 40 ra-.. materials like Uranium, Lithium, 
Cireonium etc. 
i'hese natural resources have cured the nations 
always specially the super po'wer there adventures and 
exploitations have created problems of serious. 
Itius the geopolitical, economic and strategic 
importance of the Indian Ocean has been historically . 
recognised. It has nov.' helped in determining the destinies 
cf tne countries of the reyion. 
Initially there was British domination but the 
innovations strategic weapons technology. The Indian 
Ocean v.as incorporated in the grand Oceanic strategy 
of the western powers led by the U.S.A. Thus the prophecy 
of geopolitical -hinkers Admdral•Mahan is true that whoever 
controls the Indian Ocean will dom.inate ^ s^ia. 
The s t r a t e g i c portion of the Ocean has a lso a t t r ac t ed 
the Western Pov^ers specia l ly U.S., France and Bri ta in to se t 
up mi l i t a ry base in the region. The s e t t i ng up of 
cornmunication centre i s Diego Garcia by the U.S.A. has 
contr ibuted to the predominant presence of U.S. in the 
region. I^ie s i tua t ion has also become vo l a t i l e for the 
sjper power r i v a l r y in 1968 v;itr. the enhancement of U.5.S.R. 
,on the Scenario, but i t s p lants to launch anti-submarines 
ar3 very uni ted. There i s a developm.ent of nuclear 'weapon 
namely poseidon andtrident which have jiven a vantage 
point to U.S. vath t h i s there is also a generation of ^L.-s 
(Under Sea auuched Missile system) vvhich wil l fur ther 
strengthen the U.S. s t r a t eg i c nucl-ar capab i l i ty , rtraerica 
has als:; achieved sophis t icat ion in surface vesse ls these 
nuclear powered surface vesels well rurtner consoliu^ace 
the s t r a t eg ic capabi l i ty of the U.S. In 1971 z'r.ey enetered 
Say of Sen gal to sho'.v of American strength to '.•."ard of 
India in the Indo Fak war. 
India i s the larges t country in the region of the 
Indian Ocean, i t s posi t ion makes i t a l l the mere s t r a t e g i c . 
India i s linked with the Indian Ocean. The defence of 
Indian Ocean i s dependent on the Indian sub-ccnt inent . 
Thus, South-Sast -r^sia and i-iiddle Sast they wil l depend 
for the i r defence on India. India >;as always subjugatec 
cy the Foreign Powers, thus remained under developed thus 
could not formulate a d i s t i n c t Oceanic po l icy . Seeing 
the importance of the Indian Ocean, even though tiiere 
r.ave been repeated please from India to count -it into a 
Zcr.e of Peace, i t has become a bed of super po'.ver r iva l r_ . 
The l i t t o r a l region of the Indian ocean has bscome a 
focus of the nevj cold war r i v a l r y bef.veen these super 
p c . e r s . There is a perpetual conf l i c t in ocath Jost .'--sic, 
Af-; nar.istan, Pakistan, India, I ran, I raq, ..est ' isia, 
Africa. Thgse super powers want to display iria;:i:r,u:n ;trer._t.. 
Thus the en t i re concept of Indo-Gcean as a zone of ^'e^ce 
has n u l l i f i e d . 
The efforts of In;-ia in t h i s connection were 
rewarded even though i t largely depended on the i n t e r e s t 
of individual nat ions. America, over here wanted to contain 
communism here also but with passage of time there were 
d i f fe ren t turnings and d i f ferent dim.ensions. The American 
involvement here \-ias increasingly vehement af ter the 
f iasco of the armed intervention in Vietnami. America, 
has, but, shared the desire to bring peace in t h i s area 
so tha t there i s an avoidance of competitive expansion 
of mi l i ta ry strength but she f e l t rha t U.rJ. declara t ion 
of Zone of Peace may affect the fundamental secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t s not only of Sta tes compelled to maintain 
s igni f icant securi ty preparedness, but, a lso of s t a t e s 
t h a t re ly on the s t a b i l i t y created by a p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y 
balance. The American policy seems to be c losely 
connected v.'ith i t s age old Oceanic concept which considers 
t ha t the U.3. has e special r i g h t to exercise he-emony 
on the world's ocean. I t also appears t ha t America has a 
de f in i t e desire to control the p o l i t i c a l developments in 
the Inrliap Oc^ -'-n region and to use th'=m to th" O:-!P. 
advantage ignoring the desire and the i n t e r e s t of '.-•ceanic 
region. 
America apparently i n i t i a t e d ta lk with ooviet Union 
regarding the future of the Ocean event then rem.ained cold 
to the response. They could j u s t accept tha t there should 
be the freezing of naval presence of the external pov;ers 
in the region at the ex is t ing leve l . 
In ; i a has her own fears , she thinks tha t i n s t a b i l i t y 
in tne region due to a number of i n t e r ac t i ons may lead to 
such super power confrontation which wi l l include the en t i re 
Indian Ocean region. Incia knows and understands fully well 
tha t the presence of U.S. c a r r i e s b a t t l e groups in the 
Arabian sea, together with U.S. base at Diego Garcia could 
lead to the Intel l igence shwaring witn Pakistan in the event 
of an Indo-i-ak war more p o s s i b i l i t y for in tervent ion on tne 
side of i^ax. Incia is also scared tha t the Saudi Arabia, China 
and other th.ird party may r ransfer U.S. mi l i tary technolocy 
and equipraent to Fek and t h a t American mil i tary sa les to 
China could affect the India , China mil i tary balance 
Specially in the Indian Ocean. 
Ind ia ' s policy tovvards the Indian Ocean i s directed 
by i t s concern for \vcrld peace and i t s ov;n secur i ty . 
Geographically, the secur i ty , com:nerce and trade, i t all 
depends on the [.reservatior". of peace anc s t a b i l i t y in 
the region. Seeing the Soviet presence American wants to 
cooperate in the establisluncnt of peace but i t does not 
agree with 1971 mandate of el iminat ion of Foreign names 
i n s t a l l a t i o n . 
Thus, a code of conduct should be created to vihich 
a l l rejoined and Sxtra regional countries would adhere. 
P- J ' ' '' 
^ 3^; both these countries in their respective spheres 
are planning a significant role. India v.ants the conversion 
of the region into a conflict free zone of peace whereas 
America wants a perpetual domination due to its strategic 
and its contribution into a field of Trade and Com.merce. 
* 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLES OF 
INDIA AND THE U.S.A. IN THE POLITICS OF 
INDIAN OCEAN 1968-81 
Thesis Submitted for the degree of 
Bottor of $I)ilo£iDpI)? 
IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
by 
MS. T41EAR ZQBERI 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1 9 9 2 
^ ' ^ ^ ' 
3 0 JliN t994 
CHTf^^^ 
or>nC T4415 
CHECK9^-^20(^ 
Prof , A. P. oharnia 
Chairman Oepartwent of P o l i t i c a l Scienc 
A l i g a r h Mualim Un i ve r s i t y 
A l i g a r h 
Ssptember 5, 1992 
This is to c e r t i f y that f i s . Nigar Zuber i , Lec tu re r in 
Uomen's Co l lege, Department of P o l i t i c a l Sciencef A l i q a r h , 
has cdBplBted her research on "A Comparative Study of the 
Role of India and the U.S.A. i n the P o l i t i c s of the Indian 
Ocean, 1968 - 8 1 " . She i s subw i t t i ng her thes is i n accordance 
w i t h c lause 7 , Chapter XXU of the Ordinances ( *cademic) . Her 
t h e s i s , i n my o p i n i o n , i s s u i t a b l e f o r submission f o r the 
award of the degree of Doctor of Phi losophy, 
^ ' ^ 
C O N T E N T S 
PAGE NO. 
1• PREFACE 
2 . INTRCDUCTION 
3 . CHAPTER - 1 
S t r a t e g i c S ign i f i cance of the Indian 
Ocean 1 t o 37 
4 . CHAPTER - I I 
Indian Ocean - A Zone of Confrontation 38 to 64 
5. CHAPTER - I I I 
F a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g I n d i a ' s Indian 
Ocean P o l i c y - Major fore ign po l i cy 
p e r s p e c t i v e s 65 t o 92 
6 . CHAPTER - IV 
India and The Indian Ocean 93 to 154 
7. CHAPTER - V 
The U.S.A. and the Indian Ocean 155 to 189 
8. CONCLUSION 190 to 200 
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 201 to 215 
•ir-rerace 
The study i s based on a comparative study of America 
and Indie in the p o l i t i c s of the Indian Ccean. 
'Indian Ocean is having India Pakistan and Iran in 
the liorth on the -jpstern side therf^ is Arabian Peninsula, 
the Sunda Islands of Indonesia and Austra l ia anf in the 
South there i s ^^.tarctica. 
The Indian Ocean i s tne t h i rd l a rges t Ocean ^'Jith 
i t s multiple resources, -because or these resources, the 
west and the liast have always -sliov.n a chief i n t e r e s t ir; 
the region. India, on the other hand has s t r i v e c to 
maintain peace in the Indian Ocean. India does have a 
Isrge naval strength but nothing compared with tne naval 
pc'wer of U.o.rt. The othi-r countr ies of the Indian Ocean 
areas are also not very strong in t he i r marine power 
-.vhich are in the L i t to ra l of the Indian Ocean. Thus 
Indian Ocean area remains very weak without much or a 
defence. 
The western countries with t.\eir presence in thd 
In::ian Ocean and their nuclear s t rength and t n e i r policy 
of intervent ion, Soviet Union to counter the ..estern 
move has converted Indian Ocean area in to a Zone of 
confrontation. India, has alv;ays taken the cause of the 
th i rd co-count r ies . This has made e f for t s to convert 
t h i s area into a zone of Peace. 
Indian Ocean region provides bet ter perspectives 
for Sco-exploi te t ion. The Islands of the Indian Ocean are 
also very important p o l i t i c a l l y . This has aroused U.o. 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t as vvell. one has t r ied to occupy bases 
having s t r a t e g i c importance in various countr ies , but with 
progress of time she ever withdrew them. The most important 
one bein'-; Diego Garcia. 
Th^ U.o.A. has been bas ica l ly in teres ted in 
es tabl ishing armed presence in the region with var ia t ion 
in techniques and methods. 
'Ihus the area has large po ten t i a l s for Eco-resources. 
I t has important t rade routes with s ignif icant a t t r a c t i o n 
to the U.S.A. and other outside coun t r i e s . This has a l l 
gone to convert the Indian Ocean in tlie pivot of the 
world a f f a i r s . 
In the corrpletion of t h i s work, I owe my gra t i tude 
to Dr. S.A.H. Bilgrami, £x-Chairmap, Department of P o l i t i c a l 
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INTRODUCTION 
I n d i a n Ocean t s t h e t h i r d l a r g e s t Ocean i n t h e wor ld 
a f t e r P a c i f i c and A t l a n t i c O c e a n s . I n d i a n Ocean r e s e m b l e s 
an i n v e r t e d ' W ' . At i t s apex i s t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t c o m p r i -
s i n g of I n d i a , P a k i s t a n and Bang ladesh . I t s e a s t e r n l e g i s 
r e p r e s e n t e d by Burma, M a l a y s i a n p e n i n s u l a , T h a i l a n d , S i n g a p o r e , 
I n d o n e s i a n a r c h i p e l a g o and t h e A u s t r a l i a n c o n t i n e n t , w h i l e i t s 
Wes te rn l e g i n c l u d e s I r a n , I r a q , Saud i Arab i a , U n i t e d Arab 
E m i r a t e s and t h e A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t . I n i t s s o u t h , t h e r e i s t h e 
c o n t i n e n t of A n t a r t i c a . Al l t h e s e f e a t u r e s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
make i t a ' l a n d l o c k e d s e a * . The major c o n s t i t u e n t s o f t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean a r e Red Sea , P e r s i a n Gulf , Arabian Sea , Bay of 
Benga l , Andaman Sea, J ava Sea , T i n o r Sea and t h e g r e a t A u s t r a l i a n 
B i g h t . 
I n d i a n Ocean , e v e r s i n c e t h e beg inn ing of m a r i t i m e a c t i -
v i t i e s , has been an a r e a of a t t r a c t i o n for both r e g i o n a l a s w e l l 
a s e x t r a - r e g i o n a l poviers b u t i t a c q u i r e d more i m p o r t a n c e and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e a f t e r t h e Admiral A l f r e d T. Mohan's p r o p h e c y : 
"wt-joever c o n t r o l s t h e I n d i a n Ocean dominates A s i a . The Ocean i s 
t h e key t o tfie s e v e n s e a o . I n the t w e n t y f i r s t c e n t u r y t h e 
d e s t i n y of t h e v.orld waj 1 be d e c i d e d yn i t s w a t e r s , " 
The geog raphy C t h e I i id ian Ocean enab le s i t zo accr-aire 
t h e i m p o r t a n c e of an I r t e g r a x -'"ink betvjeen the eas te r ; : ! ODG ^esj^e^i^^ 
p a r t s of t h e e a r t h . I t f u l f i l l s t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e main 
connecting l ink between the Pacir ic and Atlantic Oceans. The 
routes passing through i t connects, for instance, Europe East, 
Africa, South and South-East 'Asia, Far East Austral ia and 
Oceania, the Sea routes passing through the Indian Ocean have 
an extraordinary significance for the i r navigabi l i ty throughout 
the year. This increases the importance of various gateways to 
t h e Ocean: in the West via the Cape of Good H^pe, in the north-
west through the Suez canal, the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb 
S t r a i t in the east via the Malacca S t ra i t and fur ther South-east 
v i a , the Indonesian islands as well as post Austral ia to both 
the north and the south. 
The h is tory of seafaring in the Indian Ocean dates back 
to ear ly t imes. This i s especia l ly true of north-western area 
between Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Persia and the West Coast of 
I n d i a . This i s supposed to be the area in which in te rna t iona l 
i n t e r e s t i s pa r t i cu l a r ly concentrated today. Today more than 
90 per cent trade of t he world is carr ied by the Oceanic routes 
and the Indian Ocean located between world's t>o l a r g e s t Ocearis 
governs r a the r dicta tes the internat ional t rade . Every year 
about 30,000 ships , some 1,500 of them tankers passes through 
the Sea routes : through the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of 
Good Hope and through Malacca S t r a i t . On average two tankers 
an hour, pass through the S t r a i t o l Hgronuz forty ships a day 
through the channel between Mozambique and Madagascar and almost 
as many through the Malacca S t r a i t . About one- th i rd of a l l 
in te rna t iona l a i r routes also cross the Indian Ocean. Other 
than o i l , there are othc^r products of the area : minerals, some 
of them are essent ia l for mi l i t a ry purposes, which are transpor-
t ed by way of Indian Ocean pr inc ipa l ly to the United S ta tes , 
Europe and Japan. 
The environment of the Indian Ocean i s best su i t ed for 
navigation throughout the year with the exception of i t s Southern 
p a r t than other Oceans of the World Indian Ocean i s open only 
from one side i t s winds unlike of others Oceans are p red ic tab le . 
From the outside world, the Indian Ocean i s open at various 
places which make i t approachable from the At lant ic Ocean e i t h e r 
through the Cape of Good Hope route or through the 
S t r a i t s , Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and then 
through the S t r a i t of Beg-al-Mandeb. The most outstanding 
fea ture of the Indian Ocean i s Indian peninsula. The Location 
of India/ in th i s contex" holds out two complementary options : 
the Indian sub-continent being the central axis in s t r a t e g i c 
p a t t e r n of Asia can serve as a stupendous base and arsonal in 
the oceanic region, while Indian Ocean i t se l f can ac t as a v i t a l 
f ac to r in determining Ind ia ' s future secur i ty . I n d i a ' s s eco r i ty 
l i e d , to a larger ex tent , on the Indian Ocean and the freedom 
a t the Kercy of whichever country controls v'nis Ocean. 
From the p o l i t i c a l point of view, Indian Ocean may be 
divided into four quadrants having different problems, func-
t i o n s and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . The north-west quadrant comprises of 
t he Persian Gulf and the sea-lanes fanning out from the s t r a i t s 
of Harnuz and the Gulf of Oman. The north-east comparises of 
South-east Asia, Malacca and Sunda S t r a i t s and Indonesia. In 
t he South-western quadrant i s an unavoidable 
con f l i c t between the white and the black in the Southern of 
African continent . In the east-world Australia appears to be 
seeking ro le in i t s e l f in re la t ion to the is land people and the 
Asian mainland to the r>orth while retaining a connection with 
t he United Sta tes , 
Indian Ocean other than being an area of in te rna t iona l 
t r a d e and commerce offers vast sources of minerals including 
s t r a t e g i c ores both to the developed as well as developing 
c o u n t r i e s . Gocentrated in Li t to ra l and h in ter land s t a t e s are 
more than half Western world's prospected deposit of oi l# two 
t h i r d of i t s uraniun, half i t s gold and almost a l l i t s diamond 
depos i t s . From these countries United States alone imports 
about 40 different raw materials , including such ores as 
Uranium, l i t h iun , beryl l i on , zireoniura, e t c . 
The Indian Ocean assumes tremendous importance against 
t h e background of the fact that i t has large o i l -bea r ing regions 
on i t s coasts . The coastal shelves and other areas of i t s bottom 
acqui re because of the concentration of I ron , maganese, phos-
pho r i t e s metal containing s i l t s , brine and alumina e t c . Besides, 
t h e r e are p o s s i b i l i t i e s of discovering other minerals as well . 
The natural resources of the Indian Ocean region a l l u r e 
t he nations par t i cu la r ly siper powers. Their e f for t s to explore 
and exploi t mere resources not only crea te tensions among the 
big powers but also lead to provocations to the regional s t a t e s / 
culminating into conflicts of regional and in t ra - reg iona l 
cha rac t e r . 
* « * 
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CHAPTBR - I 
STRATEGIC SIQNIFICANCS OF THE INDIAN OCSAN 
The g e o p o l i t i c a l * economic and s t x a t e g i c importance 
of the Ind ian Ocean has been h i s t o r i c a l l y r e a l i s e d . In the 
a n c i e n t and medieval times the Indian Ocean wi tnessed commer-
c i a l t r a f f i c between India on the one hand and s o u t h , s o u t h -
e a s t Asia and Arab coun t r i e s on the o t h e r . In the modern 
p e r i o d the Ind ian Ocean dec i s ive ly determined the d e s t i n i e s 
of the c o u n t r i e s of the r eg ion . The sp ice t r ade of p r e -
Vasco de Gama years a t t r a c t e d the European powers t o t h i s 
r e g i o n . The c l a s h of i n t e r e s t s led t o the s p e c t a c u l a r econo-
mic, p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e involving Por tugese , 
Dutch, B r i t i s h and French. This f i n a l l y paved the way fo r the 
B r i t i s h dominat ion. The co lon ia l mode of product ion in t roduced 
by the western powers not only changed the socio-economic 
s p h e r e s of the coun t r i e s of the region but a l s o made them 
dependent on t h e western economic system a f t e r t h e i r indepen-
dence . This dependency s i t u a t i o n determined the economic 
r e l e v a n c e of the region for the European c o u n t r i e s . With the 
i nnova t i ons in s t r a t e g i c weapons technology the Ind ian Ocean 
was inco rpora t ed in the grand Oceanic s t r a t e g y of the wes te rn 
powers l ed by the USA. Coupled with t h i s the p rospec t s of 
seabed mining heightened the importance of the Ind ian Ocean. 
In f a c t geO' -poi i t ica l th inkers l i k e Admiral Mahan looking a t 
the future had predicted: 
"Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates 
Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven s e a s . 
In the twenty f i r s t century, the destiny of the 
world wi l l be decided on i t s waters." 
Hence a deeper study of the relevance of the Indian 
Ocean in contemporary in ternat ional r e l a t ions is p a r t i n e n t . 
To analyse ttie problems some categories l i t e geo-s t ra teg ic 
p o l i t i c a l and economic have been devised. These categories 
are not mutually exclusive, but for analy t ica l purposes sepa-
r a t e ly deal t with. 
GeQ-Strateqic and P o l i t i c a l Relevance; 
The s p a t i a l dynamics of the Indian Ocean in terms of 
i t s i s lands , s t r a i t s and embayed s ize mate i t unique. Unlite 
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the Pacific and the At lant ic th i s is a "land locked Ocean." 
North-western quadrant of the Indian Ocean contains 
v i t a l sea lanes, land mass and i s lands . The vast landJnass-
1. Quotes in K.P. Misra. Quest for International Order in 
the Indian Ocean, (Sombiiy, 1977), p . 9. 
2. K.M. Paniter , S t ra tegic Problena of the Indian Ocean, 
(Allahabad, 1944) . p, 14, 
Middle East/ Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and Norn of 
Africa - is geo-s t ra tegic and p o l i t i c a l l y s ign i f i can t . 
Arab-Israel conf l ic t has not only made th i s region 
p o l i t i c a l l y s ign i f i can t but a l so has drawn the external power 
to i t . An»erican support to I s r a e l and Business support to PLD 
for t h e i r f ight for a home land are cases in po in t . 
In and around the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea the 
turmoil centres in the Ethiopian realm: Vulnerable because of 
the inclusion with i t s boundaries of a l ien ethnic populations 
which harbour t r ad i t i ona l centr i fugal tendencies; coupled with 
the national l ibera t ion movement represented by Er i t rean 
guarr i las added signif icance t o the region. 
And in Persian Gulf the Iran-Iraq war and resurgent 
groups made th i s region p o l i t i c a l l y sens i t ive . Not only does 
i t have a strong bearing on the o i l prodiiction but a l so flow 
of o i l through the gateway of the Gulf - the s t r a i t of Norms* 
The t h r ea t by Iran to close the s t r a i t in the event of American 
entry is a pointer towards the grave future p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Equally the Arabian Peninsula is v o l a t i l e . The mobi l i -
zat ion of Uie People on re l ig ious and orthodox l ines for nation 
building purposes may not help logitimising the t r a d i t i o n a l 
regimes. Any time the revolutionary violence may e rup t . 
Geographically these (Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, 
Middle East , Arabian Peninsula) const i tu te one of the important 
regions in the globe. This is due to the locat ion of impor-
t a n t s t r a i t s , gulfs and o i l resources. 
The Bab-el-*nandeb s t r a i t is the gateway t o the Red Sea. 
And through Suez Canal, Red Sea is connected to the Miditerranean. 
Thus i t provides the shortest route to thie Rueopean par t from 
the Far East and Austral ia . Though the Suez route has declined 
in i t s s ignif icance because of the development of super tankers 
the commercial relat ions between l i t t o r a l and n o n - l i t t o r a l 
countr ies are maintained through this canal . 
The Gulf of Adan is the bottleneck which is created by 
the project ion of Africa and the south-eastern t i p of Arabia. 
The entry to this gulf is from the east s ide and is cont ro l led 
by the is land of Socotra. For ages i t had been the base of 
Arabs • 
The geographical importance of Oman l i e s in i t s Peninsular 
project ion to the Persian Gulf. The s t r a i t of Hormus can be 
e f f e c t i v e l y blocked by any naval power from the Peninsular 
p a r t of Oman* Since the s t r a i t is used for the passage of o i l 
tankers i t is considered as s t r a t eg ica l ly important by the 
western powers. The nearness of Baluchistan t o Persian Gulf 
reg ion makes th is area geo-st ra tegical ly s i g n i f i c a n t . I t i s 
because of the fact tha t the vo la t i l e s i t u a t i o n in Baluchistan 
is a; po ten t ia l th rea t to the oi l r ich conservative regimes 
of the region. 
The geo-s t ra tegic importance of the North-western 
quadrant of the Indian Ocean has been h i s t o r i c a l l y r ea l i s ed . 
Albuquerque control led the Red Sea choke point so as to domi-
nate the Western Indian Ocean. The American deployment of 
Middle-East Force (MIDFOR) in 1948, the e s t e rn suggestion t o 
ass ign s t r a t e g i c responsibi l i ty to Turkey to influence events in 
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Persian Gulf in favour of NATO power, the h i s t o r i c a l plan of 
l inking Iraq with Berlin - Baghdad Railway and the current 
Soviet intervent ion in Afghanistan amply demonstrate the impor-
tance of the a rea . 
The south western part of the Ocean containing islands 
and archipelagoes provide an ideal oceanic naval based in 
these i s l ands . Br i t i sh involvement t o form BIOT (Bri t i sh 
Indian Ocean Terri tory) , American involvement t o construct a 
fullf ledged mi l i ta ry base in Diego Garcia and French role in 
Malagasy t o divide the island for mi l i tary and s t r a t e g i c reasons 
a t t e s t to the geo-s t ra tegic importance of the region. 
3 . He was a Geopolitical Stra tegis t of f t h century, Protugal. 
4 . Albert Wohlstettr , "Meeting the Threat in the Persian 
G u l f , in Survey ; A Journal pf East-West S tudies . Vol, 25, 
No. 2, Spring 1980, pp. 183-184. 
Apart from the i s lands , the location of cape route , 
Mozambique channel and Simons town asser ts the in te rna t iona l 
s ignif icance of the region. 
Cape route connects the Indian Ocean with A t l a n t i c . 
Simons town provides a s t r a t e g i c place to guard the cape rou te . 
In fact i t is the cape route which during the closure of the 
Suez canal provided the only passage for the indus t r i a l i s ed 
countr ies of the Western World to es tab l i sh l ink with the Indian 
Ocean region. The o i l supper tankers because of the i r grand 
s i z e cannot pass through the Suez canal, hence s ign i f i can t ly 
dependent on th i s route . Thus the secur i ty of the cape route 
determines the o i l flow to the western coun t r i e s . On top of 
th i s the p o l i t i c a l equation between South Africa and the 
western world because of the r ich raw materials of the former 
heightens the geo-s t ra tegic importance of the a rea . Despite 
the c r i t i c i sms from the Afro-Asian countries the USA and the 
western countries have not severed the economic r e l a t ions with 
South Africa. The U.S. Assis tant Secretary of State for Africa, 
G. Mennen Williams, explaining the U.S. stand before the sub-
committee of the House of Representatives on 1st March 1966, 
s a i d : 
While cessation of investment might increase 
our c r ed ib i l i t y and influence with African 
countries in our efforts to encourage a non-
violent solut ion i t would ser ious ly handicap 
ODir a b i l i t y to carry on a dialogue with South 
Africa. I t would cause some damage t o our 
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economic, s c i e n t i f i c and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . 
This economic re la t ions between the United Sta tes and 
South Africa cJemonstrates the geo-strategic importance of the 
a rea . Partly because of th is the U.S. is not supporting the 
nat ional l iberat ion movements act ive in the South^^rn Africa. 
In the Eastern Indian Ocean region the conrplex s e t of 
s t r a i t s and ijslands (Andaiman, Nicobar, Cocos near Austral ia # 
s t r a i t of Malacca and Sunda) are s t r a t e g i c a l l y loca ted . The 
s e t t i n g up of a communication base in North West Cape (Austral ia) 
by the United States in 1963 s igni f ied the geo-s t r a t eg ic impor-
tance of the area. 
5 . U.S. South Afrj-can Relat ions, Hearing before the sub-
committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affa i r s , 
House of Representatives, 89th Congress, Second Session, 
March 1966, Part 1, p . 5. 
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The s t r a i t s of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean with 
the Pac i f i c . The trans-oceanic o i l Passage and the movement 
of submarines between the Indian and Pacific Ocean g rea t ly 
depend on th i s s t r a i t . The dynamism of the Japanese indus t r ia l 
soc ie ty s ign i f i can t ly hinges on the safety passage of o i l 
through th is s t r a i t . Historical ly the Japanese conquest of 
Singapore, entry of Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean from 
Subic Bay in 1971 and raiiitary ac t i v i t i e s r e la ted to ANZUS and 
SEATO ref lec ted the potent ial importance of the a r ea . 
The s t r a t e g i c importance of the Indian Ocean has been 
overwhelmingly determined by the location of i s l a n d s . The 
islands are sp^aresely populated and are away from the l i t t o r a l . 
From the standpoint of securi ty and from the s tandpoint of the 
l i ne of l eas t p o l i t i c a l resis tance the islands provide an ideal 
s e t t i n g for establishment of mili tary bases. Hence# the western 
powers namely the USA, France and Britain have s e t up mi l i ta ry 
bases in the region. 
The s e t t i n g up of communication centre in Diego Garcia 
by the USA and the subsequent plans to expand the f a c i l i t i e s 
with a view to converting i t into a mil i tary base has not only 
bols tered the nuclear s t r a t eg i c but also the conventional 
interventionisit capab i l i ty . This has contributed enormously to 
the American predominance in the Indian Ocean reg ion . 
In fact President Ford's s t a tenan t t ha t Diego Garcia 
i s not aimed against Soviet Union may be viewed in the 
6 
context of the American interventic«a3t c a p a b i l i t y . 
Another geographically important feature of t h e Indian 
Ocean is the peninsular projection of India deep in to the 
Ocean. This according to Sardar Panikkar "Changes the Charac-
7 
t e r of the Indian Ocean." The geographical cont igui ty of S r i 
Lanka t o the Indian Peninsula creates an ideal locat ion which 
can be seriously taken in any s t r a t e g i c ca l cu la t ion . 
The geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has 
been undercored in the U.S. act ion to deploy submarine launched 
b a l l i s t i c missi les . The b a l l i s t i c missi les deployed in Polar is 
submarirtes will provide invulnerable second s t r i k e capab i l i ty 
to the United S ta tes . The American act ion is the continuat ion 
of the cold war policy of the encirclement of Soviet Union. 
In fac t the Polaris operating in the northern reaches of the 
Indian Ocean could cover a subs t an t i a l par t of the Soviet 
Union and even that of China. The geographical proximity of 
the USSR to the Indian Ocean provided a s t r a t e g i c opportunity 
t o the U.S. 
6 . Quoted in Aswini Ray, "Geo-politico of the Indian Ocean",p.iv 
7. K.N. Panikkar, India and Indian Ocean^ (London, 1945) , p . 19. 
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The developtnent of second generation nuclear weapons, 
namely Poseidon and Trident# wi l l provide a strong s t r a t e g i c 
vantage point to the United S ta t e s . Coupled with th i s the 
generation of ULtls (Under Sea Launched Missile Systems) wi l l 
fu r the r strengthen the United States S t ra teg ic nuclear capa-
b i l i t y . These weapons (with far greater range as compared to 
the Polar is) if deployed in the Indian Ocean by the United 
Sta tes wi l l enhance s t r a t eg ic importance of the a rea . 
The Soviet entry to the Indian Ocean in 1968 was with 
a view to neutral is ing the nuclear threa t from the Indian 
Ocean. But Soviet capabil i ty to launch an anti-submarine 
a t t a c k is very much limited. This is due to the lack of tech-
nological sophist icat ion in the f i e ld of anti-submarine warfare, 
If with the evolution of the new technology Soviet Union a l so 
develops long range and anti-submarine a t tack capab i l i ty then 
Indian Ocean wil l be s t r a t eg i ca l ly s ign i f ican t for both the 
Super Powers. But presently the defensive capab i l i ty of the 
USSR in the Indian Ocean is no match to the s t r a t e g i c nuclear 
c a p a b i l i t y of the United S ta tes . 
From the Chinese point of view the Indian Ocean is 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y very relevant . As U.S. Bajpayee points out: 
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The growing contradictions between China 
and USSR if escalates further and the Chinese 
develop technological capabi l i ty to deploy 
SL»1S then the l ikely area of deployment wi l l 
be obviously the Bay of Bengal. Hence the 
countries bordering the area l ike Thailand, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and the islands in the 
Indian Ocean wil l acquire new s igni f icance in 
8 
the s t r a t e g i c matrix of China. 
Attempts to achieve further sophis t ica t ion , not only 
in the f i e ld of stibmarine but a lso surface vesse l s , point 
towards a grea ter re l iance upon the use of sea power as a major 
source of deterrence for sometime to come. In t h i s context 
the nuclear powered surface vessels will fxorther consol idate 
the s t r a t e g i c capab i l i ty of the United S ta t e s . In 1971 the 
nuclear powered American surface vessels. Enterpr ise entered 
the Bay of Bengal to show off force resortedly with a view to 
' r es t ra in ing* India in the Indo-Pak war. 
The nuclear powered naval f lee t enables the US not only 
to have a strong conventional in tervent ionis t c a p a b i l i t y , but 
a l s o to operate more freely, even in the far away Indian Ocean 
8, U.S. Bajpayee, o p . c i t . , p . 106. 
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in support of the Po la r i s , the Poseidon and the Trident 
s ubmar i n e s . 
Besides the USA, France is a lso Preparing herself t o 
bo l s t e r her s t r a t e g i c nuclear and conventional i n t e rven t ion i s t 
c a p a b i l i t y . Sive is operating in the Indian Ocean region. 
Hence there are p o s s i b i l i t i e s tha t France may increase her 
naval capab i l i t y in the region, thus making the area s t r a t e g i -
ca l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The o i l resources in the Gulf have a t t rac ted western 
powers to es tab l i sh s t r a t e g i c re la t ions with the regimes in 
the o i l r i ch region. I t has already been stated t h a t the U.S. 
deployed MIDPOR in 1948 claimii^ to safeguard her ' i n t e r e s t s ' . 
In subsequent years several measures were taken : Promulgation 
9 
of Eisenhower doct r ine , the support for the formation of 
10 Regional Cooperation for development, the supply of mi l i t a ry 
hardware and software to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, I s r a e l e t c . 
9. The doctrine advocates the r a i l ing back of communism and 
a policy of massive r e t a l i a t i o n and brikmanship towards 
the non-aligned count r ies . See R. Ramachandani, "Super 
Power Rivalry in Africa and the Indian Ocean", Foreiqn 
Affairs Reports. ICWA, Delhi, p . 140. 
10. I t aims a t pooling the resources of these countr ies under 
a regi6nal economic developn^-nt programme. I t was formed 
t o l i m i t American's d i r ec t mil irary commitment. 
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and the attempt to create a l l iance within local s t a t e s through 
Nixon doctr ine were some of them. 
The Western powers led by the USA argue tha t the m i l i -
t a ry presence in the Indian Ocean is necessitated because of 
t h e i r economic s takes , both on the high seas and in the l i t t o r a l 
As a matter of fact a large part of the trade and commerce 
including o i l resources of th i s area is d i rec t ly or i nd i r ec t l y 
control led by them. This is par t ly due to the pa t t e rn of t rade 
tha t developed during colonial e ra . But the mi l i t a ry presence 
cannot be a function of the economic in t e r e s t . I n t e r e s t s in 
terms of commerce and trade should be based on quid-pro-quo. 
Economic i n t e r e s t s cannot be butteressed by the conventional , 
orthodox coersive capab i l i ty . Events have proved t h a t even 
the western mi l i t a ry presence could not prevent a revolut ionary 
regime from coming in to power. Neither the Br i t i sh bases in 
Iraq and I r a q ' s membership of Baghdad pact could prevent the 
19 58 coup d e ' t a t , nor could the presence of Br i t i sh and Ameri-
can bases in Libiya ha l t the ccxip d e ' t a t , in that country in 
1969. Even in the recent past the American mi l i t a ry presence 
could not prevent the f a l l of the Shah of I ran. 
11. I t aimed to e n l i s t local armed forces to safeguard the 
U.S. i n t e r e s t s . See Cot t re l l and assoc ia tes . Sea Power 
and Strategy in the Indian Ocean (London, l98l) , p . 111. 
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Hence the economic in te res t s in the region c©n best be 
served by es tabl i sh ing commercial relat ions with the countries 
of the region. For instance the Soviet in teres ts in the I r aq i 
o i l resources in 19 71 was based on commercial give and take 
p r i n c i p l e . 
This may be interpreted "as a counter global s t ra tegy 
which coincided with some of the basic in te res t s of the bulk 
13 of the new s t a t e s of Asia. Africa and Latin America". In fac t 
the Soviet ent ry to the Indian Ocean has been in terpre ted as a 
defensive posture to cointer the increasing s t r a t e g i c nuclear 
c a p a b i l i t y of the United S ta t e s . Soviet Union's ef for ts to 
o f f se t the Western attempt to encircle her have been re f lec ted 
in the support to national l ibera t ion movements in Asia and 
Africa^ and in the signing of the friendship t r e a t i e s with the 
countr ies l i k e Iraq^ Syria, Libiya and India. I t has a lso 
been repor ted tha t the Soviet Union has es tabl ished bases in 
some coun t r i e s . But i t is d i f f i cu l t to es tabl i sh the v a l i d i t y . 
Baring the conf l ic t between the USA and the USSR the 
tension s i t u a t i o n in the Indian Ocean region in geo-po l i t i ca l 
and s t r a t e g i c terms has taken a different turn with the Chinese 
12. K.R, Singh, Indian Ocean : The Big Power Presence and the 
Local Response (Delhi, 1977) , p . 72. 
13. Rasheeduddin Khan, "Fall Out on India IS-Pakistan-China 
Axix", World Focus, 14 August 1983. 
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has influenced the resurgent groups in Africa and Asia. 
The Chinese thes is a r i s ing out of the Sino-Soviet 
ideological controversy, on the use of violence in the a n t i -
colonial and an t i - imper i a l i s t struggle* not only gave the 
Chinese an opportunity to project themselves as b e t t e r revo-
lu t ionar ies but i t alsD meant tha t the Chinese need not supply 
the insurgents with large quant i t ies of arms or heavy weapons, 
t ha t are not needed for the guer i l l a type of warfare. 
Accordingly the Chinese supported the PLO but ac t ive ly 
encouraged the popular front led by George Habash. The nat ional 
l ibera t ion forces in Oman, Arabian Gulf and South Africa were 
supported by China. The Chinese influence not only challenged 
the imper ia l is t forces in che area but a l so the t r ad i t i ona l 
regimes p>erpetrated by the Western support . 
French role in the Indian Ocean region to e s t ab l i sh l inks 
with Portugal and South Africa in 1950s and 1950s for economic 
s t r a t eg i c and p o l i t i c a l reasons amply demonstrated the support 
to the r ac i s t and imperial is t forces . Coi;^led with th i s the 
French mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean (reunion and 
Bijbouti) reinforce tte trench influence in the region. 
Thus there is a czu\pl-^x a i tuacion created in the Indian 
Ocean region by the involverrent of Super Powers and great powers, 
16 
The western powers support the conservative and r a c i s t 
regimes; on the contrary the national l ivera t ion movements 
challenge the Western powers' neo-colonialism and the t r a d i t i o -
nal conservative governments. This is spec ia l ly so in South 
Africa and West Asia. The f a l l of the Shah of Iran and the 
capture of Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia have fostered a fear 
psychosis not only amongst the western powers but a lso t r a d i -
t ional regimes. Hence to counter the national l ibe ra t ion 
movements, to perpetuate the t r ad i t i ona l conservative regimes 
and above a l l to enhance the s t r a t e g i c nuclear and interven-
t i on i s t capabi l i ty the US is ser iously considering to create the 
Fifth Fleet for the Indian Ocean. Coupled with the Seventh 
Fleet in the Pacif ic and Sixth Fleet in the At lant ic the Fif th 
Fleet wi l l enable to form a grand oceanic s t ra tegy in the second 
cold war period. This wi l l have a strong bearing on the s t r a t e -
gic importance of the Indian Ocean. As Rasheeduddin Khan has 
observed: 
Th€i other d i rec t manifestation of the second 
cold war . . . . . is the de ter iora t ion of the s i t u a -
t i o n on the Indian Ocean region. The U.S. has 
increased i t s mil i tary s trength in the Indian 
Ocean and has used events in the Norn of Africa, 
I ran , Iraq, Gulf and Afghanistan as jxis t i f ica-
t i on for not only the expansion and upgrading of 
the Diego Garcia base in to a nuclear powered 
17 
establishment, but has also recently created 
the central command/ coordinating among other 
things the activities of the Rapid Deployment 
Force, thereby transforming the Indian Ocean 
region including the Gulf as the vital inte-
14 
rests to the U.S. 
15 Moreover* the reported agreement for deployment of Pershing 2 
and cruise Missiles in I s r ae l seems to have drawn the Asian 
continent to the extended deterrence and the l imited nuclear 
war framework of President Reagan. 
Thus the geo-pol i t i ca l and s t ra teg ic importance of the 
Indian Ocean in contemporary internat ional r e l a t ions has been 
grea t ly reinforced. 
Economic Relevance? 
Agriculture forms the back bone of the countr ies of the 
Indian Ocean region. But the land population r a t i o is so high 
t h a t the food scarc i ty compels the countries to import large 
amounts from the external sources. The lack of technological 
14. Ibid*, p . 34. 
! = • TimP5 of India (Delhi) "Secret Missile Clause in U.S. -
I s r ae l Accord", Dec. 12, 1982, 
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soph i s t i ca t ion , f e r t i l i z e r and acJequate means of i r r i g a t i o n 
a re primarily responsible for the low product iv i ty . 
There is no doubt tha t the ag r i cu l tu ra l economy is 
having great niany problems but s t i l l these countr ies supply 
large quant i t ies of ag r icu l tu ra l raw materials to the indus-
t r i a l nations of the world. This is largely the function of 
the lack of sound indus t r ia l complex. Essent ia l ly the 
Western countries are dependent on the raw mater ials of these 
countries for t h e i r indus t r ia l sec to r . The operation of t r a n s -
nat ional and multinational corporations for the so-ca l led 
*natioD bui lding ' purposes further reinforce the linkage of 
these countries with western economy. To understad th i s 
economic linkage or the dependency s i tua t ion of these countries 
l e t us analyse the agr icu l tu ra l and mineral products of the 
region . 
From Table 1 i t is c lear tha t the Indian Ocean reg ion 
as a whole produces 77.3 per cent of natural rubber of the 
world/ 76.2 jjer cent of tea* 4 2 per cent of wool, 26.7 per cent 
of cotton l i n t and 19 per cent of coffee. The southern l i t t o r a l 
coun t r i es , tJie South Asia and Southeast Asia countr ies are 
the major producer of these cash crops in the Indian Ocean 
region; i t Is quite evident tha t they were introduced by the 
colonial poviers for the i r own benefit i . e . these were the areas 
01 
0 
n 
s 
*• 
s? 
CO 
A 
a 
0 
D 
g 
f) 
O 
0 
3 
H 
3 
0 
C 
0. 
H-
3 
vQ 
> 
n 0) 
V 
ST 
3 
> 
Ml 
n 
p-
0 
01 
• 
o 
w 
rf 
01 
ft 
»-• 
(fl 
ft 
o 
Q) 
5= 
0 
X 
to 
I 
(1- "O 
3'n> 
» •I 
o 
t (D 
0 3 
a i Q (t> 
0 
t-h 
>J 
- J 
• 
^! 
••9 
r^ 
o H 
o '.Z 
i>o 
i«o 
JO-
> 
g 
f t 
n 
o> 
0> 
1 
in 
o 
c f t 
or 
en 
01 
en f t 
^ 
01 
to 
O 
W 
0 
c f t 
3* 
^ 
*^ 
OJ 
M 
< 
(5 
CO 
f t 
0* 
1 
> w 
fti 0 
^ c H-ft 
0 3-
Qi m 
3 n 
3 3 0) M 
f t K 
H-f t 
0 rt 
8 ^ 
0) 
1 
P-
0 s 
1^ Z &s 
in 
h| 0) 
o 
VO 
•J 
to 
ON 
ON 
o 
o 
to 
u U) 
ON 
-J LJ 
ON K) 
*• CO 
tn 
ON 
\o 
to 
to 
fo 
00 
VO 
.p-
K) 
• 
o 
U) 
to 
• 
O 
(-• 
o 
• 
o 
M 
M 
o* U> 
VO 
U) 
8 
ON 
to 
< j 
•«j 
» 
VO 
M 
~J 
to 
IT 
ON 
to 
8 
1 
to 
a i 
LT 
OJ 
.(>• 
to 
O 
* • 
^ 
Ul 
ON 
to 
ON 
t-" 
o 
N) 
to 
to 
rf>^ 
OJ 
u 
M 
- J 
VO 
o 
ON 
• J 
H* 
tn 
O 
(-• ON 
A 
VO 
M 
^ U) 
VO 
C 
0 
0 
70 
K 
n 
•») 
K 
CO 
vr 
o 
8 
o 
0 
O 
M 0 
H- ft 
3 ft 
ft 0 
3 
to 
•^ 
^ 
8 
I 
§ 
VO 
H 
0) 
n 
vO 
20 
which were supplying raw materials for indus t r ies of the 
European countr ies . S t i l l the same linkage is maintained but 
in the form of indirect economic consumption. 
The level of indus t r i a l development has not changed s i g -
ni f icant ly aiid therefore/ these countries are unable to use 
them as the l^ase for t h e i r own indus t r i a l development. Further# 
for the successful implementation of planned economic programmes 
these countries need economic and technological aid from the 
developed nations of the world and t h a t is ava i lab le a f te r 
assured supply of these cash crops t o those aid givirg coun-
t r i e s . 
Besides these agr icu l tu ra l products, the countries of 
the region are a r ich s tore house of mineral wealth. The region 
produces 80.7 per cent of the world's gold, 56.6 per cent of 
t i n , 39 per cent of antimony, 3 2.5 per cent of crude petroleum, 
28.5 per cent of manganese, 25.2 per cent of n ickel , 18.5 per 
cent of bauxite and 18 per cent of lead. I t produces s i g n i -
f i can t amount of iron ore (13 per cent) and z inc , 12.5 per 
cent of the world's production. 
21 
Table 2 and 3 g i v e a r e g i o n - w i s e breakdown of m i n e r a l 
p r o d u c t i o n and i t shows t h a t t he s o u t h L i t t o r a l A f r i c a n reg ion 
i s i m p o r t a n t f o r c o a l , i r o n o r e , c o p p e r , g o l d , l e a d and manga-
n e s e , t h e West As ian r e g i o n i s i m p o r t a n t f o r p e t r o l e u m and i t s 
p r o d u c t s ; t h e s o u t h A s i a n r e g i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e p r o d u c -
t i o n of s e v e r a l m i n e r a l s l i k e c o a l , i r o n o r e , b a u x i t e , manganese 
a n d n a t u r a l g a s ; t h e s o u t h e a s t A s i a n r e g i o n i s i m p o r t a n t f o r 
MINERAL PRODUCTS 1971 
( thcxisand m e t r i c tons) 
Reg ion Coal 
I r o n 
Ore Baux i t e Copper Antimony Gold Crude 
P e t r o l 
S o u t h e r n 
L i t t o r a l 
A f r i c a n 
C o u n t r i e s 56873 7963 
West A s i a 431 1 
S o u t h A s i a 76107 
S . S . A s i a 237 
A u s t r a l i a 42493 
TOTAL 176177 
P e r c e n t a g e 
of w o r l d 8 .5 
1804 7 
-
24 861 
50872 
1 3 . 0 
765 
1301 
7924 
9997 
1 8 . 5 
925 
23 
10 
-
m 
089 
20 .4 
18.24 
0 . 1 
0 .12 
1.0 
0 . 8 
2 1 . 0 
3 9 . 0 
987 
0 .3 
3 .4 
0 . 0 7 
2 2 . 0 
1014 
8 0 . 7 
13000 
(UAR) 
614650 
7167 
3 7800 
2012 
6 74629 
3 2 . 7 
Sourccit Based on UN Economic S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book, 19 72-73 
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b a u x i t e , g o l d t i n , t u n g s t e n and z i n c ; and t h e A u s t r a l i a n 
r e g i o n has z i e b a l e p r o d u c t i o n of s e v e r a l m i n e r a l s . Among 
t h e c o u n t r i e s , s o u t h A f r i c a , s o u t h e r n Zimbabve, Zambia, Namibia 
i n A f r i c a , t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r e g i o n , I n d i a , I n d o n e s i a and Ma lay -
s i a i n As ia and A u s t r a l i a a r e i m p o r t a n t m i n e r a l p r o d u c i n g 
s t a t e s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n . 
Table 3 
MINERAL PRODUCTION 
( t h o u s a n d m e t r i c tons) 
R e g i o n Lead Manganese Nicke l T i n Tungs ten Z inc N a t u r a l gas 
S o u t h e r n 
L i t t o r a l 
A f r i c a n 
C o u n t r i e s 101 
West A s i a 24 
S o u t h As i a 3 
S . £ . A s i a 11 
A u s t r a l i a 451 
TOTAL 590 
P e r c e n t a g e 
of w o r l d 1 8 . 5 
S o u r c e t 
1070 
14 
575 
3 
440 
2102 
28 .5 
13 .5 
-
-
7.5 
1 1 0 . 0 
1 3 1 . 0 
25 .2 
4 . 0 
-
-
9 0 . 0 
8 .0 
1 0 2 . 0 
5 6 . 7 
0 . 3 7 
-
0 .03 
0 . 5 0 
2 . 0 
3 . 0 
7.2 
R.C, Sharroa, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l and 
t h e I n d i a n Ocean" , ( V o l . 7, No. 
138 
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7 
5 
507 
679 
1 2 . 5 
71 
8337 
3333 
4311 
265 
16317 
1.6 
R e g i o n a l Focus on 
3) P a c i f i c Coimu-
n i t y * 1976, p . 4 4 1 . 
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The m i n e r a l w e a l t h of t h e r e g i o n i s g r e a t l y d i v e r s i f i e d 
and s p a t i a l l y i t c o u l d be complementary t o p r o v i d e a sound 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r i n d u s t r i a l development . The Wes te rn c o u n -
t r i e s a r e h i g h l y dependen t on t h e r i c h raw m a t e r i a l s and m i n e r a l 
r e s o u r c e s of t h e r e g i o n . Hence t h e y have g r e a t s t a k e . The 
w e s t e r n dependence on such i m p o r t a n t i t ems i s shown i n T a b l e 4 . 
I t i s c l e a r l y s e e n t h a t most of t h e m i n e r a l s a r e e x p l o r e d and 
e x p l o i t e d i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n . Hence i t i s q u i t e n a t u -
r a l t h a t w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s remain dependent on t h e m i n e r a l s of 
t h e r e g i o n . 
TABLE 4 
WEST'S DSPKNDBNCS ON IMPORTS OF mPORTAKT ITEMS 
( I m p o r t s as s h a r e of consumption - a s p e r c e n t a g e ) 
EEC US Japan 
1974-76 1976-78 1974 
Alluminium 
Copper 
Lead 
Nickel 
Tin 
Zinc 
Iron Ore 
Manganese 
Phosphate 
Soxircet Phill ip Crowson, "The Strategic Dependence of the 
Industrial World", NATO's Fifteen Nations, June-July,1979, 
61 
81 
53 
100 
87 
68 
79 
100 
99 
85 
15 
13 
72 
83 
59 
36 
98 
Exporter 
100 
90 
76 
100 
98 
80 
99 
98 
100 
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E q u a l l y c o n c e r n e d a r e t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e T h i r d World 
which a r e dependen t on t h e Gulf r e g i o n f o r t h e i r o i l r e q u i r e -
ments . 
But i n s p i t e of t h e b o u n t i f u l n a t u r e * which c o u l d p r o v i d e 
a sound i n d u s t r i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e * t h e regiofi has n o t been a b l e 
t o d e v e l o p i n d u s t r i a l l y . 
I n d u s t r i a l l y i t has r ema ined a backward r e g i e s , t h e 
backward c o u l d be c o n c l u d e d on t h e b a s i s of s e v e r a l i n d i c a t o r s * 
p r o b a b l y t h e b e s t i n t h e p e r c a p i t a consuinpt ion of e n e r g y . 
T a b l e 5 g i v e s f o u r c a t e g o r i e s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean l i t t o r a l 
s t a t e s . Excep t t h e f i r s t c a t e g o r y a l l o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s a r e 
T a b l e 5 
COUKTRIES CLASSIFIED Oh THE BASIS 0 ? P£R CAPITA CQNSIMPTIOK OF 
OF ENERGY 1971 
( Q u a n t i t i e s i n m i l l i o n , m e t r i c t o n s of c o a l e q u i v a l e n t i n k i l o g r a m 
p e r c a p i t a X 
W o r l d ' s a v e r a g e i s 1,804 
F i r s t c a t e g o r y 
more t h a n 1800 
Second 
c a t e g o r y 
900-1800 
T h i r d c a t e g o r y 
450 -900 
F o u r t h c a t e g o r y 
below 450 
Kuwait (12588) , 
C h r i s t m a s I s l a n d 
(8250)* 
A u s t r a l i a ( 5 2 0 0 ) , 
Baha r in (4285) * 
S o u t h A f r i c a (2746) , 
I s r a e l (2154) . 
Q a t a r Afa r s arxd I s s a c s 
S e y c h e l l e s * 
S o u t h e r n Rhodes ia 
Zambia* I r a n , I r a q * 
S a u d i A r a b i a * 
T r u c i a l * Oman*Yeman, 
D.R. M a l a y s i a , 
S i n g a p o r e . 
Burundi and E t h i o p i a 
Keneya*iMalwai*Mali 
M a u r i t i o u s , Rawanda, 
Somalia* Sudan, 
T a n z a n i a , Uganda*UAR, 
J o r d a n , Muscat* anc 
Oman, Yemen, A f g h a -
n i s t a n , Bur :na * S r i 
Lanka* Ind i a* I n d o -
n e s i a , Nepa l , B a n g l a -
d e s h , P a k i s t a n . 
Sovircej Based on UN Economic S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book* 1 9 7 2 - 7 3 . 
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far below the normal ana roost of them have no indus t r i a l base. 
There are exceptions l ike India, Indonesia and Pakistan which 
have made s izeable progress in the indus t r i a l development but 
because of the high population density base, the impact on the 
per capita consumption of energy is less not iceable . The 
regional i ndus t r i a l landscape becomes more c lear if one analyses 
the figures for indus t r i a l products (Table 6) . The poor 
regions are those of West Asia and South East Asia insp i t e of 
the fact tha t they are very r ich ly endowed with mineral wealth. 
Table 6 
Region 
S o u t h e r n 
L i t t o r a l 
A f r i c a n 
c o u n t r i e s 
S o u t h As ia 
West As ia 
S,S. Asia 
A u s t r a l i a 
TOTAL 
P e r c e n t a g e 
of World 
{ F i g u r e s w i t h 
IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES 1971 
( t h o u s a n d t o n s ) 
Suga r 
3517 
686 
4751 
589 
680 
2269 
12492 
1 8 . 0 
• a r e f o r 
,S9\»r<?«» Based 
-«• 
t h e 
on 
Cement 
7136 • 
3948 
15302 
6 293 
1696 
4042 
38417 
7 . 1 
h b r t h Af 
Co t ton 
67 •». 
167 
1254 
77 
14 
28 
1607 
12 .0 
N i t r o g e n 
F e r t i l i z e r 
227 • 
103 
905 
131 
74 
183 
1623 
5 .5 
Crude 
s t e e l 
4 779 -^  
190 
6564 
85 
-
7016 
18634 
3 . 2 
r i c a n c o u n t r i e s of t h i s r e g i o n ) 
UN Economic S t a t i s t i c a l Year Book, 1972-73 
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India is s ignif icant in South Asian region. Similarly South 
Africa is the African and Austral ia in the South Eastern Indian 
Ocean region. The lack of regional interdependence in indus t r ia l 
sec tor makes th is region dependent largely on the western coun-
t r i e s . This ultimately paves the way for the economic explo i ta -
t i o n , which can be a t t r i bu ted to the operation of multinational 
and transnational corporat ions. 
The rapidly increasing population and growing scarc i ty 
of food further explains the increasing dependence on the western 
count r ies . Tlie Indian Ocean is flanked by Africa, Asia and 
Aust ra l ia . These countries lack indus t r i a l sec tor and so are 
largely dependent on the indus t r ia l products of the west. Thus 
these countries become markets for the i ndus t r i a l products of 
western countries» But the western coun t r i e s ' dependence on the 
Gulf o i l is s ign i f i can t . This can be inferred from the figures 
1 and 2. In figure 1 the import of Persian Gulf as a percentage 
of o i l consumption of US, Japan, France and Western Europe is 
given. I t is c lear from the figure that in percentage of o i l 
consumption European o i l imported from Gulf between 1964 and 1977 
grew from 60 to 64. For the U,S. i t increased from 4 to 16 per 
cent; for Japan i t increased from 60 to 78 per cent; and for 
France i t rose from 50 to 74 per cent . 
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In f igure 2 the Persian Gulf o i l imports as a percentage 
of primary energy consumption has been provided. I t is c l ea r 
t h a t in percentage of primary energy consumed European o i l 
imported from the Gulf between 1964 and 1977 grow from 24.5 to 
35; for Japan t h i s increase is. 44 to 58 per cent; for the U.S. 
i t increased from 44 to 58 per cent. The western countr ies take 
r e s o r t to mi l i t a ry , p o l i t i c a l and diplomatic means to bu t t ress 
t h e i r economic stronghold. As has already been explained the 
i n t e rven t i on i s t capabi l i ty of the US in the Indian Ocean was 
demonstrated in 19 71 when the nuclear powered en te rp r i se entered 
the Indian Ocean. The same strategy was employed during the 
' o i l c r i s i s ' period of 1973. "The USA despatched the task force 
led by the a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r Hancock into the area in November 
19 73, I t was replaced by another one led by Oriskany, in 
December". All these are pointers to the i n t e rven t ion i s t 
s t r a t egy employed by the USA to perpetuate i t s economic in te res t s 
In fact Admiral Elmo R. Zumwaldt J r . , Chief of Naval Operations 
(US) , s a id : 
The Indian Ocean has become the area with 
the potent ia l to produce major s h i f t s in the 
global power halance over the next decade. 
I t follows tha t we must have the a b i l i t y to 
16. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean ; Big Power Presence and 
Local Response N^ew Delhi, 19 77) , p . 184. 
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influence events in that area; and the 
capeibility to deploy our mi l i ta ry power 
in the region is an essen t i a l element of 
such influence. That in my judgement is 
the crux of the ra t ionale for t h a t we are 
17 
plannirg to do a t Diego Garcia". 
With the f a l l of the Shah of I ran, USA has taken several 
mi l i t a ry steps to consolidate i t s posi t ion in the Western Indian 
Ocean area . The deployment of rapidly moving force , e rec t ion of 
s t r a t e g i c command s t ructure and the s t r a t eg i e s t o perpetuate 
t r a d i t i o n a l regimes in the Western Asia are some of the measures 
to safeguard the western i n t e r e s t . The Soviet presence in Indian 
Ocean and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been i n t e rp r e -
ted by some Western observers in terms of USSR's o i l i n t e r e s t s 
18 in the Persian Gulf. But Soviet deal with the West Asian 
coun t r i e s ' o i l resources is based on conwnercial quid pro quo.^ 
Besides, the Indian Ocean provides the only warm water sea route 
t o connect the Soviet far east with i t s western p a r t . Hence i t 
i s economically and commercially s igni f icant for the Soviet 
17. Admiral R. Zumwalt, "Strategic Importance of Indian Ocean", 
Armed Forces Journal Internat ional (Washington) Apri l 1974, 
p . 28, 
18, James Hsi\iiig and winbder Chai (eds.) , Asia and the U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Praeger Special Studies, 1981), Walter K. 
Andersen, "Policy Towards India and Indian Ocean," p . 199. 
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Union. To sa feguard these economic i n t e r e s t s and t o c a r r y on 
s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h on the high seas the Sovie t presence in the 
I n d i a n Ocean i s v i t a l l y necessary. But un l ike t h e wes tern 
m i l i t a r y presence the Soviet presence i s devoid of i n t e r v e n -
t i o n i s t c a p a b i l i t y . Hence the re i s no t h r e a t pos tu re involved 
i n l a t e r ' s p r e sence . 
Apart from r i c h land and offshore raw m a t e r i a l s and mineral 
r e s o u r c e s t h e l i v i n g and non- l iv ing resources of the seabed 
underscore the economic relevance of the r e g i o n . 
The vas t con t inen ta l shel f of the l i t t o r a l c o u n t r i e s and 
the deep seabed conta in valuable resources such as manganese 
nodules which con ta in i ron, c o b a l t , n icke l and copper . In a d d i t i o n 
t h e hot b r i n e s of the Red Sea though loca ted a t depths of some 
6000 f e e t con t a in p o t e n t i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t amount of Z inc , copper , 
l e a d , s i l v e r , vanadium, molybdenum and i r o n . In a d d i t i o n t o 
t h e l a r g e s c a l e manganese nodules the ex t ens ive f i e l d of 
phosphate nodules represent ing a pos s ib l e measure new source of 
20 f e r t i l i z e r s has been located on the Agulash P l a t e a u . 
Beach sands and offshore a reas a re a c t i v e l y e x p l o i t e d 
because of the r i c h mineral c o n t e n t . Monazite , l i roen i t e , r u t i l e 
19 . James L. George (ed.) , Problems of Sea Power as We Approach 
Twenty Fipst^ Century (American En t e rp r i s e I n s t i t u t e for Pub l i c 
P o l i c y Research, 1977) , Date R. Tah i t i nen , "The Indian Ocean 
Region : A Region of P o t e n t i a l C o n f l i c t " , p . 125. 
20 . A t l a s of the Oceans (New York, 1977) , p . 153. 
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and Zircon are mined from beach sands along the shores off 
Kerala s t a t e in Southern India; sands rich in l imentite* r u t i l e , 
zircon and magnetite are extracted in North-fiastern Sr i Lanka 
and there is exploi ta t ion of beach deposits of planconite used 
in potash f e r t i l i z e r in Eastern South Africa. Cass i fer i te - a 
major source of t i n was probably the f i r s t mineral to be exploited 
on the seabed. Marine production of t i n is today concentrated 
mainly around shores of Thailand upto five miles from shore. 
C a s s i t e r i t e production off Thailand and Indonesia account for 
21 
near ly Jjth of the world's offshore t i n production. 
With such a vast po ten t i a l i ty of minerals in t he deep 
seabed the Indian Ocean has a t t rac ted the a t t en t i on of the 
technologically superior countries for mining purposes. The 
growing persis tance of the American presence in Diego Garcia and 
the looming prospects of deploying under water constructioiis may 
f a c i l i t a t e the explo i ta t ion of the deep seabed. I nd i a ' s achie-
vement in col lec t ing the polymetallic manganese nodules from the 
Indian Ocean bed and subsequent recognition by the U.N. law of 
sea conference as a pioneer investor have fur ther oper»ed up the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of large scale deep seabed mining. Sxploi ta t ion of 
the seabed resources by the western developed countr ies wi l l 
lead to the s e t t i ng up colonialism on the sea . Infect the 
explo i ta t ion of the seabed resources in the Namibian Coast and 
2 1 . Ibid. 
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and the possibilities of exploitation in Horn of Africa by the 
western powers has given rise to a fear psychosis amongst the 
developing countries of the region. 
As far as fishing is concerned Indian Ocean has occupied 
the lowest position in the world. But this is because of the 
technological and economic constraints of the littoral countries. 
Total annual production from the Indian Ocean has however increased 
from about two million tons in 1965 and about 3 million tons in 
19 74 and this rate of fishing growth measured in terms of weight 
23 
of catch currency exceeds tha t of any other major world oceans. 
The promising fishing opportunities in Antart ica and the g loba l i sa -
t i o n of protein deficiency wil l inevitably lead to the exploi ta t ion 
of r i ch po ten t i a l i t i e s in Antar t ica . In th i s connection the 
importance of the Indian Ocean wi l l loom l a rge . I t has been 
in te rp re ted by some western observatorsj 
Super power competition is not the only 
reason behind the Soviet Union's des i re to 
maintain a s ign i f ican t pressure in the Indian 
Ocean l i t t o r a l region. Probably the most 
important is re la ted to the Russian world 
wide fishing i n t e r e s t s . As Moscow i s faced 
22. Shanti Sadiq Ali , "India and the Indian Ocean", Foreign 
Affairs Reports. Vol. XXXI, No. 2 February 1982, p . 27, 
23 . Atalas of the Oceans, N. 20, p . 155. 
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with restrictions in other areas the Indian 
Ocean will become increasingly attractive. 
These fishing interests might be further 
intensified in the potentially rich Antartica 
24 
water. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o Say how f a r t h i s i s t rue . 
One more area where the Ind ian Ocean may become important 
in economic terms is the harnessing of renewable energy in 
Methanol p lan ts s i t e d in the Pers ian Gulf a r e a s . Because of the 
exces s ive requirement of the n a t u r a l gas by these p l a n t s they 
have t o be placed near the Gulf. The prospec ts of producing 
energy from these p l an t s a re b r i l l i a n t . The Japanese firms have 
25 
r e c e n t l y begun nego t i a t i ons to by i l d one such p l a n t in the a r e a . 
This p ro jec t if m a t e r i a l i s e s w i l l f u r t h e r heighten the impor-
t ance of the Pers ian Gulf a r e a . 
Thus the vas t expanse of the l i v i n g and non- l iv ing resources 
of the Indian Ocean promise a g r e a t fu tu re not only for the 
peop les of the l i t t o r a l but a l s o for the f a r off s t a t e s . The 
deba te on economic i s sues between t h e western developed and deve-
lop ing countr ies has assumed s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n s . Manganese 
24 . Jantes L. George (ed.) No. 19, p . 129. 
2 5 . Sisabath Nann Borgese and Nortorn Ginsberg (ed.) o p . c i t . . 
Ocean Year Book I , p . 133. 
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Nodule in t h i s debate may be held as symbolic force in favour of 
t h e developing c o u n t r i e s . This w i l l draw the Indian Ocean t o 
t h e vortex of the world p o l i t i c s . I t can be a s s e r t e d with 
emphasis t h a t the under lying c u r r e n t of the western power domina-
t i o n in the Ind ian Ocean is the p e r p e t u a t i o n of the n e o - c o l o n i a l i s -
t i c ambi t i ons . ThL<5 can be f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t e d by r e f e r r i n g 
t o t h e P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s s t a t e of Union speech wherein he s a i d 
t h a t U.S. would h e s i t a t e t o use any means inc lud ing m i l i t a r y t o 
defend i t s i n t e r e s t s in the Gulf and when Robert Tucker wrote -
26 
a f t e r t he o i l c r i s i s t he US should take over the Gulf o i l f i e l d s . 
Unfavourable demographic s i t u a t i o n , the underdeveloped and 
undeveloped cond i t i on due t o the log ic of c o l o n i a l r u l e , the 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s and the socio-economic pathology c o n t r i -
butes towards the economic hegemony of the western power in the 
Ind ian Ocean r e g i o n . In fac t i t . was the t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y 
of the 17th cen tu ry t h a t paved the way for the wes te rn p o l i t i c a l 
hegemony over the c o u n t r i e s of Asia and A f r i c a . And today though 
the p o l i t i c a l hegemony is over the same t e c h n o l o g i c a l sv;5>eriority 
has f a c i l i t a t e d economic hegemony. 
26. Quoted in P . S . Jayaramulu, "Super Powers and t h e Changing 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l System : A Third World P e r s p e c t i v e " , India 
Q u a r t e r l y , A p r i l - J u n e , 1952, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, p . 155. 
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Recent events in the Middle Bast t h e energy c r i s i s and 
the p o t e n t i a l for h o s t i l i t i e s in an a rea s u b j e c t t o chronic 
i n s t a b i l i t y have necess ia ted a r e - e v a l u a t i o n of US n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s in the Indian Ocean area» problems t h a t may a f f e c t 
t h o s e i n t e r e s t s and the adequancy of means now a v a i l a b l e for 
t h e i r p o r t e c t i o n . These na t iona l i n t e r e s t s which could r e q u i r e 
an occas iona l increased Navy presence a r e : (i) Free access t o 
and t r a n s i t in the Indian Ocean, ( i i ) P r o t e c t i o n of U.S. n a t i o -
na l s and ( i i i ) P ro t ec t ion of sea lanes and l i n e s of communication. 
These events and i n t e r e s t s are the b a s i s of a requirement t o 
provide l o g i s t i c support f a c i l i t i e s t o suppor t a t a s k force 
o p e r a t i n g in the Indian Ocean a r e a . F a c i l i t i e s t o be provided 
a r e the minimum requ i red t o support su r face and a i r o p e r a t i o n s . 
I n d i a n Ocean, t h u s , plays a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in s t r a t e g i c and 
space war s c e n a r i o . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g to note the broad p a r a l -
l e l i s m in the chronology of the development of d i r e c t a s c e n t HIT 
sys tem aga ins t the back ground of US s t r a t e g i e s and m i l i t a r y 
27 deployment in the Ind ian Ocean. 
1962; I n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n i t i a t e d for HIT by USAF Space Systems 
Div is ion . US Navy Pac i f i c f l e e t s t a r t s v i s i t t o Ind ian 
Ocean. 
27 . J a s j i t Singh, Indian Ocean in Global S t r a t e g i e s ; Some 
Pe r spec t i ve s , in Akhtar Majeed Ind ian Ocean : C o n f l i c t 
& Regional Co-operat ion, p . 44 , 
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1965-66; Diego-Garcia c rea ted as B r i t i s h Ind ian Ocean 
T e r r i t o r y , bel ieved t o have been done on US i n i t i a -
t i v e s . Diego-Garcia l eased t o USA for defence 
purposes a f t e r l oca l popu la t ion t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
Maur i t i u s . 
1969; USAF exploring d i r e c t a scen t ASAT C a n t i - s a t e l l i t e ) 
concept . 
19 70; Diego-Garcia communication s t a t i o n becomes 
o p e r a t i o n a l . 
1975; USAP purposes minia ture space IR boming i n t e r r e p t o r . 
19 76; Anglo-US agreement t o expand the Scope and r o l e 
of Diego-Garcia. 
1977; USAF approval §58.7 m i l l i o n c o n t r a c t for ground 
launched* d i r e c t a scen t non-nuc lea r ASAT. Concept 
of RDF c r e a t e d . Large s c a l e j o i n t N a v a l - a i r 
e x e r c i s e s including Midl ink-77 where US (with a i r 
c r a f t c a r r i e r s En te rp r i ses and Midway) . UK, I ran 
and Pakis tan took p a r t in NW Ind ian Ocean. 
1980-83; Diego-Garcia expanded as Maval a i r b a s e . The US 
Naval c a r r i e r t ask force deployed in Ind ian Ocean, 
l e v e l increas ing t o two c a r r i e r b a t t l e groups in 
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1983. HIT warhead on a combination of SRAM/Altair-3 
booster rocket launched from USAF F-15 a i r c r a f t . 
Space t e s t s of HIT ASAT s ta r t ed in 1982. F-16 a i r 
c ra f t operational with I s rae l and Saudi Arabia. 
1st Space wing of USAF Space command act ivated 
January 1983 at Peterson. AFB for managernent of 
missi le warning and space survei l lance network. US 
cent com formed on January 1, 1983 t o cover Indian 
Ocean region. 
1934-90: ASAT Missile with MHV (miniature hominy vehicle) 
weapon based on HIT t e s t f i red from F-15 on January 
21, 1984 in space. I n i t i a l operat ional capabi l i ty 
planned for 1987 with 28 weapons with one F-15 squad-
ron. Employment of weapon on European Tormado ADV 
Planned. Diego-Garcia expansion f a c i l i t i e s complete. 
Masirah/Oman build up planned for completion besides 
other f a c i l i t i e s in Indian Ocean. 
Pentagon expects to have HIT vehicles deployed to knock 
out s a t e l l i t e s a t a l t i tudes of 24,000 km., a l t i t u d e employing 
Minuteman of Trident-1 missile boosters . 
2nd Space wing of USAF space compnand planned to be a c t i -
vated in 1985 to function as space operation centre to manage 
s a t e l l i t e control centre . Misstar, l^avastar and space shu t t l e 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
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Indian Ocean region, therefore, forms an import and 
element in US p o l i t i c s of in t rusion and the concomitant mil i tary 
presence as par t of i t s global s trategy but i t is a l so l ikely 
t o play a c ruc ia l role in space and s t ra teg ic warfare. Meanwhile, 
arguments of Persian Gulf o i l and freedom of maritime navigation 
provide a high level of legitimacy to US build up in the Indian 
Ocean region against the backdrop of the larger looming Soviet 
t h r e a t and i t s presence in Afghanistan. 
In a s t r a t e g i c sense, the Indian Ocean is a d i s t i n c t 
e n t i t y . The enduring commercial and geopoli t ical importance of 
the region means tha t i t is unrea l i s t i c to expect the great 
powers to withdraw the i r mi l i t a ry presence, though some of the 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s wi l l doubtlessly continue to work towards tha t 
i d e a l . In an era of global p o l i t i c a l r iva l ry between the 
superpowers few areas of the world can expect to avoid some 
degree of improvement in tha t s t ruggle - however unwilling and 
involuntary t h a t par t ic ipa t ion may be. I t is d i f f i c u l t to 
envisage any future s i t ua t i on in which the extra-regional powers 
would f a i l to take an in t e res t in the affa i rs of the Indian 
Ocean. 
CHAPTER - I I 
INDIAN OCSAN - A ZONE OF CONFRONTATION 
i) The Thir(3 World and Super Powers • S e c u r i t y P e r c e p t i o n 
i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean; 
'Super Powers ' and 'The T h i r d World* a r e b o t h t e r m s , which 
i n v i t e c o n t r o v e r s y . I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y e x c i t i n g f o r t h e Super 
P o w e r s , t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e c o n t r o l of t h e T h i r d World . 
The Super Power I n t e r v e n t i o n i n c o n f l i c t s a r o u n d t h e T h i r d 
World i s of a d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r y of a n a l y s i s b e c a u s e of a number of 
f a c t o r s . T h e i r i n t e r v e n t i o n c o m b i n a t i o n of s e v e r a l syndrome 
depends on t h e i r G e o g r a p h i c a l r emotenes s a l s o from t h e a c t u a l 
s p h e r e of c o n f l i c t . But t h i s does n o t f u l l y e x p l a i n t h e p h e n o -
menon. Th^ Super Powers - The T h i r d World r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n i t s 
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic m a n i f e s t a t i d i n s , d i s p l a y s an 
i n e q u a l i t y i n power. Q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , t h i s i n e q u a l i t y i s s o g r e a t 
t h a t i t assumes a q u a l i t a t i v e d imens ion a l s o . The power d i s t r i -
b u t i o n i n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m i s s o r i g i d t h a t t h e p o s t -
194 5 , h i e r a r c h y has remained i n t a c t even t o d a y . Super power 
I n t e r v e n t i o n i n t he T h i r d World i s p a r t of t h e i r g l o b a l s t r a t e g y 
t o m a i n t a i n t h i s i n e q u a l i t y . As two p e r c e p t i v e T h i r d World 
s c h o l a r s have p o i n t e d o u t , " t o f i g h t o u t t h e i r b a t t l e s i n t h e 
T h i r d World i s one way of e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e i r own wor lds a r e n o t 
t o u c h e d by t h e i r c o n f l i c t s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e needs of t h e i r 
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r e l a t i onsh ips" , and "whereas the old imperial motto was 'Disarm 
the natives and f ac i l i t a t e c o n t r o l ' , the now imperial cunning has 
t r a n s l a t e d i t into 'Arm the natives and consolidate dependency*. 
While the big powers once regarded i t as p rof i t ab le to modernise 
2 
' t r i b a l warfare' - with l e tha l weapons". If these two arguments 
are put together we would have a more deeper understanding of 
the ra t iona ls for great power intervention in the Third World. 
The Indian Ocean is different from the others in tha t i t 
is landlocked in the north and does not extend into the cold 
regions towards South. The northern entrance are control led by 
narrow and easi ly monitorable waters, and i t s reaches in the 
South are far thest away from the Super Powers. Thus, whichever 
power controls the Suez canal , the Malacca S t r a i t s , the Cape of 
Good Hope; and the Australian waters can exercise s izeable 
influence over the Indian Ocean region. In t e r e s t i ng ly , i t s physical 
configuration is such that i t can be used for s t r a t e g i c weapon 
deployment against the vast mixed European & Ar ia t i c descent 
euras ian mass of the Soviet Union but cannot be used agains t the 
USA which is altogether in a di f ferent hemisphere. The Indian 
1. S i s i r Gupta» "Great Power Relations World Order and 
the Third World", Foreign Affairs Reports, July-Aug, 
2 . Ali A. Mazrui, "The Barrel of the Gun and the The Barrel 
of the Oil", Alternat ives, May 1978, p . 4 74. 
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Ocean is a l so an ocean of the non-aligned and developing count r ies . 
Among i t s Thir ty-s ix l i t t o r a l and Eleven hinterland countries only 
South Africa/ Austral ia and I s rae l are developed countries* and 
excepting these three and Thailand the res t are non-aligned coun-
t r i e s . On the other hand, i t should be kept in mind tha t nearly 
s i x hundred and fourty b i l l i on bar re l s , or more than 55% of the 
world 's o i l is to be found in the West Asian region. Resources 
of the Indian Ocean area, by and large s t i l l exploited not by 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s but outside powers. 
Some a r t i f i c i a l l y created local conflicts were used by the 
big powers to extend the i r presence in the Indian Ocean, to s u i t 
t h e i r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . These s t ra tegic i n t e r e s t s centred 
around the importance of th i s region in the global balance of 
power. As Admiral Zumwalt Chief of U.S. Naval Operations points 
out : "The Indian Ocean has become the area with the po ten t ia l to 
produce major sh i f t s in the global power balance over the next 
decade. I t follows tha t we have the ab i l i ty t o influence events 
in the region is an essen t i a l element of such inf luence. That, in 
my judgement, is the crux of the ra t ional for what we are planing 
t o do a t Diego Garcia". Because of such perceptions, the Indian 
Admiral Slmo R. Zumwalt, "Strategic Importance of Indian 
Oce*n", Armed Forces Journal International , Washington, 
April 1974, p . 28. 
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Ocean l i t t o r a l region has become the focus of a new cold war 
r i v a l r y between the Super Powers. Because of conf l ic t s and 
tens ions in Afghanistan, India-Pakistan, I ran-I raq , West Asia, 
Horn of Africa and Southern Africa and between the Super powers 
ge t an opportunity to focus presence in the region by proxy. 
The Indian Ocean assumed strategic importance from the 
e a r l y s i x t i e s , when in the war-planning a s t r a t e g i c t r i a l s was 
introduced, consist ing of nuclear missile submarines. I n t e r - c o n t i -
nenta l b a l l i s t i c Missile and the long-range bomber. After the 
o i l embargo of 1973, th i s significance becanie more acute . By 
t h i s t ime, the US had shif ted emphases from land-based t o sea-based 
s t r a t e g i c nuclear s t r i k e systems. The value of t h i s approach was 
t h a t the sea-based nuclear s t r i ke system could be withheld and 
preserved from f i r s t nuclear exchange and then used to influence 
the subsequent stages of a war. This was a s h i f t in the US 
s t r a t e g i c planning and major Soviet Union needed and equal sea -
based nuclear s t r i k e capabi l i ty to preserve i t s s t r a t e g i c r e se rve . 
This would involve and extension of the operational concepts 
4 
and the Soviets navy subsequent shif t to forward deployment. 
4 . Michael McWire, "A Neo Trend in the Soviet Naval Development", 
IPSA Journal , October-December 1^80. 
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Developments in the Indian Ocean are to be analyzed in 
t he perspective of a geographical factor tha t the Soviet Union 
dominates the Eurasian landmass, is c loser to the Indian Ocean 
and that i t has intervened in one of the l i t t o r a l s t a tes* i . e . 
Afghanistan. Whereas there is no doubt t h a t the Soviet power 
on the Eurasian landmass has a v i t a l bearing on the issues 
r e l a t i n g to the Indian Ocean and i t s l i t t o r a l * yet the U.S. 
exp lo i t a t ion of the geography of Indian Ocean to turn the area 
i n t o an asymmetric deployment zone of i t s s t r a t e g i c arsenal wi l l 
adversely affect the Soviet secur i ty perceptions and p o l i c i e s . 
i i ) Arms Race in the Indian Ocean Area; 
The l i t t o r a l of the Indian Ocean has become the main 
focus of a new cold war Rivalry between the two Super Powers. 
In the region there are conf l ic t s in South-West Asia, Afghanis-
t a n , Iran-Iraq/ West Asia, Horn of Africa and South Africa. 
Arms are being pumped by the major arm si;5)pliers to the countr ies 
5 in the North Western Indian Ocean area . The en t i r e concept of 
the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was being nu l l i f i ed by t h i s 
exa l t a t i on of military preparation for instance in the waJ«e of 
5 . Proceedings of Seminar on Indian Ocean : As a Zone of 
Peace, December 1980, Indian In terna t ional Centre* 
New Delhi. 
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I ran- I raq war* a t one time, there were in the ocean three 
a i r - c r a f t c a r r i e r s with nuclear weapons on board, besides f l ee t s of 
number of ext ra regional powers to counter this t h rea t / the 
conference of the Foreign minister ninety one Non-aligned 
members of the UN together with Palestine Liberation Organisation 
and South West Africa People's Organisation meeting in Delhi from 
Feb. 9 - 1 3 , 1981. Expressed serious concern over the dangerous 
tens ion in the area, caused by the expansion of foreign bases, 
mi l i t a ry i n s t a l l a t i o n disposi t ion of nuclear weapons, and weapons 
of mass dest ruct ion and warned of the dangers of any act ions thfit 
would provide pretext for the intervention by the 5uper Powers. 
From the e a r l i e r 1960's the naval Arms began between the 
two Super Powers which was tr iggered off by the advent of the 
weapon system based upon Nuc3eer Propulsion and Submarine Launched 
B a l l i s t i c Missile (SLBM) (Science dealing with p r o j e c t i l e (bullets) 
with the perfect ion in 1962 of the Polaris Missi le with a range 
of 2002 - 2,500 no t t i ca l miles and the establishment in 1967, the 
North-western Cape of Australia of a very low frequency communi-
ca t ion bases, i t was obvious that US was planning t o develop 
c a p a b i l i t i e s to deploy these weapons in the Indian Ocean unless 
t h i s system is replaced by the Under Sea Long Ranges Missile 
System (ULMS) and tnere are no indications that i t is being 
6, Times of India , February 14, 1981. 
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rep laced j i s t now - any reduc t ion in the s t r a t e g i c nuc lear 
7 
weapons system in the Indian Ocean i s not f o r e s e e n . 
A Soviet response t o the US cha l l enges in the form of 
g 
Sovie t navy in the ocean came about in 1968. Ac tua l ly the 
r e v e r s a l of t h e Soviet po l i cy had s t a r t e d t ak ing shape from 
1961 and t h a t was a response t o the r ap id b u i l d up of both 
s t r a t e g i c and conventional forces announced by P r e s i d e n t Kennedy» 
9 
soon a f t e r h;Ls occupation of the August Office in 1961 . The 
Sovie t Union had no t a s t e with apprehension the s h i f t in US 
emphasis from land based t o sea based s t r a t e g i c Nuclear S t r i k e 
System. The Soviet Union f e l t t h a t i t would need a matching sea 
based nuclear s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the s t r a t e g i c 
r e s e r v e and secondly the development of some means coun te r ing the 
US system because a son based syst:f=!m could be used t o deny the 
use of p ressure of Europe as an a l t e r n a t i v e socio-economic base 
10 in the post-exchange phase of a war. The i n i t i a l Sov ie t 
response was t o extend the ou te r defence, zone t o 1500 n a u t i c a l 
7 . K,R. Singh, The Indian Ocean, 1977, p . 171 . 
8. K. Subramanyam "Ebb and Flow of Power in the Ind ian Ocean", 
USI Jou rna l , Jan-March, 1968. 
9 . R.T. Wilson - Ngval M i s s i l e s S i t u a t i o n , London, 1972, p . 225. 
10 . Far Eastern Econoroic Review, 27 May 1974, p . 3 1 . 
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miles c i r c l e s from Moscow, covering the threat from c a r r i e r 
s t r i k e force sstationed in the Norwegian sea and the Eastern 
Mediterranean/ and secondly the extension of the area of naval 
concern upto 2500 N.M,, c i r c l e of th rea t , thus including the 
Eastern half of the North At lant ic and the Northern Half of 
the Arabian Sea. 
President Brezhnev can relevantly be quoted in the commu-
n i s t party conference for arms control agreement in respect of 
submarines. He sa id , "we are prepared to come t o term on l imi -
t i ng the deployment of new submarines - Ohio type by the U.S.A. 
and the s imi lar ones by the ISSR. We could also fligree to banning 
modernisation of ex i s t ing Ba l l i s t i c Missile and Development of 
12 
new ones for these submarines. 
Brezhnev was wanting to solve the problems, so he proposed 
again in 19 71 t o discuss the naval forces of the Super Powers 
present away from t h e i r respective coasts in the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Indian Ocean. Even e a r l i e r in 1968 the USSR proposed 
t h a t agreement be reached for the cessation of pa t ro l by Nuclear-
Armed Submarines in areas where the borders of p a r t i e s to the 
agreement are within a range of the i r miss i les . These proposal* 
11• Michael McCoy, "A New Trend in Soviet Naval Development, 
IDSA Journal , Oct-Dec. 1980. 
12. Brezhnev's speech to 26th CSPS Congress, Tintes of India , 
Feb. 25, 1981. 
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did not yield any positive consequences. President Reagon also 
made some proposals recently to decrease the strategic warheads 
but the proposition was limited to land based weapons. 
In the year 1977, there was a discussion between the two 
major powers related to the freezing of military in the Indian 
Ocean did predict something but the talk was suspended in 1978 
on the pretext of Soviet support to Ethiopia in the war with 
Somalia and the presence of Cuban forces in the Horn of Africa. 
There was some hope of peace in the Indian Ocean when 
discussions commenced between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 1977 
on limitation and freezing military presence in the Indian Ocean 
But, soon, these discussions were suspended* in February 1978, 
by the U.S. because of Soviet support to Ethiopia in the war with 
Somalia and the presence of Cuban forces in the Horn of Africa. 
There is a real problem for the Soviet navy in the face of 
meeting the threat nuclear missiles of the United States. Strate-
gically speaking the problem is not of locating or identifying 
13. Sipri Year Book, 1972, pp. 553-54. 
14. Richard A. Best, Indian Ocean Arms Control, UDite<j Naval 
Institute Proceedings. Feb. 1980. 
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an American submarine in the Indian Ocean i . e . r e l a t i ve ly easy. 
The rea l problem is u t i l i z i n g i t in peace time and destroying i t 
in the war time. The POLARIS can go as deep as 2#000 f t . under 
the sea, can remain there for a long period and can achieve a 
very fas t speed. To constantly back i t Is p rac t i ca l ly impossible. 
The Soviet Navy could only keep in contact with i t constantly and 
through t h i s close proximity could eliminate i t if and when 
necessary. This can be done by constantly s ta t ioning a s u f f i -
c i e n t force of detroyers , Frigades Hunter Kil ler submarines, 
anti-submarines hel icopters in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet 
presence in the Bab-al-Handab area, can p*rt ly be explained by 
these s t r a t e g i c considera t ions . From th i s point the Soviet Union 
may expect to neut ra l ize the U.S. naval presence in the Arabian 
and the Red Seas. Comparing the naval capab i l i t i e s of the two 
Super powers in the Indian Ocean area i t . i s obvious tha t the U.S.A. 
has several adbantages over the U.S.S.R. Besides the a i r - c r a f t 
c a r r i e r s the U.S.A. has two communications bases in Diego-Garcia 
and Austral ia , to f a c i l i t a t e the operation of deep submerged 
ves se l s . So far there are no reports tha t the Soviet Itoion a lso 
enjoys the f a c i l i t i e s for a Very low Frequency Conrounication 
(VLFC) . Similarly, whereas the U.S.A. and the Al l i es can operate 
from almost any point in the Indian Ocean — Aus t r a l i s , Thailand, 
Pakistan, Maldives, Bahrain, Masira, South Africa and many Bri t ish 
Islands in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union a t the most can 
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operate from the one corner of the Indian Ocean i . e . Somalia and 
15 South Yemen. 
In 1979/ the Congressional Research Service for the U.S. 
Senate Connmittee on Foreign Relations prepared a r e p o r t . "United 
States Foreign Policy objectives and overseas Mi l i t a ry I n s t a l a -
t i ons" , and i t s t a t e s : "The U.S. has both a conventional and 
perhaps a careful planning to meet an end in the Indian Ocean 
region. Mili tary Objectives for U.S. conventional forces include 
the capabi l i ty t o (i) protect U.S. Economic i n t e r e s t s in the 
Persian Gulf regions, ( i i ) employ or threaten force in support of 
U.S. deplomatic objectives in the Middle East/ ( i i i ) secure the 
Indian Ocean a i r and sea routes against harrassment of i n t e r d i c -
t ion , (iv) intervene in support of other objectives in the l i t t o r a l / 
and \v) r e l a t i ve to a l l of these balance Soviet forces in the 
region a t t a i n super ior i ty in the c r i s i s . The United States a lso 
possesses a potent ia l s t r a t e g i c nuclear mi l i t a ry object ive of 
deploying, when necessary or convenient, b a l l e s t i c missi le 
submarines targated on the U.S.S.R." 
15. Department of State Bullet in. 79(1815) , 8th Apr i l , 1974. 
16. Foreign Affairs and National Defence, Congressional 
Research Service, United States Foreign Policy Objectives 
and Overseas Mil i tary Instal lfci ions, Washington 1979, 
Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relat ions. 
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The United States Air Force s a t e l l i t e tracking Stat ion 
a t Mahe, which serves as a comtnunicfction link, between Diego-
Garcia and other U.S. bases. The Diego Garcia base has crucia l 
communication f a c i l i t i e s t ha t enable the Poseidon and Trident 
Submarines to operate effect ively from th is a rea . The a i r base 
on t h i s Is land makes i t possible for the shore-based a n t i -
submarine and maritime reconnaissance planes (P3c Orien and 
SR-71) t o gather reconnaissance and patrol the a rea . Diego 
Garcia, Masira and Cocos Islands form a jumping ground from 
where the U.S.A. can operate i t s in tervent ionis t diplomacy bases 
in Bahrain. The North-West Cape communication Stat ion in 
Austral ia is a v i t a l par t of U.S. Global command and control 
17 network to operate nuclear submarines. In Exchange for arms 
and worth $40 mi l l i a i the U.S. acquired^ in 1981, access to f ac i -
1 3 l i t i e s in Berbera, Somalia. Reconnaissance f a c i l i t i e s are availa< 
19 b le tt Nasirah, off the coast of Oman a t Mombasa, Kenya. 
The i n t e r e s t s of the United States in the Indian Ocean 
were s p e l t out by President Jimmy Carter: "an attempt by any 
outs ide force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region wi l l 
17. Ibid«« p. 96, 
18. African Records, Vol. XIX, No. 20, p. 5460. 
19. K.R, Singh, The Indian Ocean, p. 191. 
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be regarded as an assau l t on the v i t a l In te res t s of the United 
S t a t e s . And such an assau l t wi l l be repel led by means necessary* 
20 including mil i tary force." Vital i n t e re s t s being mi l i ta ry power 
t o the forefront of policy considerat ion. The United S t a t e ' s 
v i t a l in te res t s in th i s region are the secur i ty of access to West 
Asian Oil resources, and the preservation and if possible improve-
ment in her Geographical balance of power v i s -a -v is the Soviet 
Union. The U.S.A. and i t s a l l i e s are not only by , «nd large 
dependent upon the o i l from the West Asia but have invested 
b i l l i ons of dol lars in the o i l industry. The geographical fact 
i s tha t the Soviet Union is contiguous to the States overlooking 
the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Soviet mi l i ta ry 
power, based on Internal Ground l ives of communication and re*-
supply, can be d i rec t ly projected in to the l i t t o r a l . The a i r -
borne assaul t capabi l i ty of the U.S.S.R. in the region grea t ly 
foreshortens warning and response time of the U.S. forces . 
Soviet mi l i ta ry bases in Yemen, Ethiopia and Vietnam are s i t u a t e d 
on maritime s t r a t eg ic choke po in t s . What the Soviet Union can do 
was i l l u s t r a t e d by the events in Afghanistan and the long-range 
a i r - l i f t e d intervention in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78. I t was 
20. President Jimmy Carter, Sta te of the Upion Message, 
January 1980. 
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in t h i s context that the U.S. decided t o r a i s e the Rapid 
21 Deployment Force (RDF) . 
The U.S. in teres ts in the Indian Ocean area were spel led out 
in the State of t he Union message of President Carter in January 
19 80. An attenipt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region wi l l be regarded as an a s sau l t on the v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s of the United S ta t e s . And such an a s sau l t wi l l be 
repel led by any means necessary, including mi l i ta ry force . These 
' v i t a l i n t e r e s t s ' revolve around the concept of the **wells of 
power". Any potent ial s t rangulat ion of the Indus t r ia l i aeed 
economies has always haunted the West, a t l e a s t s ince 1973 
(Ref. H. Kissinger, quoted in gDSA News Review on West Asiai. 
Peb. 1975) . There have always been analyses of the prospects of 
continuation of o i l supplies , if necessary by forc ib le se izure 
of the o i l f i e l d s . 
The Western s t r a t e g i s t s do not hes i t a t e in a t r a t e g i s t s do not 
hesitfcte in acknowledging tha t the ta rge t for the RDF is Saudi 
Arabian and Horraus s t r a i t s can be swift ly captured by the RDF in 
the face of any Soviet t h r ea t . 
2 1 . Michael Getler, "Rapid Deployment Force : The In te rna t iona l 
Herald Tribune, 14 August 1980* Reproduced in IPSA, 
Strategic Digest, September 1980. 
62 
A separate Indian Ocean coromarid has been se t up by the 
U.S. Rapid Deployment Force of 230,000 men and they have been 
ent rus ted with the task of carrying out punitive operations in 
the Indian Ocean pa r t i cu la r ly in the Persian Gulf if and when the 
need a r i sen . 
The Rapid Deployment Force is to be the main instrument 
of U.S. policy in and around the Indian Ocean. I t was conceived 
in 1980 immediately a f te r the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. 
The RDF wi l l be t ru ly awesome mil i tary force consis t ing of 
not less than 5 army divis ions, 2 Marine divis ions , 2 wings of 
B-52 Boroeirs, 3 a i r c r a f t ca r r i e r s and a large number of escor t 
and sv;^ pply sh ip s . I t would be sefved by a separate Indian Ocean 
Commaind d i rec t ly under the Junior Chief of Staff. 
The Goal of the RDF is not only to stop Soviet i n f i l t r a t i o n 
or invasion but a lso -any kind of i n s t a b i l i t y tha t might prove 
dangerous to U.S. in te res t in the Area. In the Persian Gulf 
the RDF is intended exp l ic i t ly to give the U.S. the capabi l i ty 
t o force i t s way in and not wait for an invi ta t ion from a 
f r iendly Government. 
The U.S. i s building an en t i r e ly new type of long distance 
t r anspor t plane, the Mc Mx which scheduled to be operated in 1983, 
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To make the RDF ful ly effect ive i t needs huge stockpiles 
of combat ready weapons, within the area and base f a c i l i t i e s in 
Egypt, Moscow, Oman, Kenya and Somalia. Their most important 
base for effect ive deployment of the RDF is I s r a e l . 
I s rae l in future is not only to maintain a process of 
power balance in West Asia, but i t is to become an in tegra l par t 
of the American s t r a t e g i c design. Under th i s s t r a t e g i c col labo-
ra t ion with Israel* they wi l l stock p i l e in I s rae l heavy a r t i l l a r y , 
armoured troop c a r r i e r s , communication and other war material 
required for a conventional engagement in the region. I s r ae l can 
offer what no other region can, namely an effect ive a i r defence 
for the arms s tockp i l e . 
If I s rae l is the Western Sheet anchor of America's evol-
ving s t ra tegy for r«pid intervention for the West and S.W. Asia, 
Pakistan has been e lected to be i t s eastern plank. 
Like I s r ae l / Pakistan has presented i t s e l f as a c ruc ia l 
s t r a t e g i c asset for the U.S. when the Reaganites came to power 
on the c res t of a t ide of hawkish sentiment i t was easy for 
Pakistan to pursuade them to accept i t s offer of cooperation in 
t h e i r ant i -Soviet crusuade. Nor was the Reagan advice p a r t i -
cu lar ly disturbed by the fears expressed regarding the 2ia 
s t a b i l i t y for tha t Pakistan clandestively embarked a nuclear 
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prograimie. Zia obtained a large assistance package of $ 8.2 
b i l l i o n including the most sophist icated F-16 Fighter Bombers. 
The U.S. search for bases, the establishment of a Rapid 
Deployment Force and augmentation of f a c i l i t i e s a t Diego-Garcia 
a re di rected not against the Soviet threat but against the non-
Soviet th rea t s to the U.S. i n t e r e s t s , par t icuclar ly the continued 
flow of o i l to the indus t r ia l ized countr ies . The U.S. has an 
i n t e r e s t in other resources of the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l a l so , 
and has considerable trade in te res t in th is region. Also, 
most of the surplus petro-dol lars of the Gulf countries are 
invested in the Western banking system. The image of th« U.S. 
power deployed in the Indian Ocean induces many West Asian regimes, 
who perceive themself to be insecure, to seek secur i ty through 
l a rge - sca le arms purchases from the U.S. I t was in t h i s context 
t h a t the U.S. power projection in the Indian Ocean has to be seen. 
i i i ) Zone of Peace: 
An argument which was used to just i fy the increasing Western 
presence in the Indian Ocean r igh t from the very beginning was the 
so -ca l l ed 'Vacuum Theory' when the Brit ish Government decided to 
c u r t a i l i t s commitment East of Suez. The Vacuum theory which 
decided the Bri t ish curtailment of i t s commitment East of Suez was 
the best argument produced by the Western province to jus t i fy 
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t h e i r increasing presence in the Indian Ocean. This was taken 
as a move to create a power vacuum which of not fee ted by the 
Americans would be fected by the U.S.S.R. May be by sheer 
coincidence. This Bri t ish decision of withdrawal was followed 
by the entry of a small Soviet Naval Task Porce in the Indian 
Ocean in 1968. These two moves were not interconnected. American 
nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean was increasing and t h i s 
was th rea t to the Southern flank of the Soviet Union which has 
exposed to any at tacks from U.S. Submarines in the Indian Ocean. 
The Soviets concerns had aggravated after the closure of Suez 
canal a f t e r June 195 7 war which had blocked a l l l ines of communi-
ca t ion from the black and the mediterranean sea t o the Indian 
Ocean. 
Even if Bri t ish bad not decided to withdraw t h i s American 
t h r e a t would have been there and the Soviet Union would have to 
counter tha t U.S. t h r e a t . But i t is wrong to believe tha t the 
Br i ta in was conpletely withdrawing from the Indian Ocean as she 
had entered into an a l l iance with the U.S.A. to operate j o in t l y 
in the Indian Ocean. I t is therefore wrong to co r r e l a t e t h i s 
supposed Br i t i sh withdrawal and the Soviet entry in to the Indian 
Ocean. Such a corre la t ion has been advocated only t o jus t i fy 
the increased U.S. presence in the area. 
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According t o the U.N. General Assembly Resolu t ion number 
1832 (XXVI) the Indian Ocean was t o be des igna ted p e r p e t u a l l y 
22 
as a zone of peace . This r e s o l u t i o n asked the big powers t o 
e n t e r i n to consu l t a t i on with the Ind ian Ocean l i t t o r a l S t a t e s , so 
as t o half the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of t h e i r m i l i t a r y presence in the 
a rea and e l imina t ion of a l l the m i l i t a r y weapons and b a s e s . 
The r e s o l u t i o n a l s o c a l l e d upon a l l t h e concerned S t a t e s -
l i t t o r a l and h in te r l and s t a t e s , permanent members of U.N. Secu-
r i t y Council and the Maritime Users of the Ind ian Ocean t o 
e s t a b l i s h a system of Universal C o l l e c t i v e Secu r i t y without 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and t o work for r e g i o n a l coope ra t i on . Next 
year on December 15, 1972 the U.N. General Assembly e s t a b l i s h e d 
( r e s o l u t i o n 29992 -(XXVII) a 15 member Ad hoc Committee for 
23 implementation of the e a r l i e r proposal» By June 1982 t h i s 
committee cons i s t ed of 46 membpr Rta tes bes ides t he se a number 
of General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n s aimed a t e s t a b l i s h i n g the Ind ian 
Ocean as a Zone of Peace t 3080 (XXVIII) 6 December 1973, 
3259 (XXIX) 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) December 11, 1975, 
31 /88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 12 December 1977, S 10/2 of 
30 June 1978, 33/68 14 December 1978, 34/80 HNB of 11 December 
24 
19 77, 35/150 of 12 December 1980 and 36/90 of 9 December 1981. 
23t« App. X. "Quizzed for an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order in the Indian 
Ocean, K.p. Misra, A l l i ed Bombay, 1977. 
2 3 . I b i d . 
24. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Official 
Records, I2th Special Session Supplement No.5,A/S - 12/15. 
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On the basis of a l l these resolut ions in 1979 the General 
Assembly decided to convene a Conference in Colombo in 1981 to 
f ind ways of implementing t h i s idea of Zone of Peaces but 
because of irreconciable difference between the two Power 
blocs in the Ad hoc Committee t h i s Conference could not be 
convened. Another meeting of the Ad hoc Committee was held in 
Geneva in August 1982 but no consensus could be reached about 
the conmencing of the Conference. The great difference was 
between the Eastern bloc and the non-aligned countries on the 
one h*nd and the Western bloc on the o ther . The former maintained 
t h a t the Indian Ocean should be isola ted from the Super Power 
r iva l ry whereas the l a t t e r were looking a t the issue from the 
cold war perspective, r e i t e r a t i n g the r ight of co l l ec t i ve self 
defence to jus t i fy the mi l i ta ry and naval presence of ext ra 
regional powers in the Indian Ocean area . The l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
and the non-aligned have constant ly been demanding a h a l t to in 
space prol i fera t ion and introduct ion of nuclear weapons in the 
h i ther to nuclear weapon free Indian Ocean. 
The plea of the Western powers is tha t non-prol i fera t ion 
( to grow or increase) is r e s t r i c t e d only to horizontal p r o l i f e -
r a t i on i . e . acquis i t ion of nuclear by new s t a t e s , and the concept 
of nuclear weapon free zone covers only land and adjacent 
waters and not the high seas , infact th i s plea was only a 
r a t iona l i za t ion of the i r present mil i tary deployment in the a rea . 
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In fact both the sides could be blamed for these bickerings because 
no s uch preconditions were demanded a t the time of nuclear non-
p ro l i f e ra t ion Treaty nor when the Tiates tco t r e a ty was proposed. 
I t may be noted at th is juncture thiit when the December 1971 
reso lu t ion (2832) was introduced both the Two Power Blocs had 
voted against i t , th is s i t ua t i on continued t i l l 19 76, when the 
25 Eastern Bloc changed i t s s t ra tegy and obtained. I t was only 
in 19 77 that they voted in favour of the resolu t ion ac tua l ly in 
the beginning this concept of peace zone was not considered a 
cold war issue but for different reasoPiS the two s ides were opposed 
26 
to the concept. 
The policies of the Super powers in pursu i t of competitive 
naval deployment in the Indian Ocean area in defence of t h e i r 
in te res t are largely counter productive* Iran under the Shah is 
a point in case, the Shah was deposed by his own people which 
i t s e l f with him much too closely had to pay a heavy pr ice for the 
ident i f ica t ion/ l a t e r on the massive are supplies by the two 
Super Powers to Iran and Iraq were ostensibly for s t a b i l i s a t i o n 
of the i r regional s i tua t ion and for the production of the region. 
2 5 . SIPRI Year Book on ^ Worlt^ Armament anc^ Disapm^ment 1978/ 
Londoh, 1978, p p . 4 7 3 - 7 4 . 
26. Global Security Environment. Indian Securi ty Perspect ive , 
Daily, 1982. 
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In fac t , th i s only seemed to destroy the o i l i n s t a l l a t i ons of 
these two countries and to reduce the available o i l supplies to 
the world. Ear l ier the jus t i f i ca t ion of mi l i tary deployments in 
the Indian Ocean area was to secure the safety of o i l supply 
27 l anes . Now the j u s t i f i c a t i o n is to meet the de te r io ra t ion in the 
In terna t ional p o l i t i c a l system, actually the presence of extra 
regional powers in the region as i t se l f led to such de te r io ra t ion . 
Indian Ocean area wil l not be free from mi l i t a ry presence 
of the two powers unt i l and unless they both cooperative decide 
to do so . In the U.N. General Assembly both of them refused the 
note on the question regarding the i r debasing themselves from the 
area , t h i s indicates the i r disunity on th i s po in t . The ta lks 
which took place in Moscow, Washington, and Bern in reference to 
converting Indian Ocean into a zone of peace* show tha t in the 
nearr future they do not intend to do so, nor do they intend the 
Indian Ocean a nuclear free zone, but they did promise to l imit 
28 t h e i r a c t i v i t y in the area, which the United S ta tes wanted to free 
freeze the deployment of the mil i tary might of the super powers 
a t the present levels the Soviet Itoion wants U.S. nuclear vessels 
29 
not to enter the Indian Ocean region. So there was no consensus 
27. Gen John Hackett, "Protecting Oil Supplies, The Mil i tary 
Requirements, Adalphi Papers 166, Third World Conflict ir. the 
In terna t ional Security, The Internat ional I n s t i t u t e for 
S t ra t eg ic Studies, London. 
28. Chr is t ian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass) Dec. 26, 1977. 
29. The Hindu, December 21, 1977. 
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regarding the demil i ta r i s ing issue between the Two Sv^jer 
Powers. Hawever/ i t looks tha t the Super Powers not only 
formalised the question of t h e i r neval ac t ive ly in the Indian 
Ocean a t a time when the l i t t o r a l countries are t rying hard to 
multi l a t e r a l i z e i t through the United Nations. 
iv) Indian R^sppnsgt 
Indian a t ten t ion was focussed in the main on five 
aspect of the Indian Ocean development. There were (l) The 
high prof i le U.S. naval presences b u i l t rapidly in the Indian 
Ocean Waters and Special i ty on Diego-Garcia and to a consi-
derably lesser extent/ the Soviet naval response. (2) The near 
indef ini te postponement, mainly as a r e s u l t of U.S. opposit ion, 
of the conference convened by the United Nations to declare 
the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. (3) The U.S. search for 
the acquis i t ion for base f a c i l i t i e s in several countries on the 
Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l . (4) The t rans fe r of a subs tan t ia l 
quanti ty of U.S. arms including F-16 a i r c r a f t to Pak and repor-
ted Pakistan willingness to give the U.S. base f a c i l i t i e s in 
ce r t a in contingencies, and (6) Threat posed by these develop-
ments to Ind ia ' s secur i ty , i t s sovereignty over i t s t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters and the economic zone. 
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Official spokesman in and out of Parliament made i t 
c l ea r tha t the Govt, of India were c lose ly monitoring the 
naval movements of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Indian 
ocean. However» except on a half a dozen occasions o f f i c ia l 
statesments to "great power presence" and "Svjper Power" 
r i v a l r i e s in the Indian Ocean, ra ther main mention the U.S. 
by name. Similarly while a t the United Nations, Indian 
delegates strongly c r i t i c i sed the "negativism of ce r t a in 
coun t r i es , however powerful", with regard t o the holding of 
the Indian Ocean conference the U.S. was hardly mentioned by 
name. Govt, spokesman told members of the Parliament that 
I n d i a ' s grave power concern about the great power mi l i ta ry 
bui ld up in the Indian Ocean had been convened to the Govern-
ment concerned. Members of the Parliament as well as the 
members of the Eli te urged the Government to "take the in i t i a -
t i v e " to mobilize the l i t t o r a l countr ies to put an end to 
grea t power presence in the Indian Ocean and to declare the 
Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Government, however, made 
sympathetic noises but did not undertake any major diplomatic 
i n i t i a t i v e or was served by the ineffect iveness of whatever 
low level in i t i a t ives i t took. Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi confessed in the Parliament in June 1980 tha t no Indian 
i n i t i a t i v e would "affect the confrontat ion of bigger powers 
who wanted to play out the i r r i v a l r i e s away from t h e i r shores" 
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confessing helplessness she added, "we cannot match the 
s t reng th of the major powers, but we are t rying t o maintain 
defence preparedness . . . . much as we would l ike to think as 
does not have any effect on big powers'*. 
Only on one occasion an o f f i c i a l spokesman observed 
t h a t the c r i s i s in Afghanistan "dash s t r i k e " on the Indian 
Ocean development generally, the Government t r i e d not to offend 
e i t h e r Sx;4per Power. As the New Delhi correspondent of the 
Hindu reported on November 21, 1980 " in his r ep l i e s to (ques-
t i o n in Parliament) Mr. Narsimha Rao tool a great care not to 
offend the Soviet Union by equating i t with the United S ta tes , 
or even among Washington by t r ea t ing i t s refusal t o pa r t i c ipa te 
in the proposed conference in Colombo as a negative response to 
the very concept of transforming the Indian Ocean in to a Zone 
of Peace". The External Affairs Affairs Minister , however, 
had no hes i ta t ion in deploring "Western move in 1900 to s ta t ion 
an Internat ional naval armada in an around the Gulf-region. 
The Prime Minister on more than one occasion reminded members 
of the Parliament that the U.S. naval build up in the Indian 
Ocean preceded the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and 
discounted reports tha t the U.S.S.R. was seeking an ou t l e t to 
the Indian Ocean through Pakistan. 
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Joint {^mmunique issued a f te r t a lks between Indian 
leaders and heads of Governinents or States of more than 
f if teen countries s t ressed the urgency of declar ing t he Indian 
Ocean a Zone of Peace and of ridding the waters of great powers 
r i v a l r i e s . Ainong the countries tha t joined India to r e i t e r a t e 
t h i s well entrenched l i t t o r a l pos i t ion were Seychel les , Iran, 
Madagascar, U.A.B., Kuwait, Beharain, Tanzania, Guinea, 
Mozambique, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, when the 
President of India v i s i t ed Colombo l a s t year, the Sr i Lanka 
President remiiined s i l e n t on the Peace Zone proposed, though the 
v i s i t ing leader made a pointing reference to i t , 
Indians generally did not see the U.S. neval build up 
in the Indian Ocean as a response to a Soviet t h r e a t . Typical 
was the vi<=!w expressed by a generelly pro-western s t r a t e g i c 
analyst , Ravi Rikhye in 19 79. "The Soviet navy never has been, 
and cannot now be, in any posi t ion to challenge an American 
build up in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval c a p a b i l i t i e s has 
been deliberately exaggerated by the West. There is no Soviet 
mil i tary threat to o i l routes the th rea t is e n t i r e l y p o l i t i c a l . 
The crucial problem here is the endemic i n s t a b i l i t y in 
the region. To the extent tha t the regional powers do not come 
30. The Times of India . April 14, 1979. 
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to terms with the fact that regional cooperation is the solu-
t i o n to t h e i r securi ty problems, they are going to find 
increased presence of the extra-regional powers in t h e i r 
neighbourhood. There would be more of the s^per power i n t e r -
vention and confrontation in th is region, each avai l ing i t s e l f 
of such countermeasures that are available to pro tec t i t s v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s in the region. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
FACTORS AFFECTING INDIA'S INDIAN OCEAN POLICY - MAJOR FOREIGN 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 
To u n d e r s t a n d f u l l y I n d i a ' s p e r s p e c t i v e s , p o l i c y and 
d i p l o m a c y t owards I n d i a n Ocean i t i s p e r t i n e n t t o g r a s p I n d i a ' s 
m a j o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e and d i p l o m a t i c o r i e n t a t i o n . 
The main s p r i n g of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
e v e r s i n c e t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e s of i t s g r o w t h 
under J a w a h a r l a l Nehru has been c o n c e r n f o r 
p r o g r e s s i v e n a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , f o r 
w ide r Af ro-As ian development and s o l i d a r i t y , 
f o r r e g i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e , f o r 
c o a l e s c i n g t h e newly emerging c o u n t r i e s on 
t h e b road p r i n c i p l e s of oppos ing r e c l s m , c o l o -
n i a l i s m , fo r s u p p o r t i n g t h e l i b e r a t i o n s t r u g g l e s 
and f o r e x t r i c a t i o n from power g r o u p i n g s and 
m i l i t a r y b l o c k s . Non-al ignment a s t h e framework 
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i nvo lved a l l t h i s a n d more . 
F o r e i g n p o l i c y and diplomacy of any c o u n t r y g i v e an 
o r i e n t a t i o n t owards t h e r e a l i s a t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p n a t i o n a l 
1 . Rasheedudd in Khan, " I n d i a and t h e Sv;qper Powers : A 
T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e " , ioorld Focus , V o l . 3 , No. 36 -36 , 
and November & December, 1982. 
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i n t e r e s t s . Given the non permanency of fr iendship or enmity 
in diplomacy Indian statesmen also oriented t h e i r country 's 
foreign policy perspective and diplomacy towards the f u l f i l -
ment of her national i n t e r e s t . In t h i s context Jawaharlal 
Nehru apt ly said: 
Vfhatever policy you may lay down, the a r t 
of conducting the foreign af fa i r s of a 
country l i e s in finding out what ia most 
advantageous to the country. We may t a l k 
about internat ional good will and mean what 
we may say, but in the ultimate ana lys i s , a 
government functions for the good of the 
country i t governs and no government dares 
to do anything v?hich in the si'jort or long 
run is manifestly to the disadvantage of 
that country. Therefore, whether a country 
is imperial is t or s o c i a l i s t or comm\inist i t s 
foreign minister thinks primari ly of the 
2 in te res t s of that country. 
But the unchanging in ternat ional economic s i t ua t ion of 
the 1940s provided l i t t l e vantage point for India to s t ee r 
c l e a r her way to fu l f i l her national i n t e r e s t s . The compulsions 
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, India ' s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, 
September 1946-April 1961 (Wew Delhi, 1961), p . 28. 
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of domes t i c socio-econoaiic development and the i d e a l i s t i c 
reformist a t t i tude to world a f fa i r s which charac ter i sed the 
Pre-independence thinking of the Indian p o l i t i c a l e l i t e compel-
led Indian government to take account as has already been 
mentioned two policy objectives - the se l f - regarding in te res t s 
as would fu l f i l the objective of progressive nat ional recons-
t r u c t i o n and the much talked about other regarding concerns 
which subsumed world peace, in ternat ional cooperation, a n t i -
colonial ism, anti-racial ism and ant i - imperia l ism. But i t is 
over s impl is t ic to es tabl ish one to one r e l a t ionsh ip between 
nat ional interest and the realism tha t p r e v a i l . This was not 
in f ac t , undertaken by the Indian l eaders . National in t e res t 
was seen in the broad internat ional context . This was r ea l ly 
a novel way of looking a t things in a world charac ter i sed by 
'power p o l i t i e s ' , spheres of influence' and 'pos i t ions of 
s t r e n g t h ' . Nehru's statement: 
therefore we propose to look a f t e r I n d i a ' s 
interest in the context of world coopera-
tion and world peace in so far as world peace 
can be preserved. 
succinct ly ref lects the Indian thinking regarding the nat ional 
and international obl igat ions. 
3 . Quoted in K.P.. Misra (ed.) , Studies in Indian Foreign 
Policy, Introduction, p . (xvi) , (Delhi, 1969) . 
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In another statement Nehru's realism has been predo-
minantly ref lec ted: 
Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of 
economic policy, and until India has p ro -
perly evolved her economic policy her foreign 
policy will be rather vague, ra ther inchoate 
and rather groping. 
Thus Indian foreign policy perspective and diplomatic 
o r i en t a t i on not only contained idea l i s t i c but a l so r e a l i s t i c 
a t t i t u d e s . Conforming to the r e a l i s t i c p r inc ip les India 
5 
remained in the Commonwealth of Nations, 
India lacked considerable leverage and c r e d i b i l i t y in 
in te rna t iona l sphere to pursue her foreign pol icy ob jec t ives . 
But keeping in mind the declared objective of c rea t ing condi-
t ions of peace in and around both the sub-continent and the 
globe, India , not get t ing circumscribed by l i m i t a t i o n s , went 
ahead to c r i t i c i s e the power pol i t ics understood in the conven-
t ional sense of coers ive capabili ty; and to c r ea t e an in terna-
t iona l subsystems which would India a vantage pos i t i on from 
4. Quoted in Radharaman Chakrabarti, The P o l i t i c a l j^cpnorny of 
Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy, (Calcutta, 1982) ," p . 18. 
5. In the i n i t i a l periods of independence I n d i a ' s trade r e l a -
t i on was preponderantly with Br i ta in . This was examplified 
by 1939 Indo-Brit ish Trade Agreement. Fur ther , Ind ia ' s 
defence requirements were met by Br i t i sh . 
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which to pressure the entrenched in te res t s of the large system 
in to an arrangemenc of mutual give and take. 
This was precisely why Nehru declared: 
India would keep away from p o l i t i c s of 
groups aligned against one another/ which 
have led in the past to world wars, and 
which may again lead to d isas ter on an 
even vaster sca le . We believe tha t p>eace 
and freedom are indiv is ib le and the denial 
of freedom elsewhere would lead to cor-flict 
and war. We are pa r t i cu l a r l y in te res ted in 
the emancipation of colonial and dependent 
countries and peoples, and in the recognit ion 
in theory and prac t ica l of equal opportuni t ies 
6 for a l l reces . 
The non-entanglement in power p o l i t i c s of groups 
agains t one another and efforts to create an in ternat ional 
sub-system for the s t ructur ing of in ternat ional order neces-
s i t a t e d the evolution of Ind ia ' s policy of non-alignment. 
6. Quoted in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed.) Perspectives oji Non-
alignment, (Delhi, 1981) , Rasheeduddin Khan, ^'Non-
alignment Context, Dimensions and Challenges", p . 26. 
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I t was widened by the principles of Panchsheel and ten p r i n -
c i p l e s embodied in Bandung Conference. Non-Alignment was never 
conceived in the s p i r i t of building up peace and cooperation 
in a pos i t ive way. 
Non-alignment during the cold war period helped India 
to play a pos i t ive role in International forums to fos ter a 
c l imate of opinion in favour of peaceful set t lement of d i sputes . 
This was evident from the role India played in resolving 
Korean, Congo and Suez c r i s i s . Further, India not only refused 
to jo in CEATO and CENTO but also advised i t s diplomate to 
endorse non-military peaceful solutions, and to bring into 
quest ion mi l i t a ry solut ions . 
And in due course non-alignment as a pol icy subsuned the 
economic i n t e r e s t s of the nations. The sh i f t from East-West 
issues to the North-South helped India to mobilise the common 
in t e r e s t s of the nations more effect ively. Thus India got an 
external base to operate in the world p o l i t i c s . I t (non-
alignment) not only precluded foreign policy thinking from an 
exclus ively egocentric standpoint but endowed on i t a l l the 
benef i ts of co l lec t ive deliberation and concerted ac t ion . 
After a l l in these days of congregative diplomacy, the importance 
of the widest possible ar t icula t ion and aggregation of in te res t s 
cannot be exaggerated. What arose, therefore , as one nat ion 's 
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answer to the problem of block r iva l ry in the post-war world, 
u l t imately expanded into the common concern of most new 
nations joining the world community during the l a s t three 
decades. In fact rare was the case when a people having 
a t t a i ned statehood during t h i s period decided against joining 
non-aligned movement - a fact which is a t r i b u t e to the 
farsightedness of the Indian statemen who or ig ina ted i t . 
Thus from Indian perspective non-alignment provided not 
only a leadership s t a t u s , but also a much needed support base 
for her p o l i t i c s beyond her t e r r i t o r i a l boundary. This way, 
India adapting an internat ional posture espouses the cause of 
cooperation in internat ional r e l a t i o n s . Ind ia ' r pol icy of non-
alignment was never writ ten off though i t came under heavy 
s t r a i n a f te r 1962 war with China. Even the 19 71 t r e a t y with 
USSR did not undermine, instead upheld i t . Rasheeduddin Khan 
in the context of Indo-Soviet t r ea ty wri tes : 
For indeed Non-alignment provides fo r 
' s e l ec t i ve ' alignment, and even m u l t i -
l a t e r a l alignment that does not t i e the 
non-aligned to any bloc, nor to i t s 
8 
mil i tary groiping. 
7. Radharaman Cnakrabarty, n. 4, pp. 26-27. 
8, Rasheeduddin Khan (ed.) n. 6. p . 37. 
72 
The underlying thene of independence subsumed in non-
al igned policy and the demand for res t ructur ing in ternat ional 
order has been emphasised by different governments in the 
cen t re . The continuity of the policy despite change of govern-
ment reinforces Ind ia ' s major foreign policy perspect ive and 
diplomatic o r i en ta t ion . 
The same policy was continued by the Janata government 
in the garb of genuine non-alignment. The Janata Par ty ' s 
manifesto declared: 
The Janata Par ty ' s foreign policy wil l r e f l e c t 
the nat ion 's enlightened self i n t e r e s t . . . . I t 
will oppose a l l forms of colonialism, neo-
colonialism and racial ism. I t is committed to 
genuine non-al igament free from attachment to 
any power bloc. I t will s t r ive for the peaceful 
sett lement of a l l international disputes and will 
work with other th i rd world nations t o e s t a b l i s h 
9 
a new and jus t international economic order . 
Primtj Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi charac te r i s ing "non-
aligned movement as the h i s to ry ' s biggest peace movement". 
9. Text oi: Janata Par ty ' s Election Manifesto, Indian Express^ 
12 February, 1977. 
10. Key note address of the Prime Minister of India del ivered 
in the 7th non-aligned sunmit conference. New Delhi, 1983. 
Published in the Stra tegic Digest, May 1983, p . 363. 
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reaCfinned the government's policy based on non-alignment. 
She further declared: 
I t s (non-alignments) s ignif icance is not to 
be measured by the number of divis ions or the 
negation of destruct ive power we command, but 
by the in tens i ty with which we desire peace 
and freedom, development and in te rna t iona l 
jus t i ce . 
I t meains equality among nations and the democratisation 
of internatioi:val r e l a t ions , economic and p o l i t i c a l . I t wants 
global cooperation for development on the basis of mutual 
benef i t . I t is a s t rategy for the recognit ion and preservat ion 
of the world's d ivers i ty . 
Thus non-alignment has been accepted as an " a r t i c l e of 
f a i t h " , a principle and a policy for the very existence of a 
developing covintry. I t s multi-dimensional aspects have been 
emphasised by the different governments in the cen t r e . 
And when the second cold war is being fought in the 
t h i r d world countries non-aligrment is under great s t r e s s . India 
11 . Ib id . / p . 363. 
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has upheld ti-je non-alignment as a policy in much more vigorous 
way. Specially when the developing countries are asser t ing 
t h e i r r i g h t s , new cold war threatens them. When developing 
countr ies o r i en t t he i r efforts to what Eugineblack calle d "the 
diplomacy of economic development" the western developed coun-
t r i e s consciously and del iberately hinder t he i r progress by 
taking recouirse to protectionism* t a r i f f and non-tar i f f ba r r i e r s . 
In the unchanging international economic r e l a t i o n s , developing 
countr ies are a t a disadvantageous posi t ion. Despite dialogues 
in Ottawa, Cancan, Versailles and the U.N. in ternat ional r e l a -
t i o n s based on inequity is not changing. Hence i t is non-
alignment as a policy posture provides India much f l e x i b i l i t y 
and respons ib i l i ty to create conditions of peace around the 
globe. 
Hence to f a c i l i t a t e the rea l i sa t ion of the p o l i t i c a l 
and economic in teres ts of the developing countries India has 
ca l l ed for the democratisation of the internat ional system, 
s e t t i n g up of a new internat ional economic order and 
for an international conference on money and 
finance for development which will devise 
methods to mobilise finance for investment in 
the c r i t i c a l areas of food, energy and indus t r i a l 
development and to r e a s s e r t the comroitmait to 
12 col lee t i c secur i ty . 
12. I b i d . , p . 365. 
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Thus India by mobilising among others the ex-colonial 
countries in the non-aligned moveinent and formulating a common 
front strategy to highlight the issues r e l a t i n g to independence, 
development/ disarmament/ se l f - re l i ance e t c . t r i e s to crea te 
a foundation of the s t ructure of peace. Non-alignment movement 
what Rasheeduddin Khan ca l l s "as an informal and non- ins t i t u -
t i ona l counterpart of U,N. helps" . India to c rea te a climate 
of opinion in favour of peaceful co-existence and to convey 
the world the intensi ty of feeling of the developing countr ies 
for restructuring the t r ad i t iona l in ternat ional order . Besides, 
non-alignment as a policy helps India to divers i fy her own 
internat ional export and import markets and create a broad 
consensus in the domestic front on the foreign pol icy i s sues . 
And also i t assigns internat ional s t a t u s . 
Non-alignment also helps India to fos te r economic 
cooperation among developing countr ies . The progress which 
began at the Cairo Conference (October 1964) when Prajne Minis-
t e r Shastr i urged that the developing nations must help each 
other even before we seek assis tance from outside assumed 
special significance at the Lusaka Conference. Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi referred t o the "areas of cooperation in many 
f i e l d s of development in the explorat ion of which India would 
13. Quoted in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed.) n. 6. 
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be glad to play her modest par t" . The Lusaka Conference adopted 
a programme of act ion which envisaged specif ic projec ts for 
which iinport requirements should be met from the developing 
count r ies and recommended mutual si:pport of indus t r i a l expansion 
and increased flow of trade among the member coun t r i e s . Details 
of the prograiTme came up for discussion at the 17 nations coor-
dinat ing Bureau of non-aligned countries a t Algeriers (19 76) and 
found ful l emiphasis in the Economic Declaration adopted a t the 
14 Colombo Summit (16-19 August 1936) . And in 1979 Havana and 
1983 Delhi Summits more emphasis was la id on "co l l ec t ive self 
r e l i ance to ehnance the negotiating strength and the counter-
16 
va i l i ng power of the developing countr ies" . Growing economic 
and commercial re la t ions with the th i rd world countr ies on the 
bas is of commiercial quid-pro-quo and the hosting of I4ew Delhi 
consul ta t ions for south-south cooperation e t c . is a po in te r 
towards Ind i a ' s increasing diplomatic efforts to unite the 
developing countries for the promotion of t h e i r soc ia l and eco-
nomic developmental a c t i v i t i e s . 
14. Radharaman Chakrabarty/ n. 4/ pp. 98-99. 
15. Final Doc\:«nent of the Seventh Non-aligned Conference 
of Heads of State or government. S t ra tegic Digest* 
May 1983 ( In s t i t u t e for Defence Studies and Analysis) 
No. 1, p . 343. 
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r H v^ ^ 
t y-:^ 
^rr, Unh-rij^i^^ Further, NAM has provic3ed a forum for India trS 
her a n t i - r a c i a l i s t , a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t , anti-cx»lonial ist p o l i t i c s . 
In fact a n t i - r a c i a l i s t , ant i- imperial i s t and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t 
pol ic ies formed the cardinal pr inc ip les of Ind ia ' s foreign pol icy . 
India since her independence has espoused the cause of the peoples 
of Asia and Africa. The same policy is being continued by the 
government. ^^ a pioneer country to sponsor a n t i - r a c i a l i s t policy 
in the U.N,, h i ther to India has not establ ished diplomatic t i e s 
with regimes in the internat ional forums. I t has cons i s t en t ly 
svJ5)ported the national l i be ra t ion movements in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. Sometimes i t has been pointed out t ha t India 
has fai led to support the movements of East European countr ies 
for their r ight to self-determinat ion. But India has taken 
care to locate the national l ibe ra t ion movements in i t s proper 
context and determine i t s nature . But ix. i s d i f f i c u l t to say 
how far Ind ia ' s stand is co r r ec t . 
In the context of the national l i be ra t ion movements the 
seventh Non-aligned Conference declared 
The Heads of State or Government solemnly 
renew t h e i r staunchest support for a s o l i -
dar i ty with the i r struggle and the commitment 
of the non-aligned countries to the at tainment 
of Namibia's independence the e l iminat ion of 
thie opprobrious apartheid regime in South 
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Africa and the rea l i sa t ion of the i n a l i e -
nable national rights of the Pales t in ian 
people including the r ight to e s t ab l i sh 
t h e i r ovin sovereign s t a t e . 
Besides, India has become a member in the committee on 
Pales t ine and has upheld the cause of the Pales t ine people for 
t h e i r self-determination. Diplomatic e f for t s to end the h o s t i -
l i t y in the West Asia region by sending her diplomat is a 
fu r ther step taken by India to harmonise the dissensions in 
the non-aligned movement i t se l f . 
Thus by emphasising on decolonisation p r i n c i p l e s / se l f -
determination/ disarmament/ new internat ional economic order/ 
negotiat ion/ peaceful settlement e t c . India has kept herself 
away from power po l i t i c s and has oriented to what has been 
17 
c a l l e d an exercise in "inflx^nce p o l i t i c s " - which means i t is 
devoid of th rea t of sanction. Thus unlike power p>olitics which 
r e l i e s on force or coersion or sanctions/ influence p o l i t i c s 
r e l i e s on persuation and reconci l ia t ion . ' Influence p o l i t i c s ' 
o r i en t s India not only to dedicate to the immediate caxise of 
economic survival for the enjoyment of p o l i t i c a l freedom but 
16. Seventh iton-Aligned Summit Conference/ n. 15/ p . 369. 
17. K.p, Misra (ed.) n. 3. Introduction/ p . x i i . 
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a l so creating climate of peace in the in ternat ional sphere. 
Thus both the national and internat ional obl iga t ions are simul-
taneously met. 
Another pr inc ip le which determines I n d i a ' s foreign 
pol icy perspective and diplomatic o r i en ta t ion is the idea of 
Asia Sol idar i ty ( l a t e r i t was cal led as Afro-Asian so l ida r i ty ) . 
In th i s broadcast as Vice-President of the Interim 
Government on 7th September 1946, about a year before indepen-
dence Nehru underlined the important role for India in Asian 
Affa i rs , This was to be based on the close t i e s t ha t India 
had with various par ts of Asia. "We are of Asia", Nehru 
affirmed, "and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us 
than others" . He went on to s t r e s s that "because of i t s geog-
raphical location India was the pivot of Western, Southern and 
South-East Asia". In the past Ind ia ' s cul ture had flowed to 
the countries of these regions and t h e i r cul tures had in turn 
come to India in many ways. These contacts were being renewed^' 
and they were bound to the one hand, and Afghanistan, I ran and 
the Arab World on the other . India must work ser iously for 
the furtherance of that close associat ion of free countries Nehru 
mentioned the struggle for freedom in Indonesia in pa r t i cu la r 
1 8 
and conveyed Ind ia ' s good wishes for i t s success. 
18. Quoted in Bimal Prasad (ed.) In ternat ional Studies, Ju ly-
Septemi^er 1978, Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4, See Bimal Prasad, 
"An Overview" , p . 866. 
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I t was examplified by India ' s par t ic ipa t ion in the Bandung 
Conference (1955) . 
The close links were established not only with the 
Southern, South-Eastern and South Western countries of Asia but 
a l so with China. The opposition of the Indian National Congress 
to the use of Indian Army by the Bri t ish to suppress Chinese 
s t rugg le against imperialism/ the jo int declarat ion by the 
Indian and Chinese delegates in the congress of the oppressed 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s held in Brussels to coordinate t h e i r freedom 
s t rugg les and the despatch of Indian medical team under the 
leadership of Dr. Kotnis to China when l a t t e r was at tacked by 
Japan established a strong bond between India and China. 
Similarly., healthy re la t ions were es tabl i shed with the 
Himalayan s ta tes of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan through the 
t h r e a t i e s signed in 1950, 1949-50 and 1950 respec t ive ly . Though 
no t r ea ty was signed with Pakistan, Nehru declared in 1949: 
There is also no doubt at a l l in my mind tha t 
i t is inevitable for India and Pakistan to 
have close re la t ions - very close r e l a t i o n s -
sometime or other in the future. I cannot s t a t e 
when th i s will take place, but s i tua ted as we 
are , with a l l our past we cannot r e a l l y be jus t 
indifferent neighbours. We can r a the r be h o s t i l e 
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t o each o t h e r o r very f r i e n d l y , whatever 
per;Lod of h o s t i l i t y may intervene in between 
19 
because our i n t e r e s t s a re c l o s e l y i n t e r l i n k e d . 
I t i s i n t e r p r e t e d t h a t the Sino-Indian s t r a t e g i c c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n s in 1962 p rope l l ed India to e s t a b l i s h c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s 
with her ne ighbours , 
Ind ia r e a l i s e d t h a t an unfr iendly neighbour 
however weak by i t s e l f , could become a source 
of major t r o u b l e if i t chose i t s e l f t o be used 
as a base for China aga ins t I n d i a . In view of 
China ' s growing r e l a t i o n s with the d i f f e r e n t 
South Asian c o u n t r i e s , such a development could 
not be ru l ed out if India did not mend i t s 
20 fences with i t s immediate neighbours. 
S i r lmavo-Shas t r i pac t of 1964, I n d i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
Tashkent agreement t o d i f fuse t ens ion in the s u b - c o n t i n e n t , 
s e t t i n g of j o i n t commissions to car ry out economic and commercial 
diplomacy with Asian c o u n t r i e s were some ot the b o l d s t e p s t o 
19. Ibid*, p . 867. 
20. I b l q . , p . 884. 
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crea te friendly atmosphere in the sub-continent and also in 
Asia. Further, Simla pact and the t rea ty with Bangladesh 
(19 72) , improvement of re la t ions with Afghanistan, I ran and 
Sri Lanka and move towards normalisation of r e l a t ions with 
China reaffirmed Ind ia ' s commitment to build \xp f r iendly r e l a -
t ions with neighbours. Janata government's special emphasis 
on good neighbC'urliness, genuine non-alignment and on benefi-
c i a l b i la te ra l i sm further reinforced India ' s stance towards 
Asia s o l i d a r i t y aspect of foreign policy. Janata government's 
'water diplomacy' with Bangladesh, i t s commitment to construct 
Salal project in Pakistan and signing of two separate t r e a t i e s 
- one on trade and the other on t r an s i t - with Nepal contributed 
towards the good neighbourliness. This considerably helped 
India to project a low prof i le of her image amongst her neigh-
bours. In fact i t was af ter 19 71 war with Pakistan tha t the 
countr ies in the region apprehended big brotherly a t t i t u d e from 
Ind ia . But th i s was f a l s i f i ed a f te r Janata 's attempt to 
pro jec t a low prof i le image. 
But the secret deal with Is rae l by the Janata Government 
was going agairist the very fundamentals of Ind ia ' s foreign 
pol icy and diplomatic o r i en ta t ions . But i t was not moved forward. 
The most dominant aspect of Ind ia ' s Asia policy is tha t 
i t i s based on economic, commercial and cul tura l diplomacy. In 
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fac t the complimentaries of the economy of these countr ies 
have helped India to pave the way for increasing cooperation 
in the context of t h e NAM declarat ion of co l l ec t ive se l f -
suff ic iency. I t has rot only helped India to invigorate her 
own economy but also to foster a sense of f r iendl iness around 
the region. 
Given the breakdown of bipolar v.orld# growth of poly-
centr ism and the onset of new cold war based on new s t r a t e g i c 
doctr ines developing countries face tremendous challenges to 
t h e i r jus t r i g h t s . Hence India in her attempt to Keep avjay 
from the power-politics of cold war has again emphasised upon 
the need to bolster non-aligned movement and the s o l i d a r i t y 
among developing countries for economic cooperation. Indian 
e f f o r t s to build up friendly relations, with Pakistan, Nepal, 
West Asian countries and her ca l l for a conference of consumer 
and supplier countries of the West Asian o i l for b e t t e r secur i ty , 
her e f for t s to maintain a low prof i le in dealings with neighbours 
e t c . have opened the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for regional cooperation. 
In fac t Indian diplomacy ref lec ted much more sophis t ica t ion 
when i t less enthus ias t ica l ly responded to Bangladesh proposal 
for South Asian Regional Cooperation. Given Ind ia ' s geographical 
p o s i t i o n and size and the level of economic, s c i e n t i f i c and 
pol i t i c a l development the countries in the region may perceive 
I n d i a ' s i n i t i a t i v e for regional cooperation as a p o l i t i c o -
diplomatic move for domination. In t h i s context K. Subramanyam 
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r i g h t l y observed: 
India 's basic approach to the SARC is to 
leave i t to i t s neighbours to determine 
the pace of development of regional coope-
21 
ra t ion. 
The fact that regional cooperation in South Asia has been 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d and an integrated Programme of Action for 
regional cooperation in the areas of agr icul ture rural develop-
ment/ meteorology, telecommunications, s c i e n t i f i c and technolo-
logical cooperation, a r t s and cul ture has been launched amply 
demopistrates the willingness of the countries to bridge the gap 
among themselves that existed t r a d i t i o n a l l y . India can on 
fac t play a pi^/otal r o l e . 
The increasing demand that Nepal be declared a zone of 
peace and South Asia a nuclear free zone, the growing turbulence 
in Sr i Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the extension of the U.S. 
c en t r a l command to the Western Asia and the growing l ikel ihood 
of U.S. - Japan Security cooperation pose considerable hurdle 
t o Indian diplomacy to fos ter a climate of peace in the area . 
Fur ther , the mobilisation of people in South and South-West Asia 
on the basis of rel igion and the s t r a t eg ic re la t ionship of some 
21 . K. SubraiTianyam, "Present and Likely Developments in South 
and South West Asia", S t ra tegic Analysis^ November 1983, 
Vol. VII, No. 8, p . 603. 
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of the countries of tha t region with U.S.A. will c rea te a 
complex s i t u a t i o n . Hence Ind ia ' s foreign policy perspective 
and diplomacy must have i t s way through tangled web of complexi-
t i e s . Indian effor t should be oriented to develop regional 
cooperation on issues that do not r a i se controversies . 
Another basis on which India ' s foreign policy perspec-
t i v e and diplomatic or ien ta t ion is firmly based i s the " fa i th 
in the United Nations". 
India as a founder member of the United Nations played 
pivota l role for the consolidation of th i s i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Indeed the securi ty perception of India was never sole ly 
based on mi l i t a ry asptects. So also she considered the secur i ty 
of the globe not in terms of building up of arms and amunition. 
Hence since the beginning of independence soc ia l - economic 
aspects of world secur i ty has been emphasised. And i t has 
a l so been rea l i sed that securi ty can best be guaranteed in a l l 
i t s dimensions of peace India rejected the power po l i t i c s of 
the polar ised blocks. Faith in the United Nations symbolised 
the i tense aspira t ion of India to create a society where the 
g l o r i f i c a t i o n of net ion-s ta te would be minimised. M.S. Rajan 
a p t l y remarfcs: 
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In<3ia's c o n c e p t i o n of h e r membership of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y i s one i n which t h e 
concep t of s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y i s l i m i t e d 
by t h e o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i c 3 e r a t i o n of i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and i n t e r - n a t i o n a l c o o p e -
r a t i o n . 
The very a c t i v e and e f f e c t i v e r o l e 
t h a t I n d i a p l a y e d i n t h e working of i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t he 
U.N. and t h e c e p e a t e u r g i n g s f o r o r s u p p o r t 
t o e x t e n d the j u r i s d i c t i o n and scope of 
work of t h o s e o r g a n i s a t i o n s was an i n d i c a -
22 t i o n of he r approach t o t h i s i s s u e . 
The d e c o l o n i s a t i o n q u e s t i o n , d i s a r m a m e n t , new i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l economic o r d e r , law of t n e s e a , a v o i d a n c e of war , 
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c deve lopmenta l i s s u e s e t c . o c c u p i e d t h e c e n t r a l 
p l a c e i n t h e United K a t i o i i s ' a g e n d a . S i n c e t h e s e i s s u e s were 
l i n k e d t o t h e s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y of t h e 
h u m a n i t y , I n d i a t ook an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t o e spouse t h e 
c a u s e of v a s t m i l l i o n s . Hence I n d i a g o t i n v o l v e d i n t he numerous 
2 2 . M.S. Rajan, I n d i a in World A f f a i r s , (1954-56) . (Bombay,1964) , 
p p . 3 8 - 3 9 . 
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spec ia l i sed agencies of the U.N. This analysis does not gainsay 
of course the national in te res t of India. But national in te res t 
was seen in a broader framework. 
Since the inception of the organisation Indian d ip lo-
macy has been oriented towards the resolution of many complex 
i s s u e s . Colonisation and rac i s t policies of sorre countries 
moved India in 1950s to convene an informal meeting of Asian-
African s t a t e s . Thus by forming a caucus India helped the deve-
loping Asian-African countries to expedite the decolonisation 
process . Further, India consis tent ly s t ressed on the a r t i c l e 2 
of the U.N. Charter which focusses at tent ion on the l i be ra t ion 
of colonial {:>eoples and t e r r i t o r i e s . By condemning the 
r a c i a l i s t and imperial is t pol ic ies in different forums of the 
United Nations India creates a climate of opinion in favour 
of developing countr ies , whether i t is in UKCTAD, UKIDO, 
UNCLOB or any other forum India has consis tent ly oriented i t s 
diplomacy towards the creation of a commonf ront to bargain 
with the developed countr ies . 
In t h i s very f i r s t appearance before the U.N. General 
Assembly, Nehru wanted the world body to re-emphasise i t s 
p o l i t i c a l pre-occupations and take a serious look at the 
economic problems that ultimately endangered peace. A4r a time 
8^ 
when few took t h e Assembly t o be t h e p r o p e r forum t o r a i s e 
s u c h q u e s t i o n s , Mehru made t h e t r e n d s e t t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n . 
I t i s a s t r a n g e t h i n g , vxhen t h e wor ld l a c k s 
so many t h i n g s , food and o t h e r n e c e s s i t i e s 
in many p a r t s of t he wor ld . . . . t h e a t t e n t i o n 
of t h i s Assembly of N a t i o n s i s c o n c e n t r a t e d on 
a number of p o l i t i c a l p rob lems . . . I wonder i f 
i t would oe p o s s i b l e f o r t h i s Assembly t o t a k e 
a h o l i d a y f o r a w h i l e from some of t h e a c u t e 
p o l i t i c a l problems which f a c e i t , and a l l o w 
man's minds t o s e t t l e down and l o o k a t t h e v i t a l 
23 
and u rgen t economic p r o b l e m s . 
I n UKCTAD and UNIDO forums I n d i a has t a k e n up t h e cormion 
c a u s e of t h e deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . Whether i t i s t h e f o r m a t i o n 
of g roup of 77, t h e demand f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n of p r o t e c t i o n i s m , 
t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s , t h e demand f o r t h e l i n k a g e of 
SDRS t o development o r t he demand f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e 
on money and f i n a n c e , I n d i a has a lways a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 
d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . B e s i d e s , I n d i a has a lways emphas i s ed i n 
2 3 . Radharama^n C h a k r a b a r t y , n . 4 , p . 9 2 . 
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the m u l t i l a t e r a l aspect of trade and aid promotion. I t has 
cons i s t en t ly demanded for the de-pol i t i c is at ion of t rade and 
aid» and has emphasised on the comnercial quid-pro-quo. 
And in the UNIDO and UNDP India has subs tan t i a l ly 
contr ibuted to the operational programmes in terms of non-
conver t ib le rupees. I t has taken part in the modalit ies of 
technological t ransfer in different spheres. 
Thus rea l i s ing the efficacy of the U.N. for the bene-
f i t s of humanity India has become a party to the declarat ions 
of the Non-aligned movement for strengthening the U.N. 
Cairo summit described the paramount iinportance of the 
U.N. I t was also at the Cairo summit that a ca l l was made for 
c lo se r consultat ions among the non-aligned countr ies at the U.N. 
for concerted action for the achievement of objectives and 
the implementation of the programmes of action out l ined by the 
non-aligned countr ies . The Lusaka summit went a s tep fur ther , 
and emphasised the need for maintenance of regu la r contacts to 
ensure continui ty in the non-aligned movement and the implemen-
t a t i o n of i t s decisions. I t also called for consul ta t ion and 
co-ordinat ion at the United Nations level with a view to 
appropr ia te implementation of summit resolut ions . The three 
summits that followed more precise ins t i tu t iona l arrangements 
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a t t h e U.N. And in t h e seventh Non-aligned summit meeting 
s t r e s s e d : 
The importance of. t h e United Nations as the 
most a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum f o r 
f ind ing s o l u t i o n s to major world i s s u e s such 
as the achievement of general and complex d i s a r -
mament, the r e a l i s a t i o n of the New I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Economic Order , the e l im ina t i on of co lon i a l i sm 
25 
and racism and promotion of human r i g h t s . 
Bes ides , I n d i a ' s i n i t i a t i v e to o rgan ise an informal meeting of 
t h e heads of s t a t e of 30 coun t r i e s r e in fo rce s I n d i a ' s f a i t h in 
t h e United Nat ions . 
But Ind i an diplomacy has not been very e f f e c t i v e in many 
t i m e s . I n d i a has not been able to co - rod ina t e t h e a c t i o n s of 
t h e non -a l i gned c o u n t r i e s in t h e U.N. The vo t ing p a t t e r n of the 
Non-al igned count r ies - does not r e f l e c t the un i ty of the movement 
24. Quoted in K.P. Misra (ed.) Non-alignment F r o n t i e r s and 
Dynamics (New Delhi , 1982) , See K.P. Saxena, "Non-
a l ignment and the United Nat ions" , p . 92. 
25. I b i d . , p . 296. 
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I n d i a ' s e f for t to take to the path of what is ca l led "corr idor 
diplomacy" in the U.N. has not been vigorous. 
Notwithstanding the defficiency of effective diplomancy, 
India has contr ibuted enormously towards strengthening the U.N. 
r i g h t from the beginning. 
Conclusion; 
I nd i a ' s foreign policy perspective and diplomatic o r i en-
t a t i o n has been dubbed as the "hypocrisy of an i d e a l i s t " . This 
analysis is brought with e r ror . Because, India does not make 
any endeavour to cover anrrow and parochial i n t e re s t s in wider 
pr inc ip les whicrh consider the res t of the world less moral or 
27 less r a t i o n a l . I t (foreign policy) is based on non-aiignrnent» 
I t helps the decision makers to s teer India ' s way in an 
ideological ly divided world, but also f a c i l i t a t e s the likehood 
26. Bimal Prasad (ed.) n. 18, K.P. Saxena, "India and the 
Diplomacy in the United Nations", p . 87. 
27. K.P. Misra (ed.) n. 3l» p.Cxvi). 
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of c r e a t i n g whcit i s re fe r red to a s "New Alignment". 
This may help t o r e c t i f y the dependency s i t u a t i o n . The 
dependency s i t i i a t i o n cannot be remedied as long as t h e f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e and d ip lomat ic o r i e n t a t i o n does not become an 
i npu t towards the growth of a hea l thy economic i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . 
In t h i s c o n t e x t non-alignment as a foreign p o l i c y s t r a t e g y 
d e f i n i t e l y corresponds t o t h e body p o l i t i q u e based on mixed-economy 
and c r o s s - c u t t i n g i d e o l o g i e s . National bourgeois ie not only 
g e t s t h e a s s i s t a n c e from both c a p i t a l i s t and s o c i a l i s t b l o c t e 
but a l s o e s t a b l i s h b i l a t e r a l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e 
developing c o u n t r i e s . Thus t h e i n t e r a c t i o n with t h r e e s p h e r e s ; 
c a p i t a l i s t , s o c i a l i s t and developing provides much leverage t o 
c r e a t e a c l i m a t e both for na t iona l developmental process and 
fo r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y based on socio-economic aspec t of 
s e c u r i t y . In t h i s way I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s have been e s s e n t i a l l y 
d i r e c t e d t o achieve not only the na t iona l i n t e r e s t but aiLso t o 
b u i l d a s o c i e t y based on what Palme Commission c a l l e d 'common 
s e c u r i t y * and Brandt Commission 'Common S u r v i v a l ' . 
28. Rasheeduddin Khan i n t e r p r e t i n g the Non-aligned movement s t a t e s : 
Today the movement of Non-alignment should r e a l l y be c a l l e d 
the movement of New Alignment. While i t assumes the main 
t h r u s t of Non-alignment, a nodal point has been reached 
when q u a l i t a t i v e l y i t has become a force much l a r g e r , and 
in i t s agenda and s c a l e of p r i o r i t i e s , m o r e p o s i t i v e and 
d i f f e r e n t from, i t s o r i g i n a l shape and form. The t ime , has , 
the re fo re ,come t o change i t s name by r e so r t in ' ^ to the p o s i -
t i v e des igna t ion which i t s p o s i t i v e con ten t and h i s t o r y 
demand^j. In more than one sense i t i s more an alignment than 
a nef^ative withdrawal, a norm s e t t e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i -
t i c s r a t h e r than a deviant from the norm,a cha l lenge than 
r e s p o n s e . I t has helped t o des t roy ' o l d ' a l i g n m e n t s based on 
power, and create 'new* alignment based on pace , progress 
and p r o s p e r i t y . No. 6, p . 37. 
CHAPTER - IV 
INDIA AND INDIAN OCEAN 
I n t h e t h i r d c h a p t e r t h e major f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e 
was a n a l y s e d - I n t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r an a t t e m p t has been made 
t o s t u d y how w i t h i n t h e b road m a t r i x of f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e 
a n d d i p l o m a t i c o r i e n t a t i o n I n d i a l o c a t e s t h e p rob lem of I n d i a n 
O c e a n . 
Sou th A s i a ' s p o s i t i o n in t h e Ind i a n Ocean , and i t s i n t e r a c -
t i o n w i t h t h e o u t s i d e i n t e r e s t s could be e x p l a i n e d on t h e b a s i s 
of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . The n a t u r e of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
be tween I n d i a and P a k i s t a n has de te rmined by t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
t h e two Super Powers because t h e y have t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s i n t h e 
main l o c a l c o n f l i c t of t l ie r e g i o n . The e s t a b l i s h e d l i n k a g e s 
be tween t h e S\.iper Powers and t h e r e g i o n a l c o n s i s t a n t s have been 
c o v e r e d by t h e c h a n g i n g c louds of peace a f t e r t h e deve lopment of 
d e t e n t e and r e l a l a x a t i o n of t h e t e n s i o n be tween t h e two Super 
Powers a t t h e g l o b a l l e v e l and t h e emergence of a n o t h e r g r e a t 
power i n t h e v i c i n i t y of South A s i a . The deve lopmen t of Sino-US 
r e a p p r o a c h m e n t , I n d o - S o v i e t T r e a t y and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
Bang ladesh r e - e s t a b l i s h e d t h e s e l i n k a g e s in e a r l y s e v e n t i e s . 
1 . See D. Braun , "Changes i n South As ian I n t r a - r e g i o n a l and 
and E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p " i n The World Today , Vol . 3 4 . 
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Hencry Kissinger expressed his ideas about the changing 
s i t u a t i o n , tha t "Bangladesh was not merely a local conf l ic t but 
2 
an expression of a par t icu lar corre la t ion of forces" . The 
s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l background not only of Gulf but of South 
Asia were changed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
The importance of India-Pakistan equation increased for the Super 
Powers in the new world of cold war. The importance of Pakistan 
has increased for the United States on account of her proximity 
t o the Gulf and close relat ions with the Saudia-Pakistan is 
acceptable to most Gulf coiintries, and has already es tabl i shed 
linkages in the region because of i t s moderate and neutral nature 
in intra-Arab differences. Consequently, Pakistan has a special 
pos i t i on in the United States RDF-Strategy. A Rand corporation 
study discusses the u t i l i t y or importance of a close col labora-
t i o n with Pakistan for the U.S.: "The advantage tha t Pakistan 
holes for the U.S. is i t s po l i t i ca l posi t ion a t the head of the 
Pers ian Gulf. The U.S. is currently building a Rapid Development 
Force to protect Western access to o i l . The U.S. i s already 
seeking access agreements and f a c i l i t i e s in a number of 
c o u n t r i e s . Thus, the loss of Chah Bahar (Iran naval port could 
be compensated by Karachi and Gwadar ports in Pakistan. 
2. Qxcted by Jack Anderson, Times of Inc^ia 16.1.1972, 
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Furtherniore, there is the poss ib i l i ty tha t the Pakis tani army 
could serve as a proxy force fighting in the pers ian Gulf. 
This would also f a c i l i t a t e direct American aid to Afghar rebe l s , 
thus keeping Soviet resources and a t tent ion engaged in Afghanis-
tan and away from areas of great in te res t to the U.S., l ike 
Europe Pakistan could be induced to co-operate if t h e U.S. 
undertake to protect Pakistan from consequences of such deci-
s ions . 
Soviet Union domination is regarded as an a l t e rna t ive 
regional secur i ty scenario for South Asia. The Soviet Union 
may occupy a balancer position of South Asia, making both the 
subcontinental powers fa l l in l i n e , inducing and threatening 
them. The s t r a t eg i c importance of Pakistan for the Soviet 
Union has the same value l ike India, and Pakistan has a suppor-
t i v e and co-operative lobby for the Soviet Union on the pa t te rn 
of Finland. Whatever the minor var ia t ions , since the Geopolit ical 
compulsions remain the same, the future developments will not, 
4 probably, take any unprecedented tu rn . 
3 . Fukuyayama, Francis, The Security of Pakistan A Trip, 
(Rand N. 1548-RC) September 4980. 
4 . Akhtar Majeed, Indian Ocean: Conflict and Regional 
Cooperation, pp. lO- i l . 
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In March 19 81 the congressional Research Service of the 
Library of congress submitted to the House of Representat ives ' 
Foreign Affairs committee a comprehensive report on the his tory 
of U.S. r e l a t ions with the Third World. I t had been drafted in 
1980, a f te r the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Four options 
were offered to congress l i s t e d without evaluative judgement, 
which could form a basis for future American policy towards 
the Soviet Union and the Third World: 
1. a confrontation policy 
2. a Neo containment policy 
3 . a Flexible Response Policy, and 
4. an Economic Security Policy. 
The basic features of these options are as follows: 
The policy of confrontation would aim to ha l t and push 
back Soviet expansion in the Third World and to r e - e s t ab l i sh 
U.S. leadership by a l l appropriate means-military, economic, 
cu l tu ra l e t c . The Persian Gulf would by a Pr io r i ty area, together 
with central America and the Caribbean. 
5. See Soviet policy and United States Reponse in the Third 
World. Washington D.C 1981 (US Government pr in t ing 
Office) . 
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Under Neocontraintnent, the main emphasis of t h i s more 
r e s t r i c t e d version of the above option would be on the mil i tary 
ass i s tance to individual Third World coun t r i e s . The policy would 
be l imited geograpnically and on the whole would focus on the 
Gulf region and South West Asia in general and/ to a less extent/ 
on cent ra l America and North East Asia. 
This policy of Flexible response s t a r t s from the assump-
t ion tha t the Soviet Union is only expansionist with ce r t a in 
l i m i t s and that limited co-operation is therefore possible between 
the two Powers. In th i s option toO/ a p r i o r i t y i s re-inforcement 
of powers in the Gulf region (and in the Indian Ocean region 
generally) vising mil i tary means. 
Under economic securi ty/ p r i o r i t y would be given to 
securing US economic in te res t s (raw mater ia ls / investments) 
p r inc ipa l ly by diversifying sources. 
The fact of geography makes Ind ia ' s pos i t ion in the area 
t he most predominant. With a long coast l ine India is the l a rges t 
country in the Indian Ocean region. The eas tern flank comprising 
Andaman and Nicobar/ the western flank with Minicoy and Laksh-
dweep islancts and Peninsular projection deep into the sea 
6. India tes a land f ront ier of about 15/200 kilometers and a 
coast l ine of about 6,100 kilometers. 
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(1600 miles) make India the most s t r a t e g i c a l l y located country. 
In fact the control of Ind ia ' s destiny is s i g n i f i c a n t l y depen-
dent on the control of the Indian Ocean. Hence scholarship on 
the Indian Ocean way back in l a t e 1940s and 6Cs highl ighted the 
importance of t h i s vast oceanic area on Ind i a ' s geos t ra t eg ic , 
7 po l i t i c a l and economic future . The scholarship underscored the 
point that the development of sea power on the p a r t of India is 
the only a l t e rna t i ve avai lable to make i t free of the external 
power presence and to ensure secur i ty of India . Even Jawaharlal 
Nehru in a speech in Bombay on l5th March 1946 s t a t e d : 
The Indian Ocean region depends for i t s defence 
grea t ly on India which is s t r a t e g i c a l l y located 
in the Centre. Thus South East Asia and Middle 
g 
East defence will par t ly depend on Ind ia . 
He appealed to the nation 
to change i t s old land based concept of the 
Indian nation as extending from Kashmir to 
]<anyakuiiari that of one s t re tch ing from Kashmir 
q 
to Por tb la i r (Australia) . 
7. K.M. Panikar^ India an^ Indian Ocean (London, 1945>; 
P.Vidya, The Nava;i Defence of India (Bombay, 1964); Indian 
Council of World Affairs, Oefgnce and Security in t ^ 
In(;3iap Ocsfin Ar^a (New York, 1958) , 
8. Quoted in P a t r i o t (Delhi) , 7th July 19 78. 
9 . Quoted in P.I. .S. Namboodiri, J .P . Anand and Sreedhar, 
Intervent ion in the Indian Ocean (Delhi, 1982) , p . 232. 
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totwithstanding the fact tha t in the pas t , the western 
great pov/er entry into India from the oceanic f ron t i e r ra ther 
than from the central Asia was socio-economic p o l i t i c a l l y decis ive, 
the Indian perception of the Indian Ocean was incorporated in the 
broad s t ra teg ic matrix as a peripheral issue. This is somewhat 
surpr i s ing . However, the factors tha t contr ibuted to the lack 
of any major policy formulation on the pa r t of the Indian 
Government can be located in the global and regional context . 
For one thing, immediately a f t e r independence Indian condition 
in terms of p o l i t i c a l , economic and mi l i ta ry capab i l i t y was 
qu i t e weak. The logic of underdevelopment due to colonial sub-
jugation was the cause behind t h i s weakness. Hence India could 
not formulate a d i s t inc t ocean pol icy. 
Besides, the p a r t i t i o n phobia of the post indpendence 
period, the obsession of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e to ident i fy the 
secur i ty syndromes with the Central Asian t r a d i t i o n s of Moghuls, 
absence of tension in the Indian Ocean in the post war decades 
and reckoning of the Bri t ish presence as a s e c u r i t y sh ie ld for 
India might have contributed towards the absence of policy 
formulation. The agonising Sino-Indian s t r a t e g i c contradict ion 
further diverted government and public a t t en t i on from the 
oceanic f ron t i e r . The U.S. support to India in 1962 Sino-Indian 
war could have si lenced India when the U.S. Jo in t Chief of Staff, 
General Maxwell Taylor proposed for an Indian Ocean Task Force 
for the U.S. Seventh F lee t . And when the U.S. f l e e t cruised 
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in the Indian Ocean in 1963 Nehru characterised i t as "s ight 
seeing v i s i t " , ""seeing the waters" e t c . But d ispe l l ing 
various doubts, Nehru assumed the Rajya Sabha t h a t " i t would be 
q u i t e wrong to suggest that a cruise by a few U.S. Naval vessels 
in the Indian Ocean e i the r threatness our freedom or imperils 
12 
our policy of non-alignment". Even he denied the charge of t he 
CFI member Inde r j i t Gupta that the presence of the American 
vessels in the Indian Ocean amounted to mi l i t a ry bases f loa t ing 
about. 
The jposition taken by the government of India has been 
14 
sometimes ca l l ed 'ambivalent ' . But the policy of the government 
obviously did not go against the fundamentals of foreign policy 
namely non-alignment, anti-imperialism, a n t i - r a c i a l i s m , Asian 
s o l i d a r i t y , in ternat ional cooperation etCc 
The 1965 war with Pakistan, Indonesia 's augmented naval 
bui ld up and t h a t country 's mention of the p o s s i b i l i t y of sending 
some of i t s naval craf t to Pakistan's aid/ B r i t i s h withdrawal 
from the East of the Suez and Prime Minister Wilson's creat ion 
10. Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean i Towards a Zone of 
Peace (Delhi : 1972) . p . 11. 
11• Ib id . 
12. Ib id . 
13. Lok Sabha Debates, Vbl. 25, Series 3 , 10-21, February, 1964, 
Columns 1018-19, 
14. Devendra Kaushik, n. 10, p . 11 
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of the Bri t ish Indian Ocean Terr i tory (HtOT) and h is asking the 
U.S. t o 'share the burden", e t c . created a new geopdl i t i ca l 
s i t u a t i o n for India. Coqpled with t h i s , t he Arab-Israel war of 
196 7, the increasing presende of the U.S.A. in the Indian Ocean 
and the Anglo-American agreement on Diego Garcia compelled India 
to take a serious note of the s i t ua t ion . Ind i a ' s perception 
thus underwent a qua l i t a t ive change as compared to 1963. 
Though India made no formal protes t to London i t played 
an act ive role in get t ing the Anglo-American moves condemned by 
15 
a resolut ion of t h e U.N. t rus teeship council . Replying t o a 
question in t he Parliament Foreign Minister Mr. M.C. Chagla said: 
We have subscribed to resolut ion No. 1514 of 
14th December i960 and No. 2066 of 4th January 
1966, adapted by the U.N. General Assembly 
dealing with t h i s subject . Resolution No. 2066 
notes with deep concern tha t any s tep by the 
administering power to detach ce r t a in is lands 
for the purpose of es tabl ishing mi l i t a ry bases 
would be in contravention of resolut ion No. 1544. 
I t further invites the administering power to 
take no action which would dismember the t e r r i -
tory of Mauritius and violate i t s t e r r i t o r i a l 
16 in tegr i ty . 
15. The Statesman (New Delhi) . November 20, 1965. 
I 
16. Lok Sabha Debates, 4th s e r i e s . Vol. 2, 31st March 8th April 
1967, "Debate Over Proposed Purchase of I s lands" , Col.3208. 
102 
But. the views of some of the Members of Parliament ran 
counter to the government decision. 
The Members emphasised that in view of the 
Chinese atomic black mail against India/ and 
in view of the fact that no progress i s being 
made in Disarmament Committee regarding non-
prol iferat ion of nuclear weapons, e spec ia l ly 
so far as the mutual obl igat ion between the 
nuclear and non-nuclear countr ies are concerned, 
and in view of our stand tha t we are not going 
in for manufacture of nuclear weapons and in 
view of the growing detente between the U.S.A. 
and the U.S.S.R. what good i t does do to our 
national in te res t to ra i se t h i s hulbaloo about 
these bases in the high seas about which we 
cannot do anything in any case? And i t is 
better to keep s i l e n t and get the assurance of 
17 
protection against nuclear blackmail. 
17. Ib id . , Columns 3207-24. Members who espoused t h i s point 
of view are P.K. Deo and Sr i Swell (Swatantra) . 
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M.C„ Chagla did not accept th i s point of view and asse r -
ted tha t : 
India has not been in the habit in the pas t , i t 
is not in the habit now and i t w i l l , I hope, 
never be in the habit in future of not r a i s ing 
i t s pro tes t when injust ice is done or something 
is done which is opposed to our po l i cy . Our 
policy is the policy of non-alignment; our policy 
is the policy of ant i -colonial ism. What is being 
done today affects our policy of ant i - imperial ism. 
18 
This (excision of islands and se l l ing them to the U.S.'; 
i s a perpetuation of colonialism. Since the days of Bandung, 
we have, siabscribed to cer ta in p r inc ip les . We must stand by 
then; and if somebody violates these p r inc ip l e s , i t is the 
19 bounden duty of Indian to ra ise a p ro tes t " . 
After the Bri t ish withdrawal from the East of Suez in 
1968, the western powers contended that there i s a power vaccuuro 
in the Indian Ocean. India rejected th i s concept of 'power 
vacuum as another s t ra tegy to perpetuate colonia l i sm. Replying 
18. Words in the bracket are mine. 
19. ^< .^ 16. c o l s . 3207-24, 
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to a ques t ion in the Lok Sabha the then Defence M i n i s t e r 
Mr. Swaran Singh s a i d : 
I t is not our i n t e n t i o n f i r s t l y to accept 
t he v a l i d i t y of t h i s concept t h a t any vacuuiD 
be c r e a t e d . If any fo re ign power l eaves any 
p a r t i c u l a r area* then i t i s for t h a t a rea and 
for t h a t t e r r i t o r y to take adequate s t e p s to 
safeguard t h e i r own s a f e t y and t h e i r own 
20 
c o u n t r y . 
But some members in the Lok Sabha mooted t h e po in t t h a t 
India should t ake s t eps to bu i ld up a naval power t o f i l l t h e 
vacuum so t h a t Ind ian Ocean remains wi th in I n d i a ' s r each , and 
21 t h a t t h i s vacuum i s not f i l l e d up of CENTO c o u n t r i e s . 
Rooted in the t r a d i t i o n a l t heory of power and balance of 
power the power vacuum concept suggests t h a t t h e new na t ions 
of Asia and Africa on the Ind ian Ocean a re economical ly so poor 
and p o l i t i c a l l y so vu lne rab le as to be unable t o defend 
22 
themselves from wi th in as well as from wi thou t . 
20. Lok S&bha Debates , \fol. 15, Ser ies 4 , 27th March, 10th 
Apri l 1968, volunn 319 2. 
2 1 . Ib id ' . , The sugges t ion came from Balraj Madhok, M.P. (Jansangh) 
22 . See K.p. Mis ra , " Ind i an Ocean P o l i t i c s : An Afro-Asian P e r s -
p e c t i v e " , in Surendra Chopra (ed.) , S tud ies i n I n d i a ' s 
Foreign Po l i cy (Amri tsar : 1980) p . 233. 
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Following the policy of non-alignment, ant i - imper ia l ism, 
a n t i - r a c i a l i s m , peaceful coexistence e t c . India has encouraged 
the n a t i o n a l i s t forces in the region to f i l l 15) the vacuum^ if 
a t a l l , there is any. 
India following the policy of non-alignment bel ieves 
i n t e r a l i a tha t she must keep away from the power p o l i t i c s of 
m i l i t a r y b locs , l e s t i t would do multiple damage to her develop-
ment. Henc:e she has consis tent ly supported the attempts of 
(ither countr ies to create a climate of peace in the in terna t ional 
and nationail spheres of the Indian Ocean being r e l a t e d to the 
broad framework of world peace and security is s im i l a r l y suppor-
ted by Ind ia . 
India in NAM: 
India was a signatory to the proposal and declarat ion of 
the Cairo Summit Conference of non-aligned countr ies (1954) which 
c a l l e d for t h e establishment of denuclearised zones covering 
Africa, Lat in America and other areas and Oceans of the world, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those which have hi therto been free from nuclear 
23 
weapons. 
23. Conference of Heads of States and Government of Non-
Allqned Countries (Cairo j 1964) , p . 350. 
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I n t h e Lusaka Confe rence (19 70) I n d i a ' s Prime M i n i s t e r 
e m p h a s i s i n g t h e d a n g e r s of s e t t i n g i^ p of m i l i t a r y b a s e s 
o b s e r v e s ? 
We would l i k e t h e I n d i a n Ocean t o be an a r e a 
of p e a c e and c o o p e r a t i o n . M i l i t a r y b a s e s , of 
o u t s i d e p o w e r s , w i l l c r e a t e t e n s i o n and g r e a t 
24 power r i v a l r y . 
F u r t h e r I n d i a h e l p e d b r i n g abou t t h e c o n s e n s u s t o p a s s t h e 
S r i Lankan p r o p o s a l t h a t I n d i a n Ocean be d e c l a r e d a zone of 
p e a c e from which g r e a t power r i v a l r i e s and c o m p e t i t i o n s as wel l 
a s b a s e s c o n c e i v e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of such r i v a l r i e s and compe-
t i t i o n s ( e i t h e r army, navy o r e i r f o r c e bases) a r e e x c l u d e d . 
She a l s o s i g n e d a d e c l a r a t i o n t o make t h e a r e a f r e e of n u c l e a r 
"weapons • 
I n d i a i n t h e m i n i s t e r i a l mee t ing of t h e n o n - a l i g n e d coun-
t r i e s i n New York (19 71) f u r t h e r a g r e e d w i t h o t h e r s t a t e s t o 
t a k e c o n c r e t e s t e p s i n t h e (xxvi) s e s s i o n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
t o implement t h e d e c i s i o n r e l a t i n g t o t he d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean a s a zone of p e a c e , as c o n t a i n e d in t h e Lusaka 
d e c l a r a t i o n . 
2 4 . X .P . M i s r a , n . 2 2 , p . 236, 
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India also ca l led with other s ta tes to declare South 
East Asia as a zone of peace, freeAsm and neu t ra l i ty , free 
frotT) any form of menaces of interference by outside powers. 
The entry of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean 
to show off force to ' res t ra in* India in the Indo-Pak War of 
19 71 and the subsequent efforts of the Brit ish and the U.S. 
Governments to build up a base in Diego Garcia propelled her to 
condemn the plans to mi l i t a r i s e the Ocean (special ly the extension 
of base f a c i l i t i e s in Diego Garcia propelled her to condemn the 
plans to m i l i t a r i s e the Ocean (special ly the extension of base 
f a c i l i t i e s in Diego Garcia) in the meeting of coordinating 
Bureau of the non-aligned countries in Havana (19 75) . 
In the 1975 Lime Ministerial Conference of the Non-
al igned countr ies and the 19 76 Summit Conference in Colombo, 
India with other countries called for the cooperation of the 
western great powers and the major maritime users of the Indian 
Ocean to cooperate with the Adhoc Committee set up by the U.N. 
to implement the United Nations declaration t o make the Indian 
Ocean a zone of peace. I t also called upon t he non-aligned 
s t a t e s in t h e Indian Ocean region to take concerted ac t ion in 
consul ta t ion with other l i t t o r a l and hinterland coxmtries with 
a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean to implement 
the U.N. Resolution 2832 (xxvi) . Moreover, India was a signatory 
108 
t o t h e d e c l a r a t i o n which c a l l e d upon the U.N. General Assembly 
t o make the Adhoc Committee more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in c h a r a c t e r . 
Fur the r in the Colombo Sunmit Conference, I nd i a concurred 
w i th the view of the S r i Lankan Prime Min i s te r Mrs . Bhandar-
naike t h a t c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s of non-alignment a r e invoked in 
25 the d e c l a r a t i o n of the Ind ian Ocean as a zone of peace . 
I n d i a , moreover, was a s i g n a t o r y to the r e s o l u t i o n which 
s t a t e d : 
t h a t t he proposal fo r the c r e a t i o n of a zone 
of peace in t h e Indian Ocean does not l i m i t the 
r i g h t t o f r ee and unimpeded use of the Ind ian 
Ocean by t h e v e s s e l s of o the r c o u n t r i e s as long 
as they a r e in conformity with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law and do not pose m i l i t a r y o r s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t 
t o t h e independence, sovere ign ty and t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y of the l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s . 
India has p o i n t e d ou t the l im i t ed nature of t h e t a l k s 
between t h e U.S.A. and t h e U.S.S.R held in 1977 t o d e m i l i t a r i s e 
25 . Documents of t h e Gg^therings of Non-aligned c o u n t r i e s 
1961-78 (Belgrade , 1978) , p . 190, 
26. I b i d . 
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t h e Indian Ocean. Bmphasiaing on t h i s po in t t h e then fo r e ign 
m i n i s t e r of Ind ia A.B. Vajpayee s a i d : 
The U.S.-Soviet t a l k s were aimed a t l i m i t a t i o n 
of armaments# but Ind ia would l i k e e l i m i n a t e d of 
27 
a l l fore ign bases from the Ind i an Ocean r eg ion . 
In t h e 19 79 Havana Summit Conference of t h e non-a l igned 
c o u n t r i e s Ind ia r e g r e t t e d ; 
t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of t he d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e 
Ind ian Ocean as a zone of peace adopted by the 
U.N. in 1971 have remained u n f u l f i l l e d . . . and 
expressed concern over t he s t r e n g t h e n i n g of 
m i l i t a r y base in Diego Garc ia . F u r t h e r , Ind ia 
urged the s^per powers t o resume t a l k s t o d e m i l i -
28 l i t a r i s e the Ind ian ocean. 
The l e ssen ing of the US c o n t r o l over t he regimes of 
t h e West Asia (examplif ied by the f a l l of t h e Shah of I ran) and 
c a p t u r e of grand Mosque in Saudi Arab t h e r e i s again an a t t empt 
t o e s t a b l i s h command over t he Oceans, s p e c i a l l y t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
r e g i o n . Hence the concept and e s t ab l i shmen t of t he r a p i d 
deployment force fol lowing t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e 18 has 
been emphasised. Deigo Garcia with i t s extended base f a c i l i t i e s 
" " - — • —II — g— - • • T Miirmr--—r» ~ i — i — • — • ii~> ' — " 1 n i m n ~ > i i • • m • _ n i IIMB, I M I ^ I W I . I W - I I M I ^ m n \M • • • » I 1 I I I I B 
27 . Quoted in J .P .Anand,"El iminat ing Ind ian Ocean Base8**India 
Backgrounder (New Delhi , Vol.11,No.31(83) Oct . 3 1 , 1977 ,p .885 . 
28 . Shyaro Nandan Mis ra ,Min is te r of Externa l Af fa i r s i n Addres-
se s delivered! ^<; ^bf s^^i-h Cr.i^ fp>rf>ing4> nf Heatga of S t a t e o r 
Qovt. of Non-aligned c o u n t r i e s , (Havana: 1979) , p . 285 . 
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w i l l provicJe t h e vantage po in t for t h e o p e r a t i o n of RDF. Coupled 
w i th t h i s the ex tens ion of the new "coinrnand s t r u c t u r e s " and 
e r e c t i o n of " s t r a t e g i c consensus** with I s r a e l , Saudi Arab and 
I s r a e l have been f a c i l i t a t e d in the Ind ian Ocean r e g i o n . 
Keep)ing in mind these developments I n d i a wi th o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s , i n 1983 Suntnit Conference of the non-a l igned na t ions 
no t ed wi th concern " t h a t the quest for the spheres of inf luence 
undermined t h e o b j e c t i v e of e s t ab l i sh ing u n i v e r s a l c o l l e c t i v e 
s e c u r i t y without m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and the s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s 
29 
of the non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s . 
Ind ia was a l s o a s igna tory t o the d e c l a r a t i o n which 
s t a t e d * 
The Heads of S t a t e or Government view wi th 
concern the expansion of e x i s t i n g b a s e s , the 
s ea rch fo r new f a c i l i t i e s and the e s t ab l i shmen t 
of new m i l i t a r y command s t r u c t u r e s of the g r e a t 
powers aga ins t the express wishes of l i t t o r a l and 
h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s of t h e Ind i an Ocean r eg ion and 
o t h e r non-aligned c o u n t r i e s . 
29. **Final Document, Seventh Conference of Heads of S t a t e 
o r Government of Non-aligned Coun t r i e s , New De lh i , 1983**, 
S t r a t e g i c Diges t , May 1983, p . 28. 
3 0 . I b i d . 
I l l 
Besides/ Ind ia demanded f o r the e a r l y convening of an 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l conference on t h e Ind ian Ocean and urged the 
United Nations Ad-hoc Coimnittee to complete I t s p r e p a r a t i o n s 
s t r i c t l y In accordance wi th t h e mandate/ d e s p i t e t h e de laying 
t a c t i c s of t h e g r e a t powers. I t a l so urged t h e Super Powers to 
resume negot ia t ion t o d e m i l i t a r i s e the Indian Ocean. 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t a spec t of t he Seventh Sunmlt Confe-
rence Is tha t I t c a l l e d for the e a r l y r e t u r n of t h e Diego Garcia 
31 t o Maur l t ious . 
Besides the non-a l igned/ India has a c t i v e l y t aken up the 
Indian Ocean ques t ion in t h e commonwealth con fe r ences . 
In tlie Singapore Conference of Commonwealth Heads of 
S t a t e (January 1971) Ind i a was ins t rumenta l in b r i n g i n g out 
a r e s o l u t i o n which emphasised on " the d e s i r a b i l i t y of ensur ing 
32 peace and s t a b i l i t y in t h e Ind ian Ocean a r e a " . 
Also a t a l l subsequent conferences I n d i a ' s views were 
widely accepted. In Delhi meeting of Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Mrs. Gandhi expressed concern a t t h e growing 
3 1 . I b i d . / p . 29. 
32 . K.P. Misra/ n. 22, p . 240. 
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tn i l i tar lBat ion of the ocean for the in te res t s of powerful. 
She furti'ier s ta ted: 
Twelve years ago» the U.N, declared the 
Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Yet the region 
b r i s t l e s with the f leets* bases/ and new 
command s t ructures of outside powers. 
Let us hope tha t the conference pro-
posed to implement the U.N. declarat ion on 
the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace wil l be 
held before the next meeting of commonwealth 
33 
healds of government in 1984. 
Apart from the non-aligned and commonwealth forums 
India has act ively par t ic ipa ted in the United Nations to 
mobil ise public opinion in favour of the U.N. resolut ion 
283 2 (xxvi) declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 
Ind ia in the United Nations? 
India co-sponsored the 1971 resolut ion 283 2 (xxvi) 
with S r i Lanka to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace* 
She is act ively working in t h e Ad-hoc Committee on the Indian 
33 . Text of Mrs. Gandhi's address to CHOGM, 1983, Tj 
India (Delhi), 22.11.1983. 
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Ocean appointed by the CSeneral Assembly in 1972 to study the 
implication of the proposal with speci f ic reference to the 
prac t ica l measures tha t might be taken in furtherance of the 
objectives of the Resolution 2832 (xxvi) . 
India has ac t iv i sed the work of the Ad-hoc Committee 
by focussing a t t e n t i o n on the substantive issues* For example 
in 1975 stie proposed three s ign i f ican t points in response to 
the request of Ad-hoc Committee to indicate views on holding a 
conference on the Indian Ocean. These a re : 
(i) P r io r i t y a t t en t i on should be given to mobilising 
support of the internat ional community into con-
c re t e and construct ive act ion for implementing 
the dec lara t ion of the Indian Ocean a zone of peace 
by el iminat ing a l l mi l i ta ry bases conceived in the 
context of great power r i va l ry and reversing the 
present t rend of escalat ing great power r iva l ry in 
the Indian Ocean. 
( i i ) Conference should be envisaged as providing an 
acceptable framework within which consul ta t ion 
between the l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s on the 
one hand and great power and major maritime users 
on the o ther could be i n i t i a t e d and a process of 
const ruct ive dialogue se t in motion. 
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( i l l ) There should t>e general assessment of the extent 
of great power mi l i t a ry and naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean. This should be followed by elabo-
ra t ion of measures for achieving the el iminat ion 
of a l l foreign mi l i ta ry bases and reduct ion of 
t h e i r mi l i t a ry and naval presence conceived in 
the context of great power r i v a l r i e s with a view 
to eventual el imination. 
Contrary to th i s Indian perspective Pakistan proposed tha t 
a po l i t i c a l regime and a code of conduct for es tab l i sh ing r e l a -
t ions among the Indian Ocean s t a t e s be devised. The regime wil l 
es tabl ish conditions of secur i ty among Indian Ocean s t a t e s and 
will work for the el imination of g rea t power presence and 
r i v a l r y . 
Thus Pakistan held tha t a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean required tha t regional s t a t e s be assured aga ins t t h r e a t s 
from both within and withoutt 
This perspective which brings the Indo-Pak r i v a l r y into 
the peace zone proposal was not taken into account and I n d i a ' s 
diplomatic endeavour to highl ight in ter a l i a on g rea t power 
representat ion in the internat ional conference on Indian 
Ocean has been widely supported. 
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However, India has cx>nslatently ca l led »4X>n the United 
Nations General Assembly to make the Ad-hoc Committee more 
representat ive in character so tha t harmonisation of view 
points be f a c i l i t a t e d on the issue of convening an i n t e rna t i o -
nal conference. With the enlarg«nent of the membership of the 
U.N. Ad-hoc Committee useful exchange of views has been made 
poss ib le . 
Since the inception of the Ad-hoc Committee, India with 
o ther members ca l led upon t h e western g rea t powers to cooperate 
with the U.N. Ad-hoc Committee to implement the zone of peace 
proposal . The fact t h a t the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and other western 
great powers have joined the committee amply demonstrates tha t 
the diplomatic e f for t s of the countries of the region including 
India has paved the way for some Kind of dialogue. 
Besides, India on the ca l l of the Ad-hoc Committee 
attended tlie conference of the l i t t o r a l and h in te r land countr ies 
of the Indian Ocean region in New York.. In fac t t h i s conference 
was held as a f i r s t s tep towards the holding of an in ternat ional 
conference on the Indian Ocean. 
India was also represented in the three men panel appoin-
ted by the Secretary General to prepare a fac tual repor t on the 
mil i tary presence of the great powers in a l l aspects with special 
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reference to t h e i r naval deployments in t h e context of big 
power r i v a l r y . 
Further, India has cons is tent ly supported the peace 
zone propjosal. In th i s context she has opposed the Pakis tani 
proposal to declare South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. 
I t has been s t a t ed tha t one v.ay of achieving a peace zone in 
the area is to c rea t nuclear free zone/ where the loca l s t a t e s 
would undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons and nuclear 
powers would give guarantee tha t they would ne i ther a t t ack 
these s t a t e s with nuclear weapons nor bring nuclear weapons to 
t h a t area . This proposal was even supported by S r i Lanka. 
India welcomes the attempts to c rea te nuclear weapons 
zones; but the attempt must be i n i t i a t e d by the s t a t e s concerned. 
India holds the view t h a t no regime can b^ put on any country 
if tha t is not universal and non-discriminatory. And on top of 
th i s the proposal to crea te a nuclear free zone in an area which 
i s not a geographical en t i ty will not be successful . In t h i s 
context India s t a t e s tha t South Asia i s not a geographical en t i t y 
l i k e Africa or Latin America. Hence* to crea te a nuclear free 
zone in South Asia means according to the Indian representa t ive 
34. India ' s K. Subramanyam was represented in the three men 
panel appointed by the U.N. Secretary General in 19 73. 
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in the U,N., B.C. Mishra "to enforce a geographically l imi ted 
» 35 
non-prol i ferat ion t r ea ty . 
The enduring attempt of India has been to highl ight the 
Indian Ocean peace zone proposal. 
In fact there was no suggestion to c rea te a nuclear 
f ree zone in South Asia when the Indian Ocean quest ion was f i r s t 
r a i s ed in the NAM Summit Conference a t Cairo (1964) , in the 
Lusaka Summit Conference (19 70) and even during the del ibera t ions 
in the U.H. in 1971. 
Since India has time and again declared not to manufac-
t u r e nuclear weapons and conmitted herself to the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, her stand is not in contravention to the 
U.H. resolut-ion t o create a zout; of peace in the Indian Ocean. 
Her stand vJ^-a-vis NPT is based on the philosophy of equa l i ty , 
non-discrimination and universa l i ty . Hence the Indian ef for t to 
i so l a t e the South Asia nuclear free zone issue from the Indian 
Ocean peace zone proposal is a s ign i f i can t diplomatic move to 
highl ight the problem re la t ing to m i l i t a r i s a t i o n and the nuclea-
r i s a t i o n of the Indian Ocean. 
35. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean ; Bio Power Presence apd 
k?SflJ-RggBgja§£* (Delhi, 19 77) , ' p . 254. 
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Given the nuclear capab i l i ty of I s rae l and South Africa 
i t i s absurd to declare the West Asia or any par t of Asia a 
nuclear free zone. Hence India has thus by taking a stand 
agains t the linkage of nuclear free zone with peace zone propo-
sa l reaffirmed i t s f a i t h to cowrcit to peace zone proposal . 
Indian Ocean issue epitomises the conf l ic t between 
western grea t powers and the developing co\.intries. Hence/ 
India / in her attempt to crea te a climate of opinion in favour 
of zone of peace forges s o l i d a r i t y with the developing countrie 
To f a c i l i t a t e th i s India takes recourse to various p o l i t i c o -
diplomatic s t r a t e g i e s . 
Ind ia ' s e f for ts to s ens i t i ze world opinion on the issue 
of racialism has been largely successful- In fact India is th< 
f i r s t country to condemn racialism in South Africa in the U.H. 
forvw in 1946. Moreover/ India has conferred the Jawaharlal 
Nehru Award for in ternat ional understanding and peace on Nelsoi 
Mandela, the great freedom f ighter of Africa. Besides, she h< 
provided moral, material and diplomatic support to the armed 
s t ruggle of the Namibian pjeople against apartheid. In the non-
al igned conferences, U.K. and other world forans India condemns 
r a c i a l i s t p r inc ip les . In the New Delhi Svinmit Conference of 
Non-aligned countries Mrs. Gandhi r e i t e r a t e d the Indian Govern-
ment 's support to SWAPO and PLC for t h e i r r igh t against 
colonial ism and racia l ism. 
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In a d d i t i o n t o t he se measures/ Ind ia has o r i e n t e d her 
economic and c u l t u r a l diplomacy t o f o s t e r a c o l l e c t i v e op in ion 
in favour of peace zone p r o p o s a l . 
Sconomic an<3 CuJ.tural Dipj^ymacvi 
Among Ind ian Ocean s t a t e s * the s e l f - r e l i a n c e 
s t r a t e g y has been expressed in one forW/ as 
the zone of peace proposal to b u i l d c o l l e c t i v e 
s e l f defence and end m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of t h e 
ocean* A new South b a s i s fo r t he u t i l i s a t i o n 
of t h e i r own r e sou rce s has a l s o emerged as a 
p a r t of t he a l t e r n a t i v e world system. The 
o b j e c t i v e i s t o disengaged from a system which 
Saroir Amin desc r ibed as a s i t u a t i o n in which 
' coun t r i e s produce what they do not consume and 
consume what they do not p r o d u c e ' . The s e l f -
r e l i a n c e s t r a t e g y sees probl«ns of war and 
s e c u r i t y as e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l and economic 
and der ived from both g loba l and l o c a l i s s u e s 
36 
and c o n d i t i o n s . 
3 6 . George W. Shepherd/ •'Developing Co l l ec t ive S e l f - R e l i a n c e 
in the Zone of Peace" , IPSA J o u r n a l . Vol. XV/ Ho. I, 
July-September 1982, p . 20. 
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In the similar vein the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi said in the New Delhi Summit Conference of 
Non-aligned countr ies : 
The l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the non-aligned 
movement and the United Nations have dec-
lared time and again tha t the Indian Ocean 
should be a zone of peace. Can we develop 
the s t r a t e g i c to make t h i s a r e a l i t y ? 
How do we gain strength? By a l l of 
us s t r i v i n g to become economically and tech-
nologically s e l f - r e l i a n t . By s e t t l i n g through 
peaceful discussion whatever differences we 
have with or« another. By r e s i s t i n g the i n t e r -
vention of others in our in ternal a f f a i r s . 
And by strengthening the United Nations orga-
nisa t ions . 
Thus Indian diplomatic o r i en ta t ion has emphasized on the 
c rea t ion of the conditions of s t rength in p o l i t i c a l and economic 
dimensions. Policy of non-alignment not only helps India to get 
37. "Key note address by Sriroati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister 
of India in the Seventh Conference of the Heads of Sta te 
or Government of the Non-aligned countries** (Delhi) , 
Stra^t^ic Digest> May 1983, p . 364. 
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resources for her own economic development from both the blocs 
but also to form a common linkage with the developing count r ies . 
In t h i s context India plays an in tegra t ive role amongst deve-
loping countries by taking resor t to economic diplomacy. 
IndJ^ has responded cautiously to the proposals of 
38 
s e t t i n g \jp of an Indian Ocean community. 
Though th i s has not been rea l i sed yet e f fo r t s to take 
r e s o r t to provide economic a id has p a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l e d t h i s 
ob j ec t i ve . 
With re la t ive ly strong inf ras t ruc tura l f a c i l i t i e s in 
economic sector India has been an act ive pa r t i c ipan t in mul t i -
l a t e r a l aid programmes under the Colombo Plan, the Special 
Commonwealth African Assiatence Plan (SCAAP) the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the Commonwealth Fund for economic cooperation 
r i g h t since the i r inception. Recently India has joined the 
African Development Bank and has continuously been helping 
the Economic Commission for Africa in monetary terms. 
Indian efforts to s t a r t government to government loans, 
commercial credi ts and commodity loans to the 
38. Indian Ocean Community proposal was proposed by S r i 
Lanka in 19 71. 
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needy c o u n t r i e s a re s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Moreover, Ind ian j o i n t ventures and e f f o r t s to undertake 
Turkey p r o j e c t s in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s have r e i n f o r c e d I n d i a ' s 
p r i n c i p l e r o l e t o f a c i l i t a t e coopera t ion among developing coun-
t r i e s of t h i s r e g i o n . This con tex t t he Ind ian exper ience in 
i n t e rmed ia t e technology are cons idered p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t 
and a p p r o p r i a t e to the i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n programmes of roost of 
t h e developing c o u n t r i e s . 
PulDlic s e c t o r under takings namely »4T, India Tourism 
Development Corpora t ion , LIC, GIC, BHEL, Engineer ing p r o j e c t s 
have i n c r e a s i n g l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in the j o i n t venture programmes 
in many Asia and Afr ican c o u n t r i e s . Many p r i v a t e houses a l s o have 
c o n t r i b u t e d towards undertaking j o i n t ventures in the Asian 
and African c o u n t r i e s . 
India consul tancy o r g a n i s a t i o n s in the f i e l d of M e t a l l u r -
g i c a l Engineer ing, f e r t i l i s e r , r a i l s e r v i c e s , i n d u s t r i a l 
development, water and power s e r v i c e s e t c . have se rved in the 
39 . Indones ia , Kenya, Nepal, M a u r i t i u s , Tanzania, S r i Lanka, 
Vietnam, Zambia, I r a n , Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Burma, Seyche l l e s - Ghana, People of Republic of 
Yeman and Kenya a re b e n e f i c i a r i e s of t h i s scheme. R.C. 
l^nmal, "India and the Developing world"/ Ind ian and 
Foreign Review, 1-14 Apr i l 1982, Vol. 19, No. 12, p . 8. 
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countr ies ot the Indian Ocean. 
Besides, India in keeping with the decision of the Colombo 
Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries has prepared a 
s tudy on the f u l l e s t use of compliroentaries among the non-aligned 
and other developing countries in terms of resource endowments, 
41 and indus t r ia l and technological c a p a b i l i t i e s . 
Since 1964 India i n i t i a t i v e to cooperate in the f i e lds 
of science and technology with other developing countr ies has 
been considerably furthered. At the U.N. Conference on Tech-
nica l Cooperation among developing countries in 19 78, i t has 
been announced tha t India would se t apart 10 per cent of i t s 
indica t ive planning figure under the U.N. Development Programme 
for schemes devoted to technical cooperation among developing 
count r ies . 
Moreover, I nd i a ' s advances in science and technology, 
spec ia l ly nuclear and space research, has opened the p o s s i b i l i * 
t i e s of playing a s ign i f i can t role in technology t r a n s f e r . 
India has already taken the respons ib i l i ty to se t up a non-
aligned centre for science and technology in Delhi. This wil l 
40. Water and power Consultancy Services has undertaken several 
projects in neighbouring countries for hydel power and weter 
development. Metallurgy and Engineering Services have under-
taken the i n s t a l l a t i o n of spong iron based s t e e l p lan ts in 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Bangladesh. Rail India Technical and 
Economic Services l imited have successfully implemented a 
number of assignments in Iran,Iraq,Syria ,Malasia e t c . 
4 1 . VI Conference of Heads of State or C3Qvernment of Npn-aligned 
Countries (Havana) , p . 410. 
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pave the way for increasing par t i c ipa t ion of non-aligned 
countr ies in Ind ia ' s s c i e n t i f i c pro jec ts . Ind ia ' s successful 
explorat ion of the deep seabed mining and col lec t ion of manga-
nese nodules has given a new opening for developing countr ies 
of Asia and Africa to share the Indian know-how. Speaking at 
the t h i rd conference of the foreign secretar ies for South Asia 
Regional Cooperation in Islamabad* Mr. Rasgotra, Secretary in 
the Indian External Affairs Ministry made an offer of sharing 
I n d i a ' s experience in deep seabed mining. 
In Toronto World Bank Fund meet, in the New Delhi consul-
t a t i o n s among developing countries and at varloxis world forums 
India has highlighted issues r e l a t ing to the ro le of mul t i l a -
t e r a l aid agencies l ike IDA, the creation of an energy a f f i l i a t e 
of the world Bank, integrated programme of comntwdities; c rea t ion 
of common fund, protectionism, t a r i f f and non-tariff ba r r i e r s 
and the general unfavourable economic relat ions between developed 
and developing count r ies . Thus by focussing a t t en t i on on the 
commodities of the problems faced by the developing countr ies 
Indian diplomacy has been ab le to foster a sense of s o l i d a r i t y 
amongst thie developing countr ies-
42. Indian and Foreign Review, 15-31, August 1982, Vol. 19.-
No. 21, p . 22. 
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F u r t h e r , Ind ia has a c t i v e l y worked in the UNCTAD, 
UNIDD, UNDP e t c . and has b o l s t e r e d t h e e f f o r t s of t h e group 
of 77 to n e g o t i a t e with North. 
In h<»r domestic f ront India has taken a nunber of s t e p s 
t o o b v i a t e the i n i p e r i a l i s t design t o con t ro l of t h e lEM proved 
t h i s s t a n d jx j in t . But the Congress (I) government has l i b e r a l i -
s e d t h e import of technologica l know-how. But t h e undercurrent 
of o b v i a t i n g the domination of t h e ex te rna l f a c t o r s over Ind ian 
economy has been taken in to account . 
Congress (I) government's wi l l ingness t o n e g o t i a t e and 
e n a c t a 50 per cen t cu t in t a r i f f s on products of i n t e r e s t to 
o t h e r developing c o u n t r i e s , the dec is ion to i n s t i t u t e a new 
scheme which would permit duty f ree en t ry of h a n d i c r a f t products 
from o t h e r developing count r ies on a r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s and in the 
c a s e of l e a s t developed coun t r i e s on a non - r ec ip roca l b a s i s , 
s u b j e c t t o a c e r t a i n annual c e i l i n g e t c . have s t r eng thened 
I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s to b o l s t e r her economic diplomacy. In a d d i t i o n 
t h e same approach has been followed the government for techno-
logy and c a p i t a l flows as well the o i l e x p o r t i n g developing coun-
t r i e s . India has f u r t h e r offered her exper ience of planned 
43 
economic development t o o ther developing c o u n t r i e s . 
4 3 . Ex t rac ted from the t ex t of the concluding s t a t emen t by 
Mr. P.V. Narsiraha Rao, Min i s t e r of Ex te rna l A f f a i r s , Chairman 
of the M i n i s t e r i a l Conference of Non-aligned c o u n t r i e s on 
Feb. 13, 1981 . ; The Foreign Min i s t e r s from Non-Aligned 
Countr ies met i n New Delhi . 
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Recent Indian e fforts to se t up Joint Commissions with 
Saudi Arabia, Iran. Pakistan, Vietnam e t c . have given added 
s t rength to India 's economic diplomacy. Further , the i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l i sa t ion of SARC in the New Delhi meeting of the foreign 
minis ters of the South Asian countries and the formulation of an 
integrated programme of Action in the areas of ag r i cu l tu re , ru ra l 
development, meteorology, science and technology, a r t s and 
c u l t u r e , telecommunication e t c . have bu i l t up a foundation long 
way to iron out the differences between countr ies of the region. 
I n d i a ' s less enthusiast ic response to SARC and her effor ts to 
maintain a low profi le image by allowing the other nations to 
take i n i t i a t i v e have proved her diplomacy move to unite nations 
of South Asia on a common platform. 
Thus, India has considerably furthered i t s e f for t s to 
economically l ink the countries of the non-aligned and deve-
loping world. This helps India to s e n s i t i s e world public 
opinion on North-South issues and to create a common front to 
bargain with the developed countr ies . 
Culturally, Indian diplomacy has mainly been ref lec ted 
through Indian Cbuncil of Cultural Relations (ICCR) . ICCR 
la rge ly covers th i rd world countr ies . I t has got a regional 
centre in F i j i . I t s principal function has been to foster 
cu l tu ra l re la t ions with other developing coun t r i e s . Besides, 
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India ' s successful ef for ts to se t up Mahatma Gandhi Centre in 
Mauritius and another Cultural Centre in Ethiopia have r e in -
forced her stand to promote a sense of s o l i d a r i t y among African 
and Asian count r ies . Hosting the internat ional conference on 
Hindi in India and Mauritius India has further reaffirmed her 
efforts to strengthen cu l tu ra l re la t ions with the countr ies of 
the region. 
In addit ion to a l l these diplomatic e f f o r t s , I nd i a ' s 
attempts to promote an in ternat ional information order» to 
contribute towards the crea t ion of a Non-aligned News Agency 
Pool, to open Broadcasting Corporation of the Non-aligned 
countries (BOMAC) e t c . have contributed to some extent towards 
the development of a cooperative atmosphere amongst the develo-
ping countr ies . Indian i n i t i a t i v e to create a supra-national 
news agency so as to be independent of the Western dominated 
information order would s ign i f i can t ly help the developing 
countr ies . Given the experience of India in the f i e l d of s a t e l -
l i t e telecommunication i n i t i a t i v e in th i s d i rec t ion should be 
undertaken. 
Ind ia ' s foreign policy perspective and diplomacy has been 
concerned among other things in making Indian Ocean a zone of 
peace. Towards the d i rec t ion pol i t ico-diplomatic e f fo r t s in t h e 
non-alignment movement, in the commonwealth conferences and in 
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t h e U.N. have been undertaken. Even emphasis on economic and 
c u l t u r a l diplomacy has been l a i d . But here i t i s not i n t e r p r e -
t e d t h a t economic and c u l t u r a l diplonBcy has got one to one 
r e l a t i o n with the zone of peace proposa l . The t h r u s t of t h e 
argument i s t h a t India i s t r y i n g to c rea te c o n d i t i o n s and 
c l i m a t e for implementing the U.N. r e s o l u t i o n 2832 (xxvi) . 
Bi;it d e s p i t e t h e po l icy pos ture of the government t o 
c r e a t e a zone of peace , the pe r spec t ive of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , 
p r e s s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s o n t h e Indian Ocean problem do not 
cove rage . Hence a n a l y s i s of t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l p a t t e r n of p e r s -
p e c t i v e s i s undertaken. 
P e r s p e c t i v e s of Opposi t ion P a r t i e s : 
I t was a l l e g e d by the Prime Minis te r Mrs. I n d i r a Gandhi 
t h a t o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s were encouraging the American move t o 
44 
s e t up a base in Diego Garcia . 
No doubt some p a r t i e s in oppos i t ion d id not take a firm 
s t a n d a g a i n s t American move but l a r g e l y the oppjosition p a r t i e s 
condemned some aspec ts of i t . 
44 . Th<» Indian Express (Delhi) , 21 February, 1974 . 
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CPI members took a f irtn s tand r i g h t from t h e time when 
t h e B r i t i s h Government exc i sed Diego Garcia from Mar i t i u s and 
l e a s e d i t to the United S t a t e s . C.K, Chandrapan and Bhogendra 
45 Jha sugges ted the Government qu i t the cosrwjonvealth. 
Even members l i k e Bhupesh Gupta and Sa rdesa i were c r i t i -
c a l of r e f e rences by Min i s t e r s to big power r i v a l r y in t h e 
Indian Ocean, as according t o them the American end Russian s t and 
was not the same. Sa rdesa i re fe r red to U .S .S .R . ' s coopera t ion 
wi th Ind ia t o f u r t h e r l a t t e r ' s o b j e c t i v e . 
The CPI General Secre ta ry c r i t i c i s e d P re s iden t Ford for 
defending these nefa r ious a c t i v i t i e s ( s e t t i n g up a base in 
46 Diego Garcia) by d i sh ing out the falsehood t h a t the Soviet 
47 
Union has a l r eady e s t a b l i s h e d these bases . 
CPI f u r t h e r urged the government to t ake a firm s tand 
a g a i n s t t he U.S. a c t i o n . I t condemned not on ly t h e Jana Sangh 
and Congress (0) but a l so Chir^ for remaining s i l e n t over t h e 
48 U.S. move. 
4 5. Loksabha Debates, Vol. 25, 22 March 19 73, Col. 96, 
4 6 . *»ords in the bracket a re mine, 
4 7 . Loksabha Debates, Vol. XLV, No. 3 , 15 November, 1974. 
Col . 908-24. 
48 . Times of India (Delhi) , 31 January 19 75. 
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The e r s t w h i l e Congress (0) and Janasangh c r i t i c i s e d 
I n d i r a Gandhi for taking a sof t l i n e on the Sovie t Union p r e -
sence in the a rea . Speaking on a c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n motion on 
t h e presence of the U.S. t a s k force in the Ind ian Ocean in the 
Loksabha 12 November 19 73, Mukhtiar Singh (Janasangh) blamed 
t h e super powers fo r d iv id ing the world to spheres of in f luence / 
Frasannabhai Mehta (Cbngress-0) po in ted out t h a t one super power 's 
p resence wi l l pave the way for the e n t r y of the o t h e r and the 
r e s u l t wi l l be c o n f l i c t and t e n s i o n . He even accused t h e 
government of India of not c r i t i c i s i n g the e n t r y of t h e naval 
49 
s h i p s of the Soviet Union, Janasangh and Congress (0) members 
f u r t h e r charged t h a t the government of Ind ia i s not p r o j e c t i n g 
a c o r r e c t image of the s i t u a t i o n in the Indian Ocean by not 
equa t ing the Soviet Union and the U.S. presence-
The CPI (M) not only c r i t i c i s e d the U.S.A. for s e t t i n g 
up a m i l i t a r y base in Diego Garcia but a l so China fo r her s i l e n c e 
over t h i s i s s u e . 
Rash<»eduddin Khan, Member of Parl iament (Rajya Sabha, 
nominated) suggested t ha t the ques t ion of bases should be taken 
a t the Indo-U.S. b i l a t e r a l t a l k s . 
49 . Loksablia Debates. Vol. XXXII, ^to. 1, 12th Nov. 19 73, 
Cols . 250-51, 254-55. 
^^* Statesman (Delhi) , 24 March, 19 74. 
5 1 . Rajya Sabha Debates , Vol. LXXXXVIII, No. 2 , 19 Feb. 1974, 
Col. 85. 
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I n 19 74 a new s i t u a t i o n deve loped i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
w i t h t h e e n t r y of t h e U.S. n<x:lear powered a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r 
k i t t y Hawk. CPI (M) Members c r i t i c i s e d t h e government f o r no t 
t a k i n g a f i r m s t a n d a g a i n s t t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e . Mr. J y o t i Basu 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e government p o l i c y a s " r u n n i n g w i t h t h e h a r e 
and h u n t i n g w i t h t h e hound" . He f u r t h e r s t a t e d , "government i s 
hand i n g l o b e w i t h t h e Amer icans" . I t s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e U.S. 
p r e s e n c e was o n l y f o r home consumpt ion . "He a l l e g e d t h a t an 
American Company in I n d i a (Union Carbide) was s p y i n g i n t h e 
52 
I n d i a n Ocean w i t h s o p h i s t i c a t e d b o a t s under t h e g a r b of f i s h i n g " . 
B i r e n d r a S ingh (CPI) keeping in mind t h e c r u i s e of K i t t y Hawk t o 
I n d i a n Ocean reminded t h a t t h e "main t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y 
53 
t o d a y comes from t h e I n d i a n Ocean s i d e " . 
But J a n a s a n g h ' s r e s p o n s e was c o n t r a r y t o t h a t ©f t h e CPI . 
Subramaniam Swamy (Jansangh) p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e t h r e a t from t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean comes from the *big p o w e r s ' , no t from a s i n g l e 
p o w e r . He s u b s t a n t i a t e d i t by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e b i g powers i n c l u -
d i n g S o v i e t Union a b s t a i n e d from v o t i n g t h e U.H. r e s o l u t i o n 
283 2 (xxvi) . He even c i t e d t h e s t a t i s t i c s ( s h i p - d a y s ) t o s u b s -
t a n t i a t e h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e was 
54 
a s g r e a t as t h a t of t h e U.S. 
5 2 . Loksabha D e b a t e s , Vol . XXXVI, No. 15,March 12, 1974. 
C o l s . 174 -79 . 
5 3 . I b i d . , C b l . 189. 
5 4 . Rajya Sabha D e b a t e s , Vol . XL,^b . 3 , 15 Itov. 1 9 7 4 , C o l . 2 6 9 , 2 7 6 . 
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Swamy and N.G. Goray (Soc i a l i s t ) s t rong ly pleaded for 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g the Indian Kavy by adding modern submarines , 
f a s t m i s s i l e boats and the l ike to meet the s i t u a t i o n deve lo-
ping in the Indian Ocean and a t the same working for the peace 
concept for the a r e a . 
Swatantra Par ty member P.K, Deo sugges ted t h e Government 
t o " b u i l d up I n d i a ' s power in the Indian Ocean reg ion in commen-
s u r a t e with i t s s t a t u s , d igni ty and s i z e . He not only sugges ted 
t h e govemmisnt to r a i s e navy's share in the defence budget but 
a l s o to b u i l d up i s l ands located in the Eas te rn and Western f l ank 
of India as naval bases; otherwise he s a i d , "we w i l l r epea t the 
same f o l l y which the Mughal emperors did by completely n e g l e c t i n g 
55 the Indian Ocean." 
Memb€»rs of Parliament who c o n s t i t u t e the c o n s u l t a t i v e 
committee for External Affairs expressed concern about the 
U.S. naval es tab l i shment in Diego Garcia which has developed from 
a communications f a c i l i t y in to a f u l l - f l e d g e d s t r a t e g i c s t a g i n g 
b a s e . The M.Ps. who p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e d i s cus s ions on Indian 
Ocean on 5th August 1980 were Y, B. Chavan (Congress-U) , Chandra j i t 
Yadav (Lok Eial) , B.R. Bhagat (Congress-I) , Shahabuddin (Janata-JP) , 
5 5 . Loksabha Debates, Vol. XLII, No. 19, l 6 t h August 1974, 
Cols. 320-22 (half an hour d i scuss ion on I n d i a n Ocean as 
a free zone) . 
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K.P. Unnikrishnan (Congress U) and Ladli Mohan (Lok Dal) . 
The inetnbers views with concern the increasing great 
power presence af ter the events in Afghanistan (19 79) . While 
some members suggested that the presence of both the U.S. and 
Soviet Union be equally opposed by Indian and l i t t o r a l s t a t e s , 
o thers cautioned against the moves to divide l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . 
A few members suggested the government not only to moder-
nize navy with a view to safeguard maritime i n t e r e s t s , t rade 
r u i t e s and the lonsj coast l ine but also to develop technology 
t o explore and exploit under sea resources. These members 
underscored the fact that the big power r iva l ry in the Indian 
ocean is a th rea t to the economic exploi tat ion of seabed 
resources undertaken-by India. 
Congress (U ) took strong exception to the dele t ion of 
reference to Diego Garcia at the Foreign Minis ter ' s conference 
of the Non-aligned countries (19 80) . I t observed tha t there was 
a substant ia l difference between India ' s draft and the conference's 
f ina l declarat ion thereby affecting some of Ind ia ' s v i t a l secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t s . 
56. Times of India (Delhi) , 7th August, 1980. 
67. Times of India (Delhi)t, 16 ^ 18 February 1981. 
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With the change of government in the Centre in 19 77 the 
foreign policy perspective and diplomatic or ien ta t ion was not 
subject to clrastic change; special ly when we examine i t in the 
context of the problem of the Indian Ocean in Janata phase. 
In fact Janata Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
s t a t ed tha t "Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace guaranteeing 
peaceful maritime a c t i v i t y through which internat ional commerce 
flows".^® 
He further s t a t ed tha t "India can i l l afford to have 
tens ion creat ing presence" and that "nothing should l e f t in the 
Indian Ocean as a r e s u l t of ta lks between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A." 
except peace, amply demonstrates the convergence of Janata and 
Congress Government's a t t i t u d e towards the Indian Ocean. 
Further, Janata Government's foreign min i s t e r ' s "belief 
t h a t the pa r t i c ipa t ion of the great powers and major maritime 
users of Indian Ocean in the proposed international conference is 
e s s e n t i a l for achieving any concrete resul t" and h is f a i th " tha t 
the great powers would cooperate the U,N. Adhoc Committee to 
59 
make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace" reflected the policy 
58. S.C. Gangal, Indian Foreign Policy : A Documentary Study of 
Ind ia ' s Foreign Policy Since the Installa^tion of Janata 
Government 19 77 (New Delhi, 19 77), p . 448. 
59. Ib id . , p . 443. 
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posture which was rot in cont rad is t inc t ion to the congress 
pol icy . 
But the Janata Government differed in i t s foreign policy 
perspective a t l e a s t in one respec t . Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai answering a question of Vasant Sathe in Lok Sabha sa id , 
"The Honourable Member is wrong to say that the Soviet Union has 
no base whatsoever. I t has i t s sphere of influence in the Indian 
Ocean. That cannot be denied".° 
But largely the Janata perspective was or iented to create 
a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. 
Congress (I) t 
Since i t s inception as a party i t has sijpported the U.N. 
reso lu t ion . And as a party in power i t has taken the same stand. 
I t also supported the Maur i t ius ' s demand for the re turn of Diogo 
Garcia to her. Mrs. Gandhi was instrumental in bringing about a 
consensus in the Seventh Non-aligned summit to mention Diego 
61 Garcia in the final docunent. 
Unlike the Janata Government, Congress (I) did not eqxiate 
the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R's presence in terms of base f a c i l i t i e s . 
60. I b id . , p . 442. 
6 1 . Sr i Lanka opposed the mention of only Diego Garcia. She put 
forth the view tha t by s ingl ing out Diego Garcia the conference 
might rot f a c i l i t a t e American's attendance in the proposed 
international conference on the Indian Ocean. 
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This was c lear in the former foreign minister Swaran Singh's 
s ta tement . 
We should always make a d i s t inc t ion between the 
provision of f a c i l i t i e s of naval units or naval 
c raf t of any country by various parts and the 
provision of bases. 
For instance, he sa id: 
India provides the normal bunkering f a c i l i t i e s * 
even purchase of food, provisions e t c . , to a l l 
the friendly countr ies ' naval vessels whether i t 
is the United States or Britain or France or the 
U.S.S.R. So, the provision of these normal f a c i -
l i t i e s in peace time is not regarded as scnjcthing 
o bject iona b l e . 
But he added: 
the provision of a base is a serious matter which 
. 62 
canr.ot remain undetected. 
62. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. XXXVI, No. 15, March 12, 1974. 
Col. 190. 
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Press; 
Indian Press was uniformly hos t i l e to the Anglo American 
decision to convert the Diego Garcia island into a ful l-f ledged 
American naval base, although ttiere was some var ia t ion depending 
upon the ideological leaning. 
Commenting on external power involvement in the Indian 
Ocean in the ear ly 19 70s, the Northern India Patrika e d i t o r i a l l y 
sa id : 
/i3 a matter of fact looking at the Soviet 
s t ra tegy and the counter strategy adopted 
by Anglo-American i t will not be an exagge-
ra t ion to suggest that the signs of a r ev iva l 
of the cold war of the f i f t i e s are c l ea r l y 
in evidence. I t will therefore be jus t wishful 
thinking for the l i t t o r a l countries to think 
tha t the danger of a big power involvement 
in the Indian Ocean will pass off. A p r a c t i -
cal view of the international s i t ua t i on 
suggests tha t i t may be otherwise. 
"The pert inent quest ion", the paper said: 
is who is primarily responsible for t h i s 
s t a t e of a f fa i r s in other words, who s e t the 
loall r o l l i ng? I t is rjot easy to answer t h i s 
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ques t ion . . . . wi thout holding a b r i e f fo r 
e i t h e r the U.K. or t he U.S.A., i t may be 
said t h o t if an involvement takes p lace in 
the Ind ian Ocean a r e a , the Sovie t Union w i l l 
not be any l e s s r e spons ib le for t h e same. 
Big power g loba l p o l i t i c s appears to be f a r 
too i n t r i c a t e fo r I n d i a ' s r a t h e r naive fo r e ign 
p o l i c y . But of course in so f a r as I n d i a ' s 
e f f o r t is to minimize or s top such an i n v o l -
vement, she i s f u l l y j u s t i f i e d and wi l l have 
63 the suppor t of a l l r i g h t th inking peop l e . 
64 Both the papers - The Times of India arx3 the Tribune 65 
acknowledged the Sovie t Union as the second b igges t naval power, 
second only to the U.S. while the former f e l t t h a t i f the Ame-
r i c a n s decide to dominate t h i s ocean, the Russians w i l l be 
compelled to con te s t t h i s des ign , " the l a t t e r saw the Indian 
Ocean has no change of remaining a zone of peace" , and t h a t 
" i t was going to be one big ocean of t roubled wa te r " . 
6 3 . Ed i to r i a l : "Cold War", Northern Indian P a t r i k a , Allahabad, 
18 January, 19 71 . 
6 4 . Incer Malhotra, "The Future of Indian Ocean : Jtopeful and 
Distuirbing Signs^ , Times of Ind ia (Delhi) 22, Dec. 19 72. 
6 5 . Ed i to r i a l ; "Ocean P o l i t i c s " , The Tribune tAmbala) , 
8th Dejcember 19 72. 
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.66 The Times of India further looked a t the problem with 
realism s ta t ing tha t : 
The future of the Indian Ocean will depend not 
on what the l i t t o r a l s t a tes feel but on what 
big powers especia l ly t h e U.S. and the Soviet 
think is in t h e i r best i n t e r e s t . After a l l 
despite moral support from a large par t of the 
world* Austra l ia and New Zealand have been from 
conducting nuclear t e s t s in the South Pac i f ic . 
Mrs. Gandhi was candid enough to admit a t a 
meeting of t h e parliamentary consul ta t ive com-
mittee on Atomic Energy recently that there is 
very l i t t l e t h i s country can do if China decides 
to carry out i t s plans to t e s t ICB^ by f i r i n g 
the miss i le across the Indian landmass into Indian 
Ocean. To say a l l t h i s is not to plead that 
efforts to prevent the Indian Ocean f rem b ecoming 
a cockpit of big power confl ic t should by exagge-
ra t ing the possible impact of these e f f o r t s , and 
thus creat ing an aura of complacency. 
66. Editorial : Indian Ocean, Times o^ 1^53^ (Delhi) , 
12 May 19 73. 
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Writing tn the Statesman, Hiranmay Karlekar po in ted out 
t h a t a game of super power r i v a l r y was not confined to the 
super power a loi ie . Even non-powers have t h e i r feuds which get 
glown out of a l l p ropo r t i ons when t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e pa t rons 
i n t e r v e n e . 
The National Herald* however, saw the problems of keeping 
t h e Indian Ocean as a zone of peace d i f f e r e n t l y . The paper s a id : 
I t i s not t h a t t he proposal has no l a r g e s c a l e 
sv:qpport but how to make the big powers accep t 
i t . The c a l c u l a t i o n s of big powers u sua l ly do 
not t ake in to account the fea r s and needs of 
small powers, but a redeeming c r e a t u r e of t h e 
p resen t day i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i s t h a t even 
the big powers have begun not only to t h i n k but 
ac t in terms of peace . The main f ac t i s t h a t t he 
b i t jpowers a re not only i n t e r e s t e d in keeping a 
watch on one another but m c r e a t i n g a r e i g n of 
inf luence f o r them. The root cause of b ig power 
r i v a l r y i s t h i s and i t remains to be seen how f a r 
68 the United Nations can t a c < l e i t . 
6 7. Hiranmay Karlekar , "The I n d i a n Ocsan : How to Prevent Big 
Power R i v a l r i e s " , Tne Statesman (Delhi) , 13 Dec. 19 74. 
6 8 , E d i t o r i a l : The Ind i an Ocean, National Key^ ,:^ (3 (DelhD / 
13 May 19 73. 
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The Hindu cor responden t , G.K. Reddy observed: 
I t i s q u i t e apparent t h a t ne i ther of the super 
pDwers i s p repa red to concede t h a t a va s t expanse 
of sea cover ing 28 mi l l i on square miles was t h e 
exc lus ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of only the l i t t o r a l 
s t a t e s of the r e g i o n . Though they a re not doing 
anything a t p r e s e n t to s t ep up t h e i r naval r i v a l r y 
in the Ind ian Ocean, the U.S. and t h e Soviet 
Union a re not prepared to commit themselves in 
advance to a complete vjithdrawal of t h e i r presence 
even if a l l t he l i t t o r a l s t a t e s came fonward with 
a j o i n t demand to t h i s e f f e c t . 
Commenting on t h e American base in Diego Garcia / Times of 
I n d i a wrote: 
Americans a re p r a c t i c a l l y inc i t ing the Russians t o 
send a l a r g e r f l o t i l l a to the Indian Ocean and to 
look f o r s u i t a b l e bases of t h e i r o w n . . . . Despi te 
the af te rmath of the Dulles Era, the Americans do 
not seem to have l e a r n t t h a t m i l i t a r y bases a r e 
70 
source of t e n s i o n and in secu r i t y , no t of s e c u r i t y . 
^ 9 . The Hindu (MaiJras) , 15 Dec. i9 73, 
70. E d i t o r i a l , "A Basic Pallach**, Times of Inc^la (Delhi) 
24 January, 19 74, 
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The Airirit Bazar P a t r i k a on t h e o t h e r hand, took. Moscow 
t o t a s k for ^ceeping: 
Muro over i c s Ind ian Ocean manoeuvrs in the face 
of the unconcealed U.S. irove t o ' u s e ' the ocean 
on cons ide ra t i on of ' t he r e g i o n ' though Kr. Brez-
hnev, during h i s Ivew Delhi v i s i t , expressed t h e 
des i re to keep i t as a peace zone in h i s o v e r a l l 
J^ ian s e c u r i t y p l a n . 
72 The Tribune pa id a complement to the then Foreign 
M i n i s t e r , Swaran Singh, who had eiiphasised in the pa r l i ament 
t h a t : 
The base i s sue i s un re l a t ed to I n d i a ' s economic 
cooperat ion with the 'J.3.A. and to our Coiiimonwecilth 
l inks kh i l e we a re well j u s t i f i e d in express ing 
our f ee l i ngs about the Anglo-American move and 
in seeking to uphold the concept of the Ind i an 
Ocean as a peace zone in accordance with t h e U.N. 
d e c l a r a t i o n . 
7 1 , E d i t o r i a l , " F u t i l e E f f o r t s " , Amrit Baz j^p F^ t r i ka 
(Calcutta) , 3 Feb. 19 74. 
72. E d i t o r i a l , "Troubled Water-?", The Tribupe (Ambala) , 
23 Feb. 1974. 
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the paper said: 
Over react ion on our part might only create a 
new impeditrent in the effor ts to improve Indo-
Ainerican r e l a t ions jus t when they are beginning 
to show r e su l t s as in the FL-4ao funds agreements. 
Also, i t was not Ind i a ' s exclusive concern' to Keep the Indian 
Ocean free from g rea t power r i va l ry . In fur ther argued: 
If India projects the Diego Garcia issue as i t s 
own dispute with the U.S. i t will only help to 
divide the peace zone camps, apart from giving 
an opportunity to India ba i te rs in the west and 
elsewhere to impute unwarranted to our pol icy . 
The question precisely is whether the danger to I nd i a ' s secur i ty 
would arise so much from the American presence in Diego Garcia 
as from quarters nearer home. Pakistan, one the l i t t o r a l coun-
t r i e s is engaged in feverish build ^p of i t s naval s t rength and 
there is no doubt against whom i t is intended. The American naval 
a c t i v i t y in the Indian Ocean i s par t of a global s t ra tegy and India 
has only secondary relevance to t h e i r ca l cu la t ions . 
Commenting on the U.S. ef for ts to build up a base in Diego 
Garcia, the Patriot said; 
144 
The U.S. government is wedded to the po l ic ies 
of mi l i ta ry pressure against weaker s t a t e s 
despi te much ta lk about peace and detents . . . . 
These bases is meant to t a c i l i t a t e intervention 
in the a f fa i r s of the region and resor t to 
naked power p o l i t i c s . The ganie can be defeated 
only by the concerted efforts of the Indian Ocean 
73 
s t a t e s . 
Apart from the po l i t i c a l par t ies and p r e s s , the leading 
i n t e l l e c tua l s have put forth their perspective of the Indian 
Ocean. 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s : 
74 Rasheeduddin Khan suggested the spec i f ic terms on which 
demand for a zone of pezce should be made. These a re : 
1. Dismantling of a l l offensive mi l i t a ry and naval base 
l ike the Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; 
2. Cessation of the ac t iv i t i e s ca lcula ted to use the 
Indian Ocean as a part of the global confrontation 
approach or regional mil i tary a l l i a n c e s / o r neo-
c o l o n i a l i s t designs. 
73. Ed i to r i a l , **Base Strategy", Pat r io t (Delhi ) , 3 l s t July 1975, 
74. Rasheeduddin Khan, "fal l Out on India-U.S.-Pakistan China 
Axis", World Fpcus, 14,August, 1983, Issue of "Second Cold 
War", p . 67. 
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3. Stopping of attempts to thwart l ibe ra t ion movements 
and intimidation of newly l iberated count r ies . 
4. Affirmation of respect for the sovereignty/ s t a b i l i t y 
and secur i ty of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . 
5. Abandonment of the regime of gun boat diplomacy and 
sovereignt ies . 
6. Rei terat ion of respect for sovereign r i g h t of people 
to t he i r natural and other resources. 
But contrary to th i s K.P, Misra suggests a 'balance of 
75 power' approach. He underscores the point that in case the 
implementatJxjn of the zone of peace proposal i s f a c i l i t a t e d , the 
best a l t e rna t ive is to balance the forces of the powers present 
in the region. 
Jayent Bandopadhyaya suggest the balance of force approach 
to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 
77 
Countering the proposals K. Subramaniam s t a t e s that 
unless an early implementation of the U.N. resolut ion is car r ied 
out there are every p o s s i b i l i t i e s of further m i l i t a r i s a t i o n . He 
7 5 . K.P . M;Lsra, n . 22, p . 257 , 
76. Jayantunja Bandopadhyaya, Making of Ind ia ' s F9reiqn Policy 
(Calcutta) , 1980, p . 46. 
77. K. Subramanyam, "Non-alignment, Disarmament and Indian Ocean", 
in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed.) , Perspective pn Non-alignment 
(Delhi : 1981) , pp. 172-73. 
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s t a t e s t h i s in the context of the Soviet a t t empt to b u i l d a 
nuclear powered a i r c r a f t and t h e l i k e l i h o o d of i t being deployed 
in the Indian Ocean to off s e t western s t r a t e g y to e n c i r c l e her . 
Rejecting the idea of balance of forces in the Ind ian 
Ocean region K.R. Singh s t a t e s ; 
The balanced fo rce idea appears very innocuous. 
I t even sounds very p l a u s i b l e as an a l t e r n a t i v e 
to the s o - c a l l e d Super Power and g r ea t power arms 
race in the I n d i a n Ocean a r e a . But i t i s fought 
with severa l p i t f a l l s and dangers for t he Afro-
Asian s t a t e s . I t undermines the very idea of 
converting the I n d i a n Ocean area in to a zone of 
peace. I t g ives the impress ion t h a t t he e f f o r t s 
of the Afro-Asian world towax-da t l ia t d i r e c t i o n have 
t o t a l l y f a i l e d , and the only a l t e r n a t i v e l e f t i s 
to accept t h e s t a t e of a f f a i r s , and to l e g i t i m i s e 
78 the fo re ign presence in t h i s a r e a . 
I t has been f u r t h e r sugges ted by K.R. Singh t h a t s e r i o u s 
a t t e n t i o n should be given to de l i nk ing the ques t i on of c r e a t i n g 
a peace zone in the Ind ian Ocean, from the 'Grea t Power r i v a l r y ' 
78. K.R. Singh, Indian Ocean Big Power Prgjsgnpg and Lpcaj. 
Response (Delhi : 19 77) , p . 213. 
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in the a r e a , so t h a t t he ques t ion of removirjg the presence of 
each fo re ign power should be s t u d i e s s e p a r a t e l y . He s t a t e s 
t h a t by emphasising the ' g r e a t power r i v a l r y * growing conven-
t i o n a l i s t presence of some g r e a t powers in the Ind ian Ocean are 
79 
n e g l e c t e d . Late KPS Menon analys ing the s i t u a t i o n in the s i t u a -
t i o n in the Indian Ocean reg ion commentedj 
I t i s s t r ange t h a t t h e ' l i m i t e d Soviet presence* 
in the Indian Ocean should exc i t e so much concern 
in the West* even in these days of Great power 
d e t e n t e / one can only t h i n k tha t the Sovie t p r e -
sence i s being used as an excuse for dominating 
t h i s r eg ion . Moreover, beneath the smooth surface 
of the de tente co ld war seems to m e n t a l i t y i s s t i l l 
l u r k i n g . 
He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t Diego Garcia must be regarded as a t h r e a t 
t o world peace as well as to the economic independtence of t h e s t a t e s 
of Asia and Af r i ca . He added: 
World op in ion , t oo , i s impor tant . I t may o f t en 
seem e l u s i v e and d e l u s i v e , yet i t does have an 
80 
e f f e c t in the long run. 
79. Ibicjy. p . 314. 
80. K.p .S . Menon, "Diego Garcia : Nuclear War T h r e a t " , Link^ 
Vol. 16, No. 39, 5 May 1974, p . 22. 
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The perspective of t he p o l i t i c a l par t ies* press and in te l l ec tua l s 
have largely emphasised on the peace zone proposal. No doubt the 
differences are thereon speci f ic i ssues . 
For example, the ers twhile Jansangh and Congress(0) c r i t i -
cised Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 19 73 for not equating 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of t h e i r presence in the 
Indian Ocean. Also during the Janata regime an attempt was made 
to equate the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. 
81 Even sometimes the press and the p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s 
emphasized on building up a strong navy for India and i n t e l l e c -
tua l s on balancing of forces . 
Inspi te of the d i f fe ren t i a l pat tern of perspectives the 
p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s / press and the in te l l ec tua l s have seemed to 
have underlined the importance of the zone of peace. Thus, there 
seems to have a convergence between government perspective with 
tha t of the perspectives of the p o l i t i c a l par t ies press and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 
But the increasing concern of India for Indian Ocean a 
zone of peace cannot be explained without taking into account 
81. Statesman (Delhi) 2l March 1971, suggested t h a t India should 
build a nuclear navy to safeguard her i n t e r e s t in the Indian 
Ocean. 
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her national i n t e r e s t . Precisely because of t h i s and other 
reasons India has underscored the Importance of inakirg the 
Indian Ocean e zone of peace. 
I nd i a ' s trade and coimiercial re la t ions with South-East, 
West Asia and European countries are signif icantl^i dependent on 
the tnsritiine t ,raffic. Kence, India is concerned for the safety 
of the oceanic routes . 
Besides, from the securi ty point of view Indian Ocean 
becomes a " c r i t i c a l factor of consequence". The vride extension 
of both eastern and western flanks of India not only necess i ta tes 
a s trong navy but also an ocean free of external presence for 
ensuring secur i ty . In fact American gun coat diplomacy of 19 71 
made India increasingly concerned for the oceanic dimension of 
he I secur i ty . 
The Indian concern for th i s part of the Ocean has been 
fur ther conditioned by her efforts to explore the ocean bed and to 
undertake oceanographic research. Added to t h i s , the co l l ec t ion 
of manganese nodules from the deep seabed and the claim by the 
82 Indian Goverirment with the preparatory corrmittee of the U.N, 
on the lew of the sea to two plots in the Indian Ocean region for 
82. The Hindustan Tiroes (Delhi) , l7 June 1982. 
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exclusive mining r igh t s have made Indian Ocean more important for 
Ind ia . In fact India i s the only country in the t h i rd world to 
explore and exploi t the deep ocean bed for manganese nodules. 
Other developed countr ies are busy in exploi t ing the pacif ic and 
the At lan t i c . ' Ind ia ' s pioneering investor s ta tus in the U.N. 
sea law conference research. This has been ref lec ted by the 
c rea t ion of oceanographic Ins t i tu te and the Department of Ocean 
Development (1982) . These are the manifestations of the i n s t i -
tu t iona l is a t ion of the oceanic policy of India* 
The acquis i t ion of research vessels l i ke Gavesani and the 
increasing in t e res t for oceanographic research ref lec ted in two 
Antarct ica expeditions and par t i c ipa t ion in KONEX (Monsoon Experi-
ment) projects show Ind ia ' s involvement in the Indian Ocean 
problem. 
Besides y the exploration of off share o i l and l ikel ihood of 
the locat ion of more o i l f ie lds in the oceanic area have further 
opened up the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of growing concern for Indian Ocean, 
In fact India ' s dependence on Gulf o i l and the resu l tan t unfavou-
rable balance of payment has propelled her to take steps to explore 
more o i l f ie lds in the offshore areas . 
83. Ibid^ 
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The location of v i t a l indus t r ia l be l t s in Southern India 
and i t s vulnerabi l i ty to the seaborne and airborne a t tack have 
made India more concerned for the Indian Ocean. 
Further, the emergence of the new cold war with i t s 
r e su l t an t f a l l outs has created a new geo-s t ra tegic environment 
for India. The erection of a "holy a l l iance" on the basic of 
s t r a t e g i c consensus in West Asia by the U.S.A., the l ikel ihood 
of the deployment of the pershing I I and cruise missi les in 
I s r ae l ( this has been mentioned in the second chapter) , the arming 
of Pakistan with sophis t icated weapons, the Chinese capabi l i ty 
of producing SLBI and p o s s i b i l i t y of deploying them in the Indian 
Ocean and the constancy of the v i o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n in the Asian 
and African land masses have aggravated the Indian concern for 
Indian Ocean. In fac t . Garter adrriinistraticn vociferously decla-
red to show off mil i tary s t rength in West Asia in case American 
" in te res t s " v/ere jeopardised. Coupled with t h i s the Reagan 
adminis t ra t ion 's promise to hold the American mi l i t a ry banner 
high in the global arena has heightened the imper ia l i s t threa t 
to th i s area. 
And atove a l l the American conviction on the f e a s i b i l i t y 
of l imited nuclear war and the pos s ib i l i t y of t h i s idea being 
inculcated in the minds of near nuclear nations l i k e South Africa. 
I s r ae l and Pakistan may bring about a catas t rophic future for 
t h i s area, tfence, i t is quite natural that India is nothing with 
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concern the changes in geo-pol i t i ca l environment of the region. 
The 'ncv; cold' war is not only a great s t r e s s on the non-
alignment but also a great inhabiting factor for what Prof. Pauker 
84 
cal led "Third World Trade Unionism". The enduring debate in 
d i f ferent wc^rld forums has not or.ly overridingly shown the concern 
of the developing countries for the abo l i t ion of t h e e x i s t i i i g 
explo i ta t ive and hegemonistic in ternat ional economic order but 
a l so foster a fear psychosis within the western developed world 
for loosing control over the s t r a t e g i c and v i t a l raw materials 
of the South. Hence/ mil i tary bases and external power presence 
in the Indian Ocean should be seen in tha t context. The Indian 
Parl iament 's consultative committee for External Affairs expressed 
the view that mi l i t a r i sa t ion for the Indian Ocean region was with 
the long term objective of con t ro l l ing trade routes and exploi-
t i n g seabed. 
Hence i t i s the logic of the leadership of third-world 
and non-alignment movement which determine India ' s overr id ing 
concern for Indian Ocean. When the new cold war is fought within 
the non-aligned countries/ when the 'postdam' and ' y a l t a ' of old 
cold war era are absent, the s t rue cure of s t a b i l i t y in the new 
cold war would obviously be missed. Kence the en t i r e Asian-
African continent would be "the epicentre of cold war a c t i v i t y " . 
34. See K. Subramaniian, I nd i a ' s Security Perspective (New Delhi)/ 
1982, p . 3 1 . ; Third World Trade Unionism is r e fe r red to the 
demand by the South for a "New International Economic Order". 
25. The Statesman (Delhi) , 6 August, 1980. 
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I t must be rea l i sed tha t cold war fought in Asia. "The recent 
disclosures from the Truman d ia r ies reveal t h a t one of f i r s t 
nuclear threats by the U.S.A. re la ted to compelling the Soviets 
86 to withdraw from Azerbaizan (Iran)**. The Siame nuclear t h rea t 
envisaged in Presidential Directive 59 has posed a grave danger 
to the l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean. In 
fac t the imperial is ts are ready to exploi t the nuclear innocence 
of the developing countr ies . The I s rae l a t t ack on the I r aq i 
nuclear f a c i l i t i e s amply demonstrates the fact that the surro-
gates of imperialism can take any step to thwart the developmen-
t a l ac t iv i t i e s of the developing count r ies . Given th i s s i t u a t i o n 
the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l cannot afford to t a k e a relaxed view. 
Hitherto Indian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , i n t e l l e c t u a l s and 
press have vociferously come out with th^ i r stance to es tab l i sh 
a zone of peace in the area. Barring the chopping and changing 
of opinion over some issues r i s e great power r i v a l r y ' 'equating 
Soviet Union with the U.S.A.*, "Indian i n i t i a t i v e to convene the 
conference of the l i t t o r a l and hinterland countr ies" e t c , there 
i s a broad consensus t h a t m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Indian Ocean 
poses a grave danger to Ind ia ' s p o l i t i c a l , economic, social and 
cu l tu ra l secur i ty . Falklands war has further reinforced the 
po in t that developing countries naval power i s ser iously vulnerable 
86. K. Subramanyam, n. 84, p . 72. 
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to the nuclear powered submarines of the western developed 
countr ies . Kence i t is r i g h t l y pointed out that the Indian 
perception towards Indian Ocean must be based on global context . 
Times ahead Indian concern for Indian Ocean would be more serious, 
^btwithstending the emphasis on the peace zone concept 
India has seriously concentrated on her naval capabi l i ty in the 
Ocean. Indian Navi''s biggest ever exercise on the North Arabian 
Sea to demonstrate i t s punch end preparedness in simulted war 
87 
conditions demonstrate government s concernto build a strong 
naval power. In fact Ind i a ' s decision to acquire 1500 West 
. 88 Germany submarines and press suggestion to develop R & D 
f a c i l i t i e s to develop a strong submarine force shows Ind ia ' s 
concern to Improve the naval capab i l i t y . India has indige-
nously bui l t and modernised IhiS type naval c r a f t s . 
But a l l these do not indicate to what may be cal led the 
development of a sea power. After a l l Ind ia ' s vast coast l ine 
demand a strong naval force. Hence, i t can be cogently conclu-
ded that Ind ia ' s Dolicv, oersoectives and diolomarv are s t i l l 
oriented to make t h i s ocean a zon^ of oeace. 
87. Hindustan Times (New Delhii January 29, 19S2< 
88. Amrit Bazar Pat r ika , 12 August, 1980. 
CHAPTER - V 
THE U.S.A. AND THE INDIAN OCEAN 
The U.S. I n t e r e s t s in t h e I n d i a n Ocean L i t t o r a l : 
The l i t t o r a l r e g i o n of t h e I n d i a n Ocean has become t h e 
f o c u s of a new Cold-war r i v a l r y be tween t h e Twcj Super Powers . 
I n t h i s r e g i o n t h e r e a r e c o n f l i c t s i n S o u t h - E a s t A s i a , Afgha-
n i s t a n , P a k i s t a n , I n d i a , I r a n - I r a q , West A s i a , t h e Horn of A f r i c a 
a n d Sou the rn A f r i c a . Arms a r e b e i n g pumped by t h e major arms 
s u p p l i e r s of t h e world t o c o u n t r i e s i n t h i s r e g i o n . The two 
s u p e r powers a r e engaged i n o b t a i n i n g more and more f a c i l i t i e s 
f o r t h e i r f o r c e s i n t h i s r e g i o n . The G e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n of 
t h e I n d i a n Ocean i s such t h a t t h e Power which i s a b l e t o c o n t r o l 
t h e Suez Cana l , t h e Ma lacca , and I n d o n e s i a n S t r a i t s c a n E x e r c i s e 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l ove r t h e I n d i a n Ocean . The p h y s i c a l c o n f i -
g u r a t i o n of t he Ocean i s such t h a t i t c a n be used f o r s t r a t e g i c 
weapon deployment a g a i n s t t h e U . S . which i s i n an a l t o g e t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t hemi sphe re . With t h i s i n mind , t h e s t r a t e g i c i m p o r -
t a n c e of t h e ocean was enhanced f o r a Super Power i n t h e I 9 6 0 ' s 
a f t e r n u c l e a r m i s s i l e submar ine s became a major component of 
t h e i r weapon-systems a l o n g w i t h t h e l o n g - r a n g e bomber . T h i s 
s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e became e v e n more a c u t e a f t e r t h e 19 73 o i l 
embargo a g a i n s t t h e West and t h e o n s e t of t h e w o r l d Energy 
c r i s i s . 
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The U.S.. St ra tegic in te res t s in t h i s region have gone 
through a s igni f icant qua l i t a t ive change during the l a s t two 
decades. "Ear l ier / during the f i r s t and the second phase of the 
Cold War confrontation, which was based ijpon the weapon system 
demanding control of the land f ront ier and the a i r - space , the 
l i t t o r a l was the peak-head against the land-tnass of the Eastern 
block, since 1964, with the introduction of the Polar i s sub-
marine/ the l i t t o r a l became a base to control the sea end to 
preserve the American Naval Supremacy in the Indian Ocean". 
In these ear ly phases of the cold war, the U.S. had used 
the s t r a t egy of intervening in the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l in 
col laborat ion with the local E l i t e . When in I ran Mossadegh natio-
nal ised the AnQlo-Iranian Oil Company and Iranian nationalism 
began to a s se r t i t s e l f , t h e U.S. chrough the Shah of Iran put i t 
down to ensure t ha t o i l to the western Indus t r ia l countr ies 
flowed uni terrupted. Consequently, t i l l 19 79 when the Shah was 
overthrown/ Iranian o i l was pumped for the benefi t of the Indxis-
t r i a l west. After Mossadegh's overthrow, the United States 
forged the Baghdad pact and subsequently. Central Treaty in South 
West Asia, and the SEATO in South East Asia. Along with these 
mi l i t a ry a l l i ances , arms t ransfers s ta r ted to a l l i a n c e members 
among the l i t t o r a l countr ies , such as Iran and P a l e s t i n e . I t was 
1, K.R. Singh, The Indian Oc^gn, p . 29. 
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in t h i s period tha t the U.S. s tar ted periodic naval exercise 
in the Indian Ocean, 
The United States was adopting these methods with a 
def in i te object ive of denying the U.S.S.R. an opportunity to 
e s tab l i sh i t s presence in areas from where the land-based 
defence system could be out-flanked. That is why at t ha t tijnne 
the re was much anxiety in the United States about the growing 
Soviet influence in India , Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Indonesia. 
But by the middle of 19 70's such anxiety had given place to mild 
i r r i t a t i o n . A detente had s tar ted developing between the U.S.S.R. 
and the CENTO countr ies , but the U.S. was rot acutely perturbed. 
The U.S. was countering on i t s naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean. For t h i s also the U.S. was not depending on countr ies l ike 
I r an , Pakistan and Ethiopia. Though i t continued to maintain 
i n t e r e s t s in them, the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean was not 
based on the support of these local s t a t e s . An a l t e r n a t e system 
had been evolved in col laborat ion with Britain and Aus t ra l i a , to 
maintain an independent naval presence upon the I s land bases in 
the Indian Ocean. This a l te rna te system did not mean an abondon-
ment of United States i n t e r e s t s in the region. In f a c t , the U.S.A. 
was committed strongly both in the po l i t i ca l and economic sense, 
to leave th i s area to the U.S.S.R, Not only were there a number 
of pro-U.S. States in need of U.S. protection but the o i l i n t e r e s t s 
were also there . Therefore a new policy was designed to p ro tec t 
the U.S. regional i n t e r e s t s without any direct commitment on the 
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pa r t of the U.S.A. This policy centred around a new a l l i ance / 
the Regional Cooperation for Development. 
The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was e s t a -
bl ished in July 1964, and i t s emphasis was upon economic coopera-
t i o n ra ther than mi l i ta ry col laborat ion. This v^ as a t r i p a r t i t e 
arrangement between Turkey/ I ran and Pakistan and i t s object ive 
was to pool the resources of the three countries, under the regional 
economic development prograrar.e, for creat ing greater s o l i d a r i t y 
2 
among i t s members. 
But instead of creat ing a regional understanding/ the RCD 
i so la t ed i t s e l f from other countries of the region, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
crea t ing a divis ion of the West-Asian countries into Arab and non-
Arab blocs. 
The U.S. need for the West-Asian and Gulf Oil i s v i t a l and 
undisputed and is l i ke ly to continue according to the U.S. estima-
t e s , by 19 85 the United States will get 35 percent of i t s o i l 
imports from the Persian Gulf, Western Europe 62 percent and Japan 
3 
73 percent . In other words of the 20 mill ion barrels dai ly (MBD) 
2. Austin Willard, Organizing for Peace, New York, 1968,p. 53, 
3. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, U.S^ Security 
In t e re s t s and Po l i t i c s in South West Asia* Washington 1980, 
p . 180. 
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o i l prodticed in the Gulf region. The OECD Countries import 
14.6 MBD. For the Gulf countr ies , in 1980 the production 
figures were as follows : Saudi Arabia 9.5 MBD, Iran 3 MBD, 
4 
Kuwait 2.3 MBD, UAE 3 MBD ar.d Oman 0.3 MBD. The U.S. appre-
hensions and fears in respect of ava i l ab i l i t y of o i l frcxn the 
Persian Gulf Countries r e l a t e to the pos s ib i l i t y of stoppage of 
o i l flow consequent to internal developments, such as in I ran 
a f t e r the overthrow of the Shah. The U.S. feels tha t while i t 
would be easy to handle one c r i s i s a t a time ( - as during the 
period of decl i r e in I ranian Oil Production during the anti-Shah 
revolution and then the I ran-I raq war) , i t would be utterly-
devastating if the o i l Simply from Saudi Arabia i s suspended. 
Therefore the main focus of the U.S. a t t en t ion is Saudi Arabia 
and the developments in the Gulf which may have some impact on 
Saudi Arabia. Besides o i l the U.S. has v i t a l t rade I n t e r e s t s in 
the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l which in 19 77 was worth Fourty (40) 
b i l l i o n dollars as against Sixty-one b i l l i o n dol lars with western 
Europe and Twenty-nine b i l l i o n dol lars with Japan. Trade with 
the Persian Gulf alone, was 20.6 b i l l i on dollars and h t l f of t h i s 
was with Saudi Arabia. Apart from the trade most of the surplus 
Petro-dollars of the Gulf countries to the time of something l i ke 
4 . Ib id . , pp. 233-137. 
5. Congressional Research Cbirimittee, U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy Obiectiv^? 
and Overseas militgirv Instalj-^tipng, Washington, 19 79* 
pp. 86-88. 
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80 b i l l i o n dol lars are invested in t h e Western and the U.S. banks. 
I t is for these reasons t ha t t h i s region i s of v i t a l i n t e r e s t s for 
the United S t a t e s . The Western Strategic analysis make? no secre t 
of the fact tha t if even the Rapid Deployment Force is to be used/ 
the most l i k e l y t a rge t i s to be Saudi Arabian Oil ^ ie lds and 
Complexes ; Ab-qaiq* Dammam, Chawar, Qatit and Berri Ras Tanura, 
6 Juaymeh, Dharan and Horrouz. Whether such a more wil l ensure the 
U.S. i n t e r e s t s in another matter. What is s ign i f i can t is tha t 
the United States policy makers were prepared to go to t h i s 
extent to ensure what they consider the vi tal i n t e r e s t s of the 
United S ta t e s . 
In a very in te res t ing study on the West Asian region, the 
U.S. commission on U.S. - Soviet Relations poincs out: " the 
Persian Gulf area in the present circanstances have the highest 
p r i o r i t y among our regional concerns. This regions s t r a t e g i c 
importance to the West is obvious; i t is one of the pe rve r s i t i e s 
of our time tha t an area so crucial to the Western survival should 
should be geographically so close to the U.S.S.R. (the Soviets 
have no comparable dependence on any area s imi la r ly located near 
the U.S.) . The Gulf i s and will remain the primary supplier of 
energy which the indus t r i a l i sed nations so c lose ly associated 
with the needs of the United States in order to function. I n t e r -
nal conf l i c t s and cross currents also make the region a cause 
6. Adelphi paper 166, p p . c i t . 
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of worry for the Soviets - as well as vulnerable to t h e i r 
i n t rus ion . As a r e s u l t in the commissions view/ the Soviet 
Union has the following objectives ir. the area "to e s t a b l i s h 
influence for i t s own sake, to prevent a renewed western m i l i -
t a r y presence to acquire the potent ial capacity to deny, cons t r i c t 
or control 'Aestern access to the area 's energy; and to assure 
Soviet access if or when i t comes to have major energy needs". 
I t i s against any such "strangulat ion of the Indus t r i a l i z ed 
8 
Economic" t ha t pres ident Carter spe l t out the nature of U.S. 
i n t e r e s t s irj the Indian Ccean area. An attempt by an outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded 
ar, a s sau l t on the v i ta l i n t e re s t s of the United S t a t e s . And 
such en assaul t will be repel led by any means necessary, inclu-
9 
diny mi l i t a ry force. I t is these "wells of power" tha t are of 
primary U.S. concern. 
For the United States in teres t and involvement in t h i s 
region, a novel but in te res t ing argument i s a lso given: "The 
Economic and p o l i t i c a l weakness of the United S ta tes i s re f lec ted 
7. Council on Foreign Relations, The Commission on U.S. -
Soviet Relat ions, The Soviet Challenge ; A Policy Framework 
for the 1980's,American Centre, New Delhi-1981, p . 21. 
8. Henry Kissinger, Business 'week, Jan. 13, 1975, Quoted in 
IPSA News Review on West Asia, February 19 75. 
9. President Jimmy Carter, State of t h e Unipn Message 
January 1980, American Centre, New Delhi. 
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cur iously enough in many arms deals with countries ranging 
geographically from Morocco to Pakistan. I t i s hard for the 
opponents of the arms sales to counter the argument tha t were 
i t not for such t ransact ions the American balance of payment 
d e f i c i t not to mention unemployment figures would be t o t a l l y 
unacceptable. In other words, the United States is keeping i t s 
Economy limping along with the crutch of foreign currency earnings 
from weapons s a l e s . The face saving argument put up by those who 
benef i t from the pros l iga te spreadirg of advanced armaments 
through out a vo la t i l e region is that t h i s in turn given the U.S. 
control over the mi l i ta ry and even p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s of rece-
p ien t countr ies , for, in the absence of U.S. back vp support 
p ro t r ac t ed mil i tary operations are impossible". 
As far as Africa is concerned/ the United States did not 
have big s t a t e s in the African l i t t o r a l of Indian Ocean in the 
beginning and as l a t e as the beginning of the 6 0 ' s . I t was 
considered a low p r io r i t y area. "The U.S. had thus far f a i l ed 
to develop any over a l l policy which would compare in breadth and 
dynamism with those i t had devised in other pa r t s of t h e world. 
Africa had been regarded in Washington as e s s e n t i a l l y a respon-
s i b i l i t y of the European powers, to whom t h e Uni^ted Sta tes might 
g ive advice on occasions but whom i t could not and did not wish 
10. Robert Spring Borg "The Middle East" in Mohammad Ayub (ed.) , 
Conflict and Intervention in the Third Worlds N.Delhi, p . 89, 
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to Supplant. At t h i s time the assis tance programme v.as also 
not much, whatever was there, was given mostly to Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Somalia. I t was with the Kennedy Era tha t the U.S. 
r e a l i s e d "the verdict of history in Africa, i t i s not yet fu l ly 
spe l led out i s unmistakable and irrevocable. The old colonial 
Era is dead, and with i t the old power re la t ionsh ip by which the 
12 world was formerly shaped". 
With the beginning of i960's the North-Eastern Africa, 
known as the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya become involved in confl icts and by the middle of the 
1960's the Southern -African region had also become a c r i s i s 
a r ea . The factors having an explosive effect included the Rho-
desian c r i s i s . The policy of ^^jartheid. National Liberat ion rrove-
mcnt, the Soc ia l i s t Government in Tanzania and i t s close r e l a t ions 
with China. 
The United States s tar ted i t s African involvement in the 
context of the cold war. The U.S. Ethiopean r e l a t i ons provided 
the U.S. not only a footfold in the continent but also the 
11 . The U.S. Department of State, The United States in World 
Affairs , 1959, p. 102. 
12. Department of State Bulletin, 44 (1133), 13 March, I9bl , 
p . 376. 
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Kegnew communications base on important posi t ion among the U.S. 
mi l i t a ry communications from the Phi l l ip ines to Morocco. This 
re la t ionsh ip continued and by 19 77 Ethiopia was receiving 285 
mi l l ion d o l l a r s . 
With the development of these crucial s i t ua t i on South 
Africa assumed an inportant role in the United States diplomacy. 
I t cont ro ls approaches to the western Indian Ocean through the 
South At lant ic Ocean. The s t r a t eg ic advantages of South Africa 
for the United States were recognized as useful by the United 
S t a t e s . "In s c i e n t i f i c Economic and s t ra teg ic respects our 
b i l a t e r a l re la t ionsh ip with South Africa is useful to us - even 
in some f ie lds important". 
Pa r t i cu la r ly a f te r the closure of the Suez Canal the 
Sea-route via Cape of Good Hope became s t r a t eg i ca l l y important 
for the United S ta t e s . In the whole of sub-saharan Africa, 
harbour f a c i l i t i e s for major naval vessels were ava i lab le only 
15 in South Africa; fur ther South Africa def ini te ly the most 
powerful local s t a t e s in the region according to numerous 
13. Horn of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 3, July-Sept. 1978, p . 2. 
14. The Sub-Committee on Africa, of the Committee of Foreign 
Affairs , House of the Representatives, United Sta tes South 
African Relat ions, Washington, 1966, p . 5. 
15. I b i d . , p . 108. 
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unconfirmed reports already a nuclear power. Naturally i t i s 
of v i t a l i n t e res t for the United Sta tes . 
After 1965 the United States position in the South Asia 
was not unenvioable. The Indo-Pakistan war of 196 5 and the 
consequent Tashkent Agreement were responsible for the down-
grading of the U.S. iiifluence, and ascendency of the Soviet . 
The United States image suffered another setback a f t e r the f u t i l e 
" t i t l e " in the December 19 71 war. With th is the U.S. rot only 
a l i ena ted India further but also los t face t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 
of Pakistan, under the terms of March 1^59/ b i l a t e r a l agreement, 
the U.S. support was far less than what the Pakistan had expec-
t ed . With th i s an inference may be drawn that the United States 
can t ry to int imate Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l through Gun-Boat 
diplomacy, Ala Enterprise in December 19 71 but a t the same time 
such in DecemlDer 197L but at the same time such an intervent ion 
would be ineffect ive if the l i t t o r a l States become determined to 
oppose such a move. In the wake of Soviet occupation of Afgha-
n is tan the St ra tegic importance for Pakistan increased manifold, 
"Pakistan i s a fr iendly independent developing ODuntry and an 
important s t r a t e g i c locat ion. I t is in a pos i t ion t o exert 
cons t ruc t ive leadership among an important gro^p of n a t i o n s , . . . 
The Government of India has taken strong exception to our 
new secur i ty re la t ionship with Pakistan, arguing t h a t mi l i tary 
equipment sa les to Pakistan will upset the power balance in South 
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Asia and pose a secur i ty th rea t to India with whom Pakistan had 
fought three wars. We emphatically disagree. I t i s the Soviet 
Union by i t s Invasion of Afghanistan which had upset the Power 
Eqxiation in t h i s region. Moreover/ India has an overwhelming 
fnili tary Superior i ty in South Asia and the arms ass i s tance which 
we wil l provide to Pakistan will not a l t e r t h i s s i t u a t i d n s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y . 
There are few who doubt that developments in Iran and 
Afghanistan have fundamentally a l t e red the s t r a t e g i c s i t ua t i on 
in t h i s region. I t is our common view that the dangers to t h i s 
country have teen increased by developments since 1^79. 
Soviet act ions in Afghanistan have turned Pakistan in the popular 
phrase, into a " f ront - l ine" S t a t e . I muse s t r e s s my conviction 
tha t Pakisi-an vdll find che United States a r e l i a b l e and 
supportive friend wfien i t comes to dealing with t h rea t s which 
may emanate from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan". 
About the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l as a whole, i t may be 
said tha t the U.S. involvement has not brought any ext ra advan-
tages on land but U.S. has been able to spread i t s influence in 
the Ocean. The U.S.A. has not only the case f a c i l i t i e s in 
Pakistan, South Africa ?nd Chain of Bri t ish Islands bases in the 
16. Ronald I . S ie rs , U.S. Ambc^ssaoor to Pakistan, U.S. 
Pakistan Relations, American Centre, Mew Delhi, 19 82, 
pp. 1-6. 
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Indian Ocean, besides bases in Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Aus t ra l ia 
and Saudi Arabia. All the f a c i l i t i e s and bases are interconnec-
ted not only for the s t ra teg ic in teres ts but a lso for the 
in te rven t ion i s t s capabi l i ty of the United Staters of America. 
United States Perceptions of Threats to i t s i n t e r e s t s in the 
Indian Ocean; 
United States believes that the th rea t s to i t s national 
i n t e r e s t co».ild be from v;ithin and outs ide the region. 
These th rea t s could or iginate from the local conf l i c t s or from 
Soviet act ion a l t e rna t ive ly there may be a combination of the 
two. ^ut the fact is that any real threat to the U.S. i n t e r e s t 
could come when the local conflicts or in t ra - reg iona l conf l ic t s 
get mixed up with any Soviet action. Without such Soviet act ion, 
local conf l i c t s or threats may be injurious to the United States 
i n t e r e s t s bu no such scenario is possible just now in which they 
pose a d i rec t and grave threat to the interest, of the United 
S t a t e s . 
I t i s in the United States* in te res t to preserve and 
improve, wherever possible a local balance of power in the 
Geo-pol i t ica l terms that would reduce the r i s k of any d i rec t 
17 Super Power confrontation. This task of preservat ion and 
improvement of such a balance would have to be r e l a t ed to such 
17. United States International Communication Agency, New 
Delhi, Background, December 1980. 
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geographical facts as are par t of the Indian Ocean region and 
are connected with the question of the securi ty of o i l resources 
and sea l anes . 
I t is an unpleasant geographical fact for the United 
States tha t the U.S.S.R. is contigenous to t he chain of State 
on the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. I t i s 
an es tab l i shed and proved fact that massive Soviet mi l i t a ry 
power based on internal l ines of communications and supply can 
be projected d i r ec t ly into the l i t t o r a l of the Gulf or Arabian 
sea . Such a po ten t ia l capabi l i ty has always exis ted for the 
Soviet forces . But, a f te r I9 70's these capab i l i t i e s have 
bas t ly improved as far as ground assault and a i r defence equipment 
are concerned. These ground assaul t capabi l i t ies have been 
augmented by an impressive a i r l i f t and airborne assau l t capa-
b i l i t y . All the l a t t e r has considerably reduced the warning 
time avai lable to the United States and a l l i e s , affect ing 
adversely the i r responses. In the region, Soviet mi l i t a ry bases, 
in Yemen, Ethiopia and Vietnam, are s i tuated s t r a t e g i c a l l y on 
maritime choke points and Soviet "blue naval forces" are capable 
of considerable harassment in support of the iJoviet naval ope-
r a t i ons in the Indian Ocean. 
These are not jus t theore t ica l scenarios, but are hard 
fac t s based on experience of Soviet act ions. The danger to the 
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U.S. in te res t s through these Soviet forces i s i l l u s t r a t e d by-
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the i r long range a i r l i f t e d 
and sea l i f t e d intervention in the Horn of Africa in 19 77-78. 
This African incident in which Cubar. forces were also involved/ 
reversed the mil i tary fortune of Ethiopia and Somalia. Along 
the red sea and the Horn of Africa, the p o s s i b i l i t y of any sudden 
large scale Soviet mil i tary act ion had become an es tabl i shed fact 
and the U.S. faced with the most d i rec t threa t to i t s i n t e r e s t s 
in the region. 
In th i s way the Soviet Union has consolidated i t s mi l i ta ry 
pos i t ion along the northern Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea near 
the Hormuz S t r a i t . This may jeopardise the In te rna t iona l Oil 
delivery destinations making them hostage to Soviet wishes and 
threatening the in t e re s t of those countries which are great ly 
dependent oh the West-Asian o i l for their overa l l i ndus t r i a l 
capacity. A direct Soviet occupation of Gulf Oil may not be 
unconceivable but a consolidated Soviet presence in the region 
would defini tely provide to the Soviets a p o l i t i c a l control over 
o i l . I t may be mentioned that t h i s is only a war scenario 
because in peace time there is no need for the Soviet Union to 
destroy Gulf Oil f a c i l i t i e s . In fact control over them would 
far more useful and th i s i s what the United States f e a r s . 
Philip Wilcox/ U.S. Department of S ta te , pointed out that 
t ha t the Soviet Union has an immense mil i tary force which could 
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be made avai lable a t a noments notice within the Indian Ocean 
region vast ly greater than what is at the disposal of the West. 
The l i s t e d not only the 1,00,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
but a lso 3,50,000 troops "employed in the Southern mi l i t a ry 
d i s t r i c t of the U.S.S.R. He mentioned that vathin some 4,000 km. 
of the s t r a i t of Hormuz between Oman and I ran are 40 tank moto-
r i zed and a i r borne divisions, some 8,000 tanks, 1400 armoured 
veh ic les , iOO long range bombers, 700 a i r defence f i g h t e r s , 200 
t ranspor t a i r c r a f t s and medium range and in te rcont inen ta l range 
18 
nuclear mis s i l e s . There is a feeling in the United States that 
the deduction of naval forces in the area woiild only increase 
the prepjonderence of land forces, the Soviets have in South of 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan, that is the reason they could 
afford to champion their idea of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace 
which the United States perceives against i t s i n t e r e s t s . 
There are two forms of U.S. perceptions of a p lausible 
t h r e a t to i t s in te res t . F i r s t that a Soviet percept ion of a 
poss ible geopol i t ica l . game in achieving p o l i t i c a l cont ro l , over 
the o i l l i f e time of the West would make a t e r r i t o r i a l enchroa-
chment also highly tempting. This the Soviets could do if the 
r i s k can be sk i l fu l ly because of p o l i t i c a l (considerations such 
as the weaknesses of some buffer s ta tes in t h e region. 
18, United States Communications Agency, New Delhi/ Background, 
April 30, 1982, p . 3. 
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As far as U.S. geopol i t ica l in te res t s in th i s region are 
concerned, they got adversely affected by the continued affects of 
the revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
This was an abrupt de te r io ra t ion in the regional geopol i t ica l 
balance of Power. To compensate for th i s a mi l i ta ry response on 
the pa r t of the U.S. was not only required but a lso imperative. 
Prom the point of view of vulnerabi l i ty of Gulf Oil the Iranian 
developments were c ruc i a l . But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
also demonstrated the Intentions and capabi l i t i e s of the U.S.S.R. 
Hence the rapid Deployment Forces was perceived as a counter to 
th i s threa t in the region. This force is intended to any di rec t 
Soviet moves against the Gulf States and to provide a measure of 
deterrence to those S ta t e s , which are friendly to the Unit:ed States 
against any such Soviet designs. 
The United States does come to r ea l i ze t ha t : without secure 
a l l iances and due to internal weaknesses and i n s t a b i l i t i e s of the 
region, the protec t ion of United States in te res t require the ava i -
l a b i l i t y of mi l i t a ry forces. These forces xaust be able to swift ly 
reach the area from considerable distances and be able to 
once they a r r i v e . According to a U.S. Study the United States 
s ho ul d: 
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Seek to prdserve local p o l i t i c a l and mi l i ta ry 
balances by impeding ei ther the emergence of 
a dominant regional power of the control of any 
major regional country by a Soviet-Client 
region. (As a general matter liowever/ i t must 
be recognised that U.S. a b i l i t y d i r ec t ly to 
influence developments within a region may be 
limi-ced when they stem from events l ike* for 
example the Iraq-Iran war) . 
Fashion de facto secur i ty re la t ionships with fr iendly 
s t a t e s in the region against external aggression while being 
s e n s i t i v e to the needs for the i r maintaining domestic support. 
Build a regional infrastructure of mi l i t a ry f a c i l i t i e s 
and stocks of equipments and obtain accessive r igh t s to sus ta in 
rapidly deployable (and perhaps stationed) forces to meet a 
wide range of mi l i t a ry contingencies, short of l a rge - sca l e land 
warfare -— 
Commit i t s e l f to keep open the sea lanes to and from the 
Persian Gulf and take v is ib le steps to th i s end. To give the 
substance to such postures , the commission recommends tha t U.S. 
should proceed with the development of forces deployable 
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Overseas, including Rapid Deployment Forces, and building the 
required Inf ras t ruc ture (as already noted above in the context 
of the Persian Gulf) . This will require generating the neces-
sary congressional end public understanding of the purposes and 
l i m i t a t i o n s of these forces — 
Maintain the opinion of arms t ransfers and other kinds of 
mi l i t a ry and pol ice support (e.g. training) where i t i s in our 
i n t e r e s t to contr ibute to internal securi ty and to preserve local 
and regional secur i ty balances — 
Make c lear to the Soviets that the United States i s 
prepared to consider r e s t r a i n t s on competitive arms t ransfers 
to local adversaries provided there is a s t r i c t rec iproc i ty and 
enforcement . 
U.S. Armed Presence in the Indian Ocean: 
Right af ter the second World War the United States had 
s t a r t e d vigorous ef for ts to build up i t s mi l i t a ry presence in 
the Indian Ocean. The United States navy had s t a r t e d procuring 
19. The Cbromission on U.S. - Soviet Relat ions. American Centre, 
New Delhi, The Soviet Challenge : A Policy Framework fpr the 
19 80s, pp. 20-21. 
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bases as e a r l y as 194 8, I t based i t s Middle East Force in 
Bahrain as a gues t of the B r i t i s h navy a t tlriat t ime/ and t h i s 
fo rce c o n s i s t e d of two des t roye r s and coinmandship, a conver ted 
sea-p lane l e n d e r . In 19 71 the United S t a t e s s igned an agreement 
wi th Bahrain to use the former B r i t i s h naval base f o r i t s Middle 
20 East F l e e t . 
I t was exp la ined t h a t the base was needed to manifes t U.S. 
i n t e r e s t s in the Area. A small t a s k force a t t he time* provided 
a cons tan t show of United S t a t e s f l ag in t h e Arabian Sea and the 
Western Indian Ocean. Bahrain has welcomed the U.S. base as a 
p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t the Sovie t presence which was growing in the 
r e g i o n . 
This agreement was kept a s e c r e t sometime* because Bahrain 
was apprehensive of Arab r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t l e a s i n g t h e on ly base 
i n the Gulf. In 19 73, Bahrain u n i l a t e r a l l y asked t h e United 
S t a t e s to withdraw the b a s e , which was done in June 19 77, but 
from ^toverober 19 79, United S t a t e s got t he re harbour f a c i l i t i e s 
21 f o r i t s warships . 
20. Pe te r Wilson, The Middle East Bonanza, London, 19 80, 
p . 121. 
2 1 . Ib ic j . , p . 137. 
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"With the cooperation given by Oman, tJie United States 
was able to sus ta in i t s permanent naval presence in the region. 
The United States got from Oman the Island of Masirah and t h i s 
paved the way to the stat ioning of Gulf s t r i k e force of the 
United States multiservice Rapid Deployment Force. 
In the Gulf of Aden i tself / close to the Island of 
Socotra is the U.S. Somali Port of Berbera. The runway at th is 
base has been modernized to cope with the B-52 s t r a t e g i c bombers 
with nuclear weapons. This i s in addit ion to s imi lar f a c i l i t i e s 
in the port of Matra, Salalah and the Is land of Masirah. 
I t was a t around the same time that the United States had 
developed the Polaris A-3 missile with a range of 2500 nautical 
mi les , and had commissioned the very low frequency communication 
s t a t i o n in the North-West Cape of Australia (19 67) . With these 
development i t became possible for the United States to a t tack 
t h e southern U.S.S.R. by i t s missi les launched from sub-tnarines 
s t a t ioned in the Indian Ocean. 
In a report "United States Foreign policy object ives and 
overseas mi l i ta ry ins ta l l a t ions" prepared by the congressional 
research service for U.S. senate committee on Foreign Relations 
in 19 79/ i t has been s ta ted: "The United Sta tes had both 
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conventional and perhaps a s t r a t e g i c nuclear mi l i tary i n t e r e s t 
in the Indian Ocean region. Mil i tary objectives for U.S. con-
ventional forces include the capabi l i ty to 
i) Protect the U.S. Economic in te res t s in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
i i ) employ or threa ten force in support of U.S. 
diplomatic object ives in the Middle East . 
i i i ) secure th^ Indian Ocean a i r and sea routes 
against harassment of protect ion. 
iv) intervene in support of other object ives in 
the l i t t o r a l / and re la ted to a l l of t he se . 
v) balance Soviet forces in the region and a t t a i n 
s i p e r i o r i t y in a c r i s i s . The United States 
also possesses a potent ia l s t r a t eg ic nuclear 
m i l i t a r y object ive of deploying when necessary 
or convenient/ b a l l i s t i c missi le submarines 
ta rge ted on the U.S.S.R.' H 2 2 
22. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations/ Washington/ 
19 79. 
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Th i s r e p o r t p o i n t s ou t t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e of deployment 
of s u b m a r i n e b a s e d Nuc lea r M i s s i l e s t a r g e t t e d a g a i n s t t h e U.S .S .R 
i s se ldom d i s c u s s e d by t h e U.S. o f f i c i a l s and* i n f a c t , t h e 
o f f i c i a l p u b l i c p o s i t i o n of t h e U.S. Goverrjnent i s t h a t t h e Navy 
does no t r e g u l a r l y o p e r a t e t h e s e submar ines i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean . 
" N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s a widespread b e l i e f t h a t t h e U.S . uses 
t h e I n d i a n Ocean f o r SSBN P a t r o l s . With t h e deve lopmen t of 
T r i d e n t I M i s s i l e sys tem t h e S o v i e t Union w i l l become even more 
23 
v u l n e r a b l e t o SSBN dep loyed i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n " . 
I n t h e s t r a t e g i c c o m p e t i t i o n between t h e S i p e r powers f o r 
t h e c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a p p e a r s f a r 
a h e a d of t h e S o v i e t Union. The U.S .S .R. i s s e v e r e l y h a n d i c a p p e d 
i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t has no bases i n t h e Indiaxi Ocean , wiiereas 
t h e U.S. h a s . The f a c t t h a t t h e U.S.S .R. he s no b a s e s b u t o n l y 
a c c e s s e s t o l o c a l f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean a l s o s t a n d s o u t 
i n U.S . a s s e s s m e n t of S o v i e t f a c i l i t i e s a t S o c o t a a . The 
a d v a n t a g e s en joyed by t h e U.S. i n l o c a l f a c i l i t i e s a r e u n b e a t a b l e . 
The U.S. has t h e U.S. A i r Force S a t e l l i t e t r a c k i n g S t a t i o n a t 
Mahe a l s o s e r v e s as a communicat ion l i n k be tween Diego G a r c i a and 
o t h e r U.S. b a s e s . Among t h e n o t a b l e f e a t u r e s o f t h e Diego G a r c i a 
b a s e a r e a h i g h l y c l a s s i f i e d i n t e l l i g e n c e and communica t i ons 
2 3 . I b i d . / 19 79. 
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f a c i l i t y a 12000 f t . r u n away c a p a b l e of takir^g i n b i g n u c l e a r 
bombers , a l a r g e n a t u r a l h a r b o u r which i s p r o t e c t e d on t h r e e 
s i d e s fue l s t o r a g e * c a p a c i t y o f 380 ,000 b a r r e l s o f a v i a t i o n f u e l 
o i l f o r s h i p s , a n d a n c h o r a g e and 600 f t b o r t h i n g f o r l o a d i n g and 
24 
u n l o a d i n g f u e l . 
The Nor th West Cape communica t ion s t a t i o n i n A u s t r a l i a 
forms pajTt o f t h e U.S. Global command and c o n t r o l n e t w o r k t o 
25 
o p e r a t e n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s . I n 1 9 8 1 , t h e U.S. a c q u i r e d a c c e s s 
t o f a c i l i t i e s i n Berbera m Somal ia i n exchange f o r arms and wor th 
26 40 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s ; and t o t h e fo rmer B r i t i s h b a s e i n M a s i r a h 
27 
o f f Coast of Oman. There a r e r e p o r t s i n d i c a t i n g b r o a d e r a c c e s s 
28 
t o f a c i l i t i e s i n P a k i s t a n . And t h e U.S. r e c o n n a i s a n c e a i r c r a f t 
make use of l a n d i n g r i g h t s a t Mombasa i n iCenya and S i n g a p o r e i n 
t h e i r p a t r o l f l i g h t s t o t r a c k s h i p s and s u b m a r i n e s . 
The U.S. nava l s t r e n g t h i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean o s t e n s i b l y 
i n c r e a s e d as a c o u n t e r t o t h e g rowing S o v i e t nava l p r e s e n c e . 
24 . U.S. Sena t e Committee R e p o r t , p p . c i t . , p . 9 6 . 
2 5 . I b i d . , p p . 90 and 9 7 . 
2 6 . A f r i c a n R e c o r d e r , Vbl , XIX l o . 2 0 , p . 5460. 
27 . S. A l i Shah, "South West A s i a , Can t h e U.S. l e a r n From t h e 
P a s t M i s t a k e " , S t raMegic Review, W i n t - r , 1 9 3 1 . 
2 8 . The L a s t Chance, S t r a t e g i c Review, S p r i n g , 19 8 0 . 
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This not only made che U.S. s t r a t e g i c a l t superior to the U.S.S.R. 
but enabled her to deploy if and where necessary, i t s conventional 
naval power as an in te rven t ion i s t force in the region. The entry 
of the U.S. task force led by nuclear a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r . 
Enterprise into the Indian Ocean in December 19 71, marked a 
newphase of the U.S. naval s t ra tegy as an in te rvent ion is t ro le 
was also acquired. This policy of Gunboat diplomacy was again 
demonstrated a t the time of Arab-Israel War of October 19 73. 
This confl ic t demonstrated t he "v i t a l necessity of having a 
demonstrable U.S. capabi l i ty in the Indian Ocean - Persian Gulf 
area was so sharply brought home. I t was a c l a s s i c case where 
the fact that the U.S. had a presence in the area, and was seen 
by a l l to have i t there made i t highly unlikely tha t i t would 
over have to be used. In short i t played the t r ad i t iona l ro le 
which mi l i ta ry power should pley chat of supporting diplomatic 
• .. • ^ • 29 
i n i t i a t i v e s . 
Essential ly the United States armed response to the Soviet 
t h r e a t revolves around (i) Rapid Deployment Force and (i i) Secu-
r i t y guarantee and assis tance for threatened countries such as 
29. Semour Weiss, "U.S. I n t e r e s t s and Act iv i t ies in the Indian 
Ocean Area", Department of State Bullet in, 70 (l8l5) , 
8 April 1974, pp. 371-75. 
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Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 
The RDF response largely consists of establ ishing and 
in teg ra t ing a new corranand s t ructure of U.S. Forces for long 
distance emergency response. This is intended for a rapid pro-
jec t ion of forces in a regional emergency. This force was 
under considerat ion since 1975, but President Carter on 
October 1, 1979 announced i t s formation, consist ing of 50,300? 
t roops on three a i r c ra f t c a r r i e r , t e c t i c a l f ighterships 82nd 
and lOls t . Airborne Division and one mechanised Infantry Bridgade. 
The area of concern are the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, 
I t i s widely held that the real t a rge t for the RDF is 
30 Saudi Arabian Oil f i e l d . Four on shore o i l f i e lds - Abqaiq, 
Dammam, Chawar and Qatif, and one offshore at Berri - are within 
10,000 sq. miles - will cover the United States needs. I t will 
a lso be necessary to secure the Ras Tanura and JUAYMEH complexes 
the Dammam port and the Dharan a i r base and Hoirmuz s t r a i t a . 
This could be eas i ly done by the RDF, because i t i s sparcely popu-
la t ed area eas i ly monitored and pat ro l led from a i r . 
All t h i s i s not something new. In fact even in 1971; 
the United States was thinking on similar l ines when the RDF was 
30. K. Subramanyam, in his Lecture on Indian Ocean a t The 
Department of Po l i t i c a l Science, AMU Aligarh, on March 
,2^, 19 83. 
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not heard of, a t tha t time the U.S.S.R proposed l imit ing the naval 
forces of the super pov/ers in the Indian Ocean. The United States 
did ro t agree to i t because t h e i r planning had s t a r t e d for 
improving the Diego Garcia base. I t was pointed out tha t "we are 
not in arm race with the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, and 
our requirements for a f a c i l i t y a t Biego Garcia are r e l a t ed to an 
ent i re , spectrum of U.S. in t e res t and considerations only one half 
of which bears on the level of Soviet deployments there* Such 
arrangements as might be possible to agree to with the Soviet 
Union concerning the levels of our respective naval forces in the 
area are unlikely to be inhibited by our having a capab i l i ty to 
deploy forces in the area; in fact , precisely the contrary would 
be t r u e . We seek nothing rpore than an a b i l i t y to stage forces in 
the area s imi lar to the a b i l i t y the Soviet Union present ly has 
by using port f a c i l i t i e s a t Berbera in Somalia and at Aden plus 
the anchorages they routinely use off the Island of Socotra. Our 
capacity to deploy in no way prejudices future agreements on levels 
of forces to be deployed. Thus, while we remain open to the 
constructive p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an arms control arrangement bearing 
on specif ic deployment levels in the area, we see the reason to 
be believe that such an agreement would prelude the need for the 
31 
capabi l i ty which Diego Garcia would provide". 
31 , Seymour Weiss, o p . c i t . , p . 375. 
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Diego Garcia Base; 
In Itovember 1965 the Brit ish Government announced the 
formation of a new crown colony, designated as a Bri t ish Indian 
Ocean Territory (BIOT) . Previously i t consisted of four separate 
Islands groins sca t tered over the Western and Central sectors of 
the Ocean, detached from the previous governing au thor i ty . 
Mauritius added Chagos Archipelago including the Diego Garcia 
Seychelles gave the three Islands of Aldabra, Deschorces and 
Farquhar, but, in 19 76 Britain returned them to the control of a 
new Republic. Since then BIOT has been bas ica l ly l imited to 
Diego Garcia only. 
United States got the base of Diego Garcia in 19 72. The 
r ival ry between the tvo Super Powers was becoming more prominent 
agaias t the background of a progressive destcibil ization of the 
Middle East, South Asia and East Africa, f a c i l i t i e s for United 
States Havy and Air Force, were constructed. Or ig ina l ly , the 
a c t i v i t i e s at Diego Garcia were very l imi ted. I t was only a 
communication s i t e , but, gradually there was a rapid increase in 
the ac t i v i t i e s and by the middle of 19 70s, i t had become America's 
primary naval airbase in the Indian Ocean. 
Including the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea the Island 
has become extremely important for the implementation of mil i tary 
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power throughout a l l s e c t o r s of Indian Ocean. The American 
warship f l e e t s , p a t r o l l i n g the waters a re provided wi th dock 
f a c i l i t i e s . The a i r s t r i p s are a l so no l e s s impor tant from the 
p o i n t they provide an oppor tun i ty fo r landing and r e f u e l i n g t o 
t h e much needed p lanes f i g h t i n g from U,S, P a c i f i c base t o va r ious 
d e s t i n a t i o n s in the ocean and as far away as t h e middle E a s t . 
ApproxiHiately four hundred mi l l ion do l l a r s a r e being s p e n t on 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n programme to s t rengthen the a i r f i e l d to al low 
B-523 t o l and on a r e g u l a r b a s i s . U.S.A. i s t a k i n g every p r e -
c a u t i o n t o meet the c r i s i s in t h i s p a r t of t h e world by s t o r i n g 
t o n s of m i l i t a r y equipments abroad, seven p r e p o s i t i o n e d merchant 
s h i p s docked in t h e lagoon given to a U.S. Rapid Deployment 
F o r c e s . 
As f a r as t h e geographical s i t u a t i o n of Diego Garcia i s 
concerned i t s i s o l a t i o n i s s t r i k i n g of the s i x a t o l l s of Chagos 
Arch ipe lago , i t t h e Southern most loca ted 3400 m i l e s from the 
Cape of Good Hope, 2600 miles from North-Western Cape of A u s t r a l i a 
and 2200 mi les from t h e U.S. coast i t covers a Sea voyage of more 
t h a n 10,000 m i l e s , t h e nea res t neighbours being Maldives in Ind ia 
1000 mi les away. The na tu ra l fea tures of Diego Garc ia include a 
deep water s h e l t e r e d lagoon loca ted in the c e n t r e of t he I s l a n d , 
32 
which i s approximate ly 15 long and four -e igh t m i l e s b road . 
32. Joe l Larus - Diego Garcia; P o l i t i c a l Clouds over a Vi ta l U.S. 
Base - Stf^^ppic Rgyi'^w, Winter, 1982, p . 4 6 . 
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As e a r l y as 1965 B r i t i s h and t h e U.S.A. had s t a r t e d t h e 
nego t i a t i ons a U.S. Base i n Diego Garc ia . B r i t a i n guaranteed t o 
33 U.S. a 50 years back fro a base on the I s l a n d in December 1969. 
At t h a t t ime the o b j e c t i v e of t h e U.S. po l i cy was t h e same as i t 
develop l a t e r on i . e . "not a sudden r e a c t i v e response by t h e United 
S t a t e s to the p o s s i b l e Sov ie t t h r e a t in the Ind ian Ocean but a 
cu lmina t ion of the U.S. e f f o r t s t o meet a naval communications 
34 
requi r«nent8 da t ing back t o t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 ' s . 
Another B r i t i s h U.S. agreement was concluded on October 24, 
1972, speciaf i c a l l y d e d i c a t i n g Diego Garcia to t h e i r j o i n t m i l i -
35 
t a r y use . By t h i s U.S. v»as a u t h o r i s e d to de^^lop a l i m i t e d naval 
communication f a c i l i t y t o p rov ide a l i n k in defence communications, 
fu rn i sh ing inproved communications suppor t in t h e Ind ian Ocean 
fo r sh ips and a i r c r a f t s - According t o t h i s agreeinent the U.S. 
use of Diego Garcia was t o con t inue "for t h e du ra t ion of the BIOT 
colony of u n t i l such t ime as i » p o r t of Diego Garcia i s any longer 
36 
r e q u i r e d for t h e purposes of the f a c i l i t y which ever occurs f a s t . 
By t h e mid l9 70 ' s t h e United S t a t e s was f e e l i n g t h a t t h e Diego 
33 . K.R. Singh, o p . c i t . , p . 192. 
34. Department of S t a t e BuljLetin, No. 65 , Aug. 23 , 19 71, p . 203. 
35. T r e a t i e s and o t h e r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Agreement s e r i e s , ND. 7481 
U.S. Department of S t a t e , A r t i c l e 1(a) & 2. 
36. I b i d . , A r t i c l e 20. 
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Garc ia f a c i l i t i e s were in need of iqpgradation to suppor t t h e 
navy and the a i r fo rce in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e miss ions in the 
I n d i a n Ocean and with t h i s in view the B r i t i s h Government was 
r e q u i r e d for a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o begin a s e r i e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n 
prograxmie to design to transform the I s l a n d s and i n t o *a. s import 
37 
f a c i l i t y of t h e U.S. Navy". The agreements a u t h o r i s i n g such 
3 8 
changes were s igned on February 29/1976, There i s a s i g n i f i -
c a n t p r o v i s i o n under t h i s agreement where by t h e tvo s t a t e s a re 
p e r i o d i c a l l y concerned on t h e i r j o i n t o b j e c t i v e s and p o l i c i e s in 
39 
t h e Ind ian Ocean. 
If before t h i s agreement the emphasis was on developing a 
cotwDunication base a f t e r i t the emphasis s h i f t e d to the c o n s t r u c -
t i o n of a l a r g e fuel duiq)s, improvements i n harbour f a c i l i t i e s . -
improvement on a i r s t r i p s and accommodation f a c i l i t i e s fo r a 
l a r g e number of people/ t h i s was designed t o make 'Diego Garcia 
f u n c t i o n as a base for U.S. submarines conven t iona l Task Forces / 
a s t a g i n g p o r t for heavy t ranspor p lanes and a tase fo r range 
Bomber o p e r a t i o n s . In 1981 the United S t a t e s A i r Force s t a r t e d 
works on T h i r t y - n i n e m i l l i o n do l la r c o n s t r u c t i o n . For t h e 
37. Joe l Larus / o p . c i t . / p . 47. 
38 . T r e a t i e s and o the r I n t e r n a t i o n a l agreCTients s e r i e s / No. 8230, 
U.S. Department of S t a t e . 
39 . I b i d . / A r t i c l e 3 . 
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extension of f a c i l i t i e s for B-52 Bombers. Then i t vould be 
possible for these Botaber planes flying out of the U.S. base a t 
Guam, to land and refuel a t Diego Garcia before continuing on 
t h e i r mission. In t h i s way Diego Garcia vould become a new 
jxwiping from which the United States can project i t s interven-
t i o n i s t capabi l i ty a t any point in the Indian Ocean area . 
Because of i t s geographical factors ( - small s ize and remoteness-) 
Diego Garcia canrot be compared to the United States base a t Guam 
but i t i s an a l l purpose home port base of f a c i l i t y . 
After the development of o i l these f a c i l i t a t e s American 
capab i l i t i e s in the region would increase. I t i s for the pro tec-
t i on of the naval and communication base a t Diego Garcia tha t t h e 
U.S. has assembled the members reconnaissance and the a n t i -
submarine a i r c r a f t s . This would provide safety for the nuclear 
submarine s ta t ioned at the around Diego Garcia p ro tec t ion from 
possible covinter measures would increase the U.S. conventional 
capab i l i t i e s and the l a t t e r may be then used for the Gun-boat 
diplomacy in the region, the net r e su l t would be an American 
svjpermacy over the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. 
With the U.S. policy c i r c l e s there have been differ ing 
stands regarding the necessity of the United States presence in 
through the Diego Garcia base. From the very beginning there was 
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a considerable opposit ion within the U.S. congress t o t h e request 
of the Aaministration for building t h i s base. Those vjho opposed 
the base termed i t as "an extension of a policy of the United 
S ta tes t rying to be policeman of the world, a stepping stone a 
- 40 th ree ocean Navy . 
Many unanswered questions were ra i sed aiiong the policy 
c i r c l e s a t t h i s time. 
"Why have the Soviets in the past s ix years gradually 
expanded the i r naval presence in the Indian Ocean and why do they 
now seem intent on es tabl ishing a support f a c i l i t y in Somalia"? 
I s t he i r purpose merely to extend the i r geopol i t ica l influence 
into the Indian Ocean by showing the flag in much the same manner 
t h a t Western names here have been doing for decades or do they 
have a nore s i n i s t e r motive of in terdic t ing the crucia l sea-lanes 
leading out of the Persian Gulf? But are the Soviets r ea l ly 
l ike ly to take the r i s k of attacking Western shipping when the 
p r i ce may be an a l l out nuclear war? Cannot the U.S. already 
project naval power in the Indian Ocean if i t s v»ants? By cons-
t ruc t ing a base a t Diego Garcia, is not the United Sta tes con t r i -
buting to a a Sxjper Power naval race in the Indian Ocean, which 
41 
may or may not have been s t a r t ed by the Russians", 
40. The Times> New ^ r k . May 23, 1975. 
4 1 . Ib i^ . New York, July 6, 1975. 
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On t h e o t h e r hand, a re some s tands t h a t border on being 
r i d i c u l o u s . Some U.S. spokesman have been denied t h e r i g h t of 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s even to ques t ion the U.S. presence in t h e a r e a . 
For i n s t a n c e Daniel P. Moynihan, which ques t ion ing the very name 
of t h e Ind ian Ocean (Why c a l l i t the Indian Ocean? One may 
we l l c a l l i t Madagascar Sea") , po in ted out t h a t Diego Garcia 
was 1600 krots. away from Indian and the re was nothing of funda-
mental concern for Indians t he re and t h a t t he Global s t r a t e g y of 
U.S.A. r e q u i r e d a base on t h a t I s l a n d , no twi ths tanding what 
42 
f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s might fee l about i t . 
The ' forward base* concept of the U.S. s t r a t e g y n e c e s s i -
t a t e d the bu i ld ing up of over 60 naval bases i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , 
i nc lud ing one of the b igges t a t Diego Garcia . No doubt , under 
normal c o n d i t i o n s , t n e r e may be no need to permanently base 
s h i p s and naval fo rces t h e r e . But the inherent m o b i l i t y of m a r i -
t ime forces enable them to be brought to this base w i t h i n a 
ma t t e r of days . Diego Garcia i s capable of meeting a l l t he needs 
t o enable s u s t a i n e d o p e r a t i o n in the Indian Ocean. The o b j e c t i v e 
of deployment of nuc lea r m i s s i l e submarines, t a r g e t e d a g a i n s t 
t h e Soviet Union from t h e Ind ian Ocean, i s seldom d i scus sed by 
t h e U.S. and, i n f a c t , t h e o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n of t h e U.S. 
government i s t h a t t he U.S. Navy does not r e g u l a r l y o p e r a t e 
42 . The Hindustan Times. March 5, 1974. 
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nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, i t i s 
believed tha t the U.S. uses the Indian Ocean for t h i s purpose, 
because with the development of the Trident-I miss i le system, 
and i t s deployment in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union will 
become vulnerable. 
43. Congressional Research Service, U.^^ Fpreicm Pojlicy Qblectives 
and Overseas Mil i tary I n s t a l l a t i o p s (Washington, D.C., 19 79) . 
C O N C L _ y S _ i p N 
Ever since the geginning of maritime a c t i v i t i e s , the 
Indian Ocean has remained an area of a t t r a c t i o n to outside 
powers. But i t is since 1970's tha t the area is witnessing an 
ever- increasing level of tensions and i n s t a b i l i t y in the 
L i t t o r a l States and an increasing level of external mi l i ta ry 
presence in the region. Some of the L i t t o r a l States attempted 
to refuse these tensions, reduce disonances and improve the 
secur i ty environment, regional cooperation through proposals 
l i k e that of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and support for 
Naval Arm Limitations Talks. 
In the l a s t ten years , the secur i ty environment of the 
Indian Ocean and i t s L i t t o r a l States has undergone a s i g n i f i -
cant , and perhaps i r revers ib le charge. What India is in teres ted 
in , is to ensure tha t t h i s area becomes an area of peace, 
peaceful co-existence and cooperation based on equal i ty and 
mutual benefi t ; a role of partnership with a l l other countries 
in safeguarding Independence and secur i ty ; promoting peace and 
progress and a role of opposit ion to a l l forces of economic 
exp lo i ta t ion , and rac ia l discrimination. 
With the decline of Br i t i sh empire and i t s influence on 
Indian Ocean, the idea of power vacuum was projected in view 
of the fact tha t regional communities were not economically a nd 
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p o l i t i c a l l y sound and s table which India did not accept saying 
t h a t any power vacuum can be created if any foreign power leaves 
any pa r t i cu la r area. Then i t is for tha t area and t e r r i t o r y to 
t ake adequate steps to safeguard the i r own secur i ty and t h e i r 
own country. 
Rejecting the myth of power vacuum India asser ted the r i gh t 
of regional powers to f i l l up the so . ca l led power vacuum which 
was possible only through intensive and durable regional co-
operat ion both in po l i t i c a l and economic f i e l d s . India provided 
a lead to the nations of Indian Ocean to defend t h e i r maritime 
coas t lir.es and the common sea beyond and ensure t h a t the ocean 
i s not policed and dominated by the unfriendly foreign powers 
and thereby ensure the secur i ty of t he i r own maritime t rade and 
the ships of other nations which come to tracte and t r a n s i t . 
As India was evolving i t s views regardincj an a l t e r n a t i v e to 
power vacuiin myth in the Indian Ocean in the form of regional 
community cooperation, the Anglo-American th rus t became predominant 
by 1967 which led the Soviet Union to jump into the arena in the 
following year. The super powers were a t t r ac ted t o do so primarily 
due to the fact tha t Indian Ocean offers an a t t r a c t i v e pr ize to 
any power and with two power blocs having reached a stalemate i r 
both the pacif ic and Atlant ic oceans the one which acquires the 
control of the Indian Ocean region to the exclusion of other may 
be able to t i l t the balance of power in i t s favour. The Americans 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y began the c3evelop the i r bases in the Indian Ocean 
area possing a ser ious t h r ea t to Li t tora l s t a tes pa r t i cu l a r ly 
to India for she ^ s to defend i t s coastal waters and Ocean 
t e r r i t o r i e s such as the Andaman, Nicobars, Laccadives and 
Minocoy e t c . Motivated to protec t her in te res t s in the region 
India deplored the a r r i v a l of the power game in the Indian 
Ocean and warmly accepted Sri Lanka's view tha t weapon, a t t r a c t 
weapons and tha t if the major power could be persuaded to pull 
out of the Indian Ocean, the root cause for the bases would 
vanish. Taking a long term view of the super power r iva l ry in 
the region, India observed tha t the interplay of the r i v a l r i e s 
of the external powers or the disputes and quarrels among the 
L i t t o r a l s t a t e s has always resu l ted in the establishment of 
colonialism of the people of the region. India has been making 
i t s opposition known in almost unequivocal tenr.s through 
appropriate national and in ternat ional forums without taking 
upon i t s e l f the r e spons ib i l i t y of organising a concerted campaign 
by the L i t t o r a l States against the growing super v iva l r i e s in 
the Indian Ocean. India has been missing no opportunity of 
using relevant committees and the United States for decrying the 
super power r i v a l r i e s in an area which the L i t t o r a l States want 
to t r e a t as a zone of peace. 
The consis tant Indian support to the concept of peace 
zone in the Indian Ocean es tab l i shes India ' s commitment to the 
purpose of holding conference on Indian Ocean wherein India 
hopefully envisaged to find an acceptable framework within which 
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consul ta t ions between the L i t t o r a l and hinterland s t a t e s on the 
one hand and the great powers and the major tnaritlme users of 
the Indian Ocean on the other could be i n i t i a t e d and a process 
of constructive dialogue get in motion. Indian perspective of 
the concept of peace zone has hardly been influencing the 
a t t i t u d e and a c t i v i t i e s of the big powers in t he Indian Ocean 
region. India , knowing tha t i t can not individually or co l l ec -
t i v e l y , prevent the United States or Soviet Union from coming 
in the Indian Ocean and adopted the policy of regional cooperation 
and negotiations amongst the regional powers and external powers. 
The response and react ion of different nations to the idea 
of peace zone was determined by t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in the Indian 
Ocean region. The American i n t e r e s t s in the Indian Ocean emerged 
as a par t of the Global s t ra tegy in the Post World War I I period 
to contain the expansion of communism in t he Afro-Asian region. 
With the passage of time i t assumed different dimension, p a r t i -
c u l a r l y po l i t i co -mi l i t a ry . With the increasing in t e re s t 
American involvement in the region also increased leading to the 
establishment of a net-work of mi l i ta ry bases and ins ta l l a t ions 
in the region. American involvement in t h e region has tremendously 
increased pa r t i cu la r ly af ter the fiasco of the policy of 
armed aggression in Vietnam. America hopes to browbeat the 
countries in the remaining par t of the Afro-^^ian region through 
an unwarranted mil i tary int rusion into an area which the 
reso lu t ion of 19 71 of the UN General Assembly designed to declare 
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as the zone of peace and free from nvx:lear power presence. 
Cov:plecl with the policy of arming the friends and a l l i e s in 
the region beyond the i r needs and capacity and the entente with 
China the Indian Ocean has becoming inmensely s ign i f i can t not 
only for what i t is but for what i t would be abase for 
project ing influence into region. 
The American Defence Department has been reported to urge, 
time and again, upon the need for a sizeable naval presence in 
West Asia including s ta t ioning of a strong f l e e t of warships in 
the Indian Ocean. To bols ter American i n t e r e s t in the region 
Diego Garcia has been made into a fu l l scale naval and a i r 
support f a c i l i t y . The Americans have also planned to undertake 
per iodic f l i gh t s of t he i r war planes as demonstration of US 
support to the i r friends and a l l i e s in the region and to create 
a new Indian Ocean f l ee t based on the island of Diego Garcia. 
The Americans believe that the Diego Garcia base will enable 
them to exercise a far more effect ive control over the p o l i t i c a l 
and economic p o l i t i e s of South Asia, Middle Eastern and East 
African count r ies . This measure is designed to demonstrate, 
American resolve to protect o i l - rou tes and stand by i t s a l l i e s* 
American response to the concept of peace zone in the 
Indian Ocean region, during 1971, was primarily shaped by ics 
increasing involvement in the region as a pa r t of i t s global 
s t r a t egy . However the United States shared the des i re of ths 
- 19 5 -
sponsors of the draft resolut ion to pronote conditions of peace 
and t r anqu i l i ty in the region and in tha t connection t o seek 
to avoid a competitive expansion of mi l i t a ry strength on the 
p a r t of the major powers but they rejected the view t h a t a 
group of s t a t e s in c e r t a i n region can es tab l i sh a legal regime 
for the high seas in t ha t region. American policy further 
e laborated in an o f f i c i a l document s t a t ing t h a t the peaceful 
use of the Oceans requires t r ea ty tha t will strengthen shared 
community r igh ts in the Oceans including freedom of navigation. 
I t should also provide a far-s ighted legal regime on the use of 
Marine resources, the conduct of s c i e n t i f i c research, protection 
of Marine environment and the peaceful reso lu t ion of oceanic 
d i spu tes . The USA f e l t tha t the resolut ion adopted by the 
United Nations declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace 
may affect t'ne fundamental securi ty i n t e r e s t s not only of s t a t e s 
compelled to maintain s igni f icant secur i ty preparedness but also 
of States tha t r e ly on the s t a b i l i t y created by a p o l i t i c o -
Mil i ta ry balance. 
By the year 19 74, America developed a def ini te a t t i t ude 
towards Indian Ocean declaring that American in te res t s in the 
region are d i r ec t l y l inked with American i n t e r e s t s in Europe and 
Asia and with the fundamental American i n t e r e s t s in maintaining 
a s table world-wide balance of power. American envisaged i t s 
bases to be essen t ia l staging area for operations to be conducted 
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in areas remote from national shores. The American policy 
seems to be c losely connected with i t s age-old oceanic concept 
which considers tha t the U.S. has a special r ight to exercise 
hegemony on t h e world's oceans. I t appears tha t the America has 
a def ini te desire to control the po l i t i c a l developments in 
the Indian Ocean region and to use them to the own advantage 
whenever necessary ignoring the desire and i n t e r e s t s of t h e States 
of the Indian Ocean region. 
By 1913, the poss ib i l i t y of America accepting the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace become very bleak but increasing 
in ternat ional tensions and the f ear of the L i t t o r a l States forced 
the Americans to consider an agreement with the Soviet Union 
regarding the future of t he Indian Ocean region. But the ta lks 
remained inconclusive due to cold American response. The 
observers f e l t tha t the America had no intent ion to make any 
s igni f icant change in i t s Indian Ocean policy. The maximum tha t 
they could accept was a freeze on t h e naval presence of t h e 
external powers in the region at the existing l e v e l . 
As far as the escala t ion in stper power mi l i t a ry 
deployments in the Indian Ocean region is concerned* the Americans 
believe that such deployments have (teclined percept ib ly since 
the beginning of the e i g h t i e s . They believe tha t t he 'blue water* 
naval forces have not esca la ted af ter t ha t . On the other hand 
19 7 
I n d i a i s c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e q u a l i t a t i v e change in such dep loyment s 
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e r e g u l a r s t a t i o n i n g of c a r r i e r b a t t l e g roups 
i n t h e A r a b i a n Sea . There i s a c o n t i n u i n g g rowth i n t h e s u p e r 
power i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l s u p p o r t f a c i l i t i e s e s p € ; c i a l l y t h e p r e p o s i -
t i o n i n g of equipment and weaponry a t Diego G a r c i a f o r use by 
t h e U.S. r a p i d deployment f o r c e s which poses a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o 
t h e s e c u r i t y of I n d i a a s most of I n d i a n a i r - f i e l d s , p a r t s , 
d o c k y a r d s , commuTiication n e t - w o r k s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and m i l i t a r y 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s f a l l w i t h i n t h e r a n g e of l anguage a i r c r a f t l i k e 
B-52 Ebmbers based a t Dieyo G a r c i a and submar ines p l y i n g ove r 
a n d under t h e s u r f a c e of t h e I n d i a n Ocean. I n d i a has been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c e r n e d u n l i k e t h e U.S-A. , t h a t a f a i l u r e o f 
g l o b a l a rmie s c o n t r o l e f f o r t s c o u l d open t h e way f o r v a r i o u s 
fo rms of new and d e s t a b i l i s i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n t h e I n d i a n 
O c e a n by b o t h super pcvvers, i n c l u d i n g p o s s i b l e n u c l e a r d e p l o y -
m e n t s . 
The Uni ted S t a t e s r e t a i n s t h e o p t i o n of submar ine l a u n c h e d 
n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s deployments i n t h e r e g i o n . The deployment of 
t h e s e m i s s i l e s w i l l pose p rob lems t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o a g g r o v a t e 
n u c l e a r a n x i e t i e s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n a s we l l as i n 
o t h e r p a r t s of t h e w o r l d . I n d i a ' s c o n c a r n i s t h a t t h e p r e s e n t 
r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y i n s u p e r power c o n v e n t i o n a l dep loyments c o u l d 
a b r u p t l y change i n a c l i m a t e of i n c r e a s i n g t e n s i o n j e o p a r d i s i n g 
t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r and t h e 
w o r l d a t l a r g e . The changes in m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y , t h e a d v e n t 
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o f c r u i s e m i s s i l e s , a n t i - s a t e l l i t e weaponry, and s p a c e - b a s e d 
a n d o p e r a t e d a n t i - m i s s i l e s y s t e m s c o u l d make t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
w a t e r s p r e a d and t h e L i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s a t h e a t e r 
o f growing t e n s i o n be tween t h e s u p e r powers marked by an 
e x p a n d i n g c o m p e t i t i v e s e a r c h f o r f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . I n d i a 
b e l i e v e s t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e f o r sijqper powers t o g i v e 
a t t e n t i o n i n some form t o i s s u e s of s p e c i f i c c o n c e r n t o I n d i a n 
Ocean r e g i o n as p a r t of t h e i r g l o b a l arms c o n t r o l d i a l o g u e . 
At t h e same t i m e when and i f i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e g l o b a l 
c o n t e x t , t h e s u p e r powers s h o u l d r e s u n e a s e p a r a t e d i a l o g u e on 
r e g i o n a l l y - d e f i n e d i s s u e s w i t h an eye t o t h e ; p o s s i b i l i t y of 
f r e e z e and s u b s e q u e n t r e d u c t i o n of m i l i t a r y deployments and f a c i -
1 i t i e s i n t h e r e g i o n . 
I n d i a f e a r s t h a t t h e c o n t i n u i n g ? n = ; t a b l l i t y i n t h e r e g i o n 
a r i s i n g from i n t e r a c t i n g r e g i o n a l and e x t r a - r e g i o n a l f a c t o r s 
c o u l d l e a d t h e s v ^ e r powers i n t o a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n , 
i n c l u d i n g t h e whole t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n . I n d i a i n t h e 
background of t h e c o n t i n u i n g I n d i a - P a k i s t a n t e n s i o n and t h e 
p r o v i s i o n of advaix:ed American m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y t o P a k i s t a n 
b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of a U.S. c a r r i e r b a t t l e g rocp i n 
A r a b i a n S e a , t o g e t h e r w i t h J . S . b a s e a t Diego G a r c i a c o u l d l e a d 
t o i n t e l l i g e n c e s h a r i n g wi th P a k i s t a n i n t h e e v e n t of an I n d i a -
P a k i s t a n war and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t o more d i r e c t forms of American 
i n t e r v e n t i o n on t h e s i d e of P a k i s t a n . I n d i a i s a l s o conce rned 
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about that the Saudi Arabia, China and other t h i rd party may 
t r ans fe r U.S. mi l i t a ry technology and equipment to Pakistan and 
t h a t American m i l i t a r y sales to China could affect the India-
China mi l i t a ry balance, especial ly in the Indian Ocean. 
Ind ia ' s policy towards the Indian Ocean has been shaped 
Doth by i t s concern for world peace and by the very v i t a l 
considera t ions linked with i t s own i n t e r e s t s . Geographically 
loca ted as i t i s , i t s security,commerce and t rade in a l l 
depend on preservat ion of peace and s t a b i l i t y in the region. 
Along with other developing of economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s , 
s t a b i l i t y of a l l i e s and friends and prevention of seaward th rus t 
of Soviet power. There is row more f l e x i b i l i t y in the American 
a t t i t u d e to cooperatioi.; but a t the same time America i n s i s t s tha t 
t h e 19 71 mandate of the Indian Ocean Peace zone must be changed; 
i t s main emphasis should no longer be on the el imination of 
foreign navies and i n s t a l l a t i o n s , but rather a much more 
comprehensive concept should lead to a strengthening of elements 
of peace in the area . What i s required according to American 
pos i t ion is a code of conduct to which a l l the regional and ex t ra -
regional countries would adhere. There seems to be now more 
f l e x i b i l i t y in the American a t t i tude to cooperation; but a t the 
same time America i n s i s t s tha t the 19 71 mandate of t h e Indian 
Ocean Peace Zone must be changed; i t s main emphasis should not 
be on the elimination of foreign navies and mi l i t a ry i n s t a l l a -
t i o n s , but rather a much more comprehensive concept should lead 
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to a strengthening of elements of peace in tlTe area. What i s 
required according to American posit ion is a code of conduct 
to which a l l the regional and extra regional countries would 
adhere. 
* * * 
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